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ABSTRACT 
The Epistle to the Hebrews demonstrates a complex of what scholars label 
technical legal terms. Enlisting a series of word studies, this thesis attempts to uncover 
where the author learned the terminology in order to understand more about the 
anonymous author and the theology of the Epistle to the Hebrews. This thesis examines 
terms in Heb 2:2-4; 6:13-18; 7:11-19; 8:13; 9:15-18; 10:9. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCING A COLLECTION OF LEGAL TERMS IN THE EPISTLE TO THE 
HEBREWS
The Problem 
 A hand-written letter to a struggling community opens with the spoken word of 
God. The anonymous author writes, “Long ago God spoke . . . by the prophets, but in 
these last days he has spoken to us by a Son” (Heb 1:1).1 After describing the grandeur of 
this son (1:2-14), the author urges his audience to pay attention to what they have heard 
(2:1). He reasons that the word of God has been valid (βέβαιος; 2:2) before and that just 
recompense (ἔνδικον μισθαποδοσίαν) accompanied its transgression (παράβασις) and 
disobedience (παρακοή). How much more sure was the word of the son, which was 
validated (ἐβεβαιώθη; 2:3) by those who heard?  Not only is this word valid, but God 
testifies (συνεπιμαρτυρέω) to it “by signs and wonders . . .” (2:4). The vocabulary of this 
periodic sentence is vivid and attributes a judicial sense to the word of God.  
In the following chapters, the word of God takes the shape of an oath. When 
speaking about the wilderness generation God says, “As in my anger I swore (ὀμνυῶ), 
‘They shall not enter my rest’” (3:11; 4:3). God also swore to Abraham and having “no 
one greater by whom to swear, he swore by himself” (6:13). Apparently oath taking has 
certain requirements that make it a proper oath. As the author of Hebrews explains, an 
oath requires that “Human beings . . . swear by someone greater than themselves . . .” 
                                                 
1. Because this is the introductory chapter, all Scripture references are taken from the NRSV. In 
the following chapters, Biblical translations are mine unless otherwise noted. 
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(6:16). Normally the one being invoked, God used the oath to demonstrate blessing to 
Abraham (Gen 22:16), of which the author of Hebrews offers an analysis.  
 Not only does the author state what an oath requires, he explains how an oath 
functions. Like the word of God in Heb 2:2-4, an oath (ὅρκος) is for confirmation (εἰς 
βεβαίωσιν), but this confirmation puts “an end (πέρας) to all dispute (ἀντιλογίας)” (6:16). 
The author contends that God wished to reassure the heirs (κληρονόμοις) about “the 
unchangeable (ἀμετάθετος) character of his purpose” (6:17). So, God guaranteed 
(μεσιτεύω) this by an oath. Hebrews 6:13-18 takes a concept found in the author’s Bible 
(Gen 22:16-17 [LXX]) and attributes to it a function found outside the Old Testament. 
The words ἀμετάθετος, ἀντιλογίας, μεσιτεύω, and πέρας never coordinate with ὅρκος in 
the LXX. Thus, something else must have contributed to the author’s knowledge of 
ὅρκος.  
 The concept of unchangeable (ἀμετάθετος) is contrasted with two objects that 
have a change (μετάθεσις) in Heb 7:12. The author says, “For when there is a change 
(μετατίθημι) in the priesthood, there is necessarily a change (μετάθεσις) in the law as 
well.” The discussion of the Law suggests words such as μετάθεσις, μετατίθημι, and 
consequentially ἀμετάθετος (6:17) have a legal context. The same follows for the 
vocabulary in 7:18, where Hebrews makes one of its more startling claims. The author 
writes, “There is, on the one hand, the abrogation (ἀθέτησις) of an earlier commandment 
because it was weak (ἀσθενές) and ineffectual (ἀνωφελές) (for the law made nothing 
perfect). . .” (7:18-19). This chapter suggests the author had a familiarity with legal 
discourse concerning a change in law. As with Heb 2:2-4 and 6:13-18, the author uses a 
collection of legal terms to communicate his theology in Heb 7:11-19.  
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 This legal discourse continues in the rest of chapter 7, where the author discusses 
another oath of God. The author quotes Psalm 110:4, which says, “The Lord has sworn 
and will not change his mind, ‘You are a priest forever, according to the order of 
Melchizedek’” (cf. Heb 7:17; 7:21). This oath of God (ὁρκωμοσία; 7:20), which 
overrides the Law (7:28), makes Jesus “the guarantee (ἔγγυος) of a better covenant” 
(7:22). The word ἔγγυος also has a legal resonance, and is used for an intermediary who 
secures payment.
2
 The idea of Jesus as the legal security of a better covenant is developed 
in the next two chapters.  
 In Hebrews 8:6, Jesus is described this time as a “μεσίτης of a better covenant 
(διαθήκη).” The word is used only once in the LXX (Job 9:33), so its meaning must be 
found elsewhere. Albert Oepke states that μεσίτης “became one of the most varied 
technical terms in the vocabulary of Hellen[istic] law.”3 It is a legal term, which BDAG 
defines as mediator.
4
 This new covenant, which is mediated by Jesus, is “enacted 
(νομοθετέω) through better promises” (8:6). In addition to μεσίτης, the verb νομοθετέω 
suggests that 8:6 has a legal context, just like Heb 2:2-4; 6:13-18; and 7:11-28. In these 
passages, the author communicates his theology through legal terms.  
 The theme of the better covenant culminates in 9:15-22. Here the author explains 
how the death of Jesus inaugurated (ἐγκαινίζω; 9:18) the new covenant promised by 
Jeremiah (Heb 9:15). Repeating that Jesus “is the mediator of a new covenant,” Hebrews 
argues that the transgressions (παράβασις) under the first covenant (διαθήκη) were 
forgiven and that those who are called will receive their inheritance (κληρονομία). Then 
                                                 
2. Ceslas Spicq, “ἔγγυος,” TLNT 1:390-395. Cf. Sir 29:15-17. 
 
3. Albert Oepke, “μεσίτης, μεσιτεύω,” TDNT 4:598-624; here 599. 
 
4. BDAG, 634.  
4 
  
the author states, “Where a will (διαθήκη) is involved, the death of the one who made it 
(διατίθημι) must be established (φέρω). For a will takes effect only at death (ἐπὶ νεκροῖς 
βεβαία), since it is not in force (ἰσχύω) as long as the one who made it (διατίθημι) is 
alive” (9:16-17). Then the author cites Exod 24:8 as the Scriptural precedence for these 
requirements (Heb 9:18-22). 
Who knew that the inauguration of a covenant had such a procedure? The 
collective vocabulary here is oddly specific; the author’s understanding of the death of 
Jesus depends on an intimate knowledge about διαθήκη that is not found in his Bible. The 
author’s comment that “Indeed, under the law (νόμος) almost everything is purified with 
blood” (9:22a) suggests that the author understands that these requirements are mandated 
by the Law, but – again – the practice found in Heb 9:16-17 is mentioned nowhere in the 
OT. Hebrews 9:15-22 exemplifies a problem observed throughout the Epistle to the 
Hebrews. 
 The Epistle to the Hebrews exhibits a complex of legal terms as observed in Heb 
2:2-4; 6:13-18; 7:11-28; 8:6; and 9:15-22. Moreover, the detailed arguments in these 
passages suggest the author possessed a robust knowledge of these terms. The problem is 
that the majority of the legal terms are not found in the Old Testament as used in 
Hebrews. Indeed, it is unclear where the author learned them. Therefore, I set out to 
answer this question: where did the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews learn his 
knowledge of collective legal terms?
5
 Identifying the origin of these legal terms will aid 
                                                 
5. Essentially, this is a question asked in rhetorical criticism. The critic often asks from what 
school of rhetoric the author learned his or her style. For example, see Jack R. Lundbom, Jeremiah 1-20: A 
New Translation with Introduction and Commentary, The Anchor Bible Commentaries 21A (New York: 
Doubleday, 1999), 92. Lundbom references Donald C. Bryant, “Uses of Rhetoric in Criticism,” in Papers 
in Rhetoric and Poetic, ed. Donald C. Bryant (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1965), 1-14; see pg. 2-
4. 
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in understanding the theology of Hebrews, which at times depends on the terms (e.g., 
9:15-22).  
Review of Research 
In order to answer my question, I need to set a framework of prior research. 
Relatively little has been said about the collective use of legal terms in Hebrews; most 
attention has been focused on the meaning of διαθήκη.6 Even less has been said about 
where the author learned his legal terminology. Nevertheless, those who discuss the legal 
terminology of Hebrews offer a foundation from which to investigate. The following 
commentators are listed synchronically in order to highlight where I can advance 
research. 
 Harold W. Attridge is one such commentator who observes the legal terminology 
of Hebrews. In his introduction, Attridge suggests the terms are metaphors found in “the 
standard rhetorical repertoire. . . .” 7 This is the only place where Attridge addresses the 
legal terms collectively. He claims they are a part of common rhetoric, but never 
expounds upon where the author learned them. Throughout the rest of his commentary, 
Attridge discusses the terms on an individual basis. He labels the words as either 
“technical legal terminology” or “common Hellenistic legal terminology.”8 In addition, 
                                                 
6. For example, see the two-page footnote of secondary sources that discuss διαθήκη in John J. 
Hughes, “Hebrews IX 15ff. and Galatians III 15ff.: A Study in Covenant Practice and Procedure,” NovT 21 
(1979): 27-96; here 35n. 26. Because my focus is on the collective legal terms of Hebrews, discussion of 
some of Hughes’s secondary sources (as well as others) is reserved for my chapter 5. 
 
7. Harold W. Attridge, The Epistle to the Hebrews: A Commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews, 
Hermeneia (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1989), 21. 
 
8. For the technical sense, see βέβαιος (Heb 2:2 and  9:17; Attridge, Hebrews, 65n. 30), βεβαίοω 
(2:3; 65n. 30, 67), συνεπιμαρτυρέω (2:4; 67n. 59), ἀθέτησις (7:18; 203), ἀφανισμός (8:13; 228-9), 
φέρεσθαι (9:16; 256n. 33), τοῦ διαθεμένου (9:16; 256n. 34), ἀναιρεῖ and ἵστημι (10:9; 275); for common, 
see ὅρκος (6:16; 180), βεβαίωσις (6:16; 180); ἀντιλογίας (6:16; 180), μετάθεσις and μετατιθεμένης (7:12; 
200), ἔγγυος (7:22; 208), μεσίτης (8:6; 221); as a special category see διαθήκη (7:22; 8:6; 9:15-17: 253-4) 
because it has “a technical legal connotation common in Hellensitic Greek. . . .” (255). 
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Attridge suggests the terms ἀναιρέω and ἵστημι (Heb 10:9) are Hellensitic legal terms for 
a change in law.
9
 Attridge calls attention to the legal terms in the epistle and provides 
abundant primary references for understanding the legal terms in the Hellenistic world. 
Similarly, Luke Timothy Johnson comments upon the collective legal 
terminology of Hebrews only once. He says, “Hebrews is unusually rich in its use of 
metaphors, which are . . . ways of structuring thought. Hebrews uses metaphors drawn 
from the realm of law (2:3-4; 6:16; 7:12) and property (2:14; 3:1; 6:13-18; 7:4-10; 9:16-
22; 10:34; 11:1) [amongst other realms]. . . . these metaphorical fields are familiar in 
Greco-Roman culture.”10 Like Attridge, Johnson then discusses each legal term 
individually. With his primary references, he confirms Heb 2:2-4; 6:13-18; 7:11-28; 8:6; 
9:15-18; and 10:9 as having a Hellenistic legal context.
11
 In addition, Johnson adds two 
more words to the list of legal terms in Hebrews. He argues that ἀπαράβατος (Heb 7:24) 
and ἐντυγχάνω (7:25) are found in Hellenistic legal contexts as well.12 
William L. Lane also discusses the legal terminology in Hebrews. He comments, 
“The most striking feature of the vocabulary [at Heb 2:1-4] is the turning away from 
language sanctioned by the LXX toward an idiomatic hellenistic diction.”13 He cites 
Hellenistic papyri for the legal context of βέβαιος, and notes it is an uncommon word in 
                                                 
9. Attridge, Hebrews, 275-6. 
 
10. Luke Timothy Johnson, Hebrews: A Commentary, The New Testament Library (Louisville: 
Westminster John Knox, 2006), 9. Brackets mine. 
 
11. Another commentator who confirms the terms as legal, but does not contribute to where the 
author learned them is Paul Ellingworth, The Epistle to the Hebrews: A Commentary on the Greek Text, 
NIGTC (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1993). See also James W. Thompson, Hebrews, Paideia (Grand Rapids: 
Baker Academic, 2008). Concerning these legal terms and their origin, these commentators – Johnson, 
Ellingworth, and Thompson – parallel Attridge.  
 
12. Johnson, Hebrews, 194. 
 
13. William L. Lane, Hebrews 1-8, Word Biblical Commentary 47A (Dallas, TX: Word, 1991), 
35.  
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the LXX. Furthermore, the Hellenistic legal terms ἔνδικος (2:2) and συνεπιμαρτυροῦντος 
(2:4) are not found in the LXX. In contrast with Heb 2:2-4, the words ὅρκος, ἀντιλογία, 
and ὀμνύω (6:16) find “ample illustration in the LXX and in . . . the papyri.”14 When it 
comes to understanding διαθήκη (7:22; 8:6; 9:15-22), however, Lane consistently favors 
the Septuagintal idea of covenant. 
Following the argument of J. J. Hughes, Lane refuses to posit διαθήκη as the 
Hellenistic last will or testament in Heb 9:16-17 because no διαθήκη in classical or 
papyrological sources required the death of the testator.
15
 In other sources, the heir could 
receive their inheritance before the testator’s death. Lane states, “Lexical and semantic 
considerations indicate that the writer has employed διαθήκη in a consistent way in 9:15-
18 to mean ‘covenant’. . . .”16 He also argues that φέρειν cannot be a Hellenistic legal 
term because it never coordinates with διαθήκη in extrabiblical literature. The LXX uses 
it for bringing sacrifices, thus the context of 9:15-22. Arguing that ἐπί νεκροῖς refers to 
representative animal sacrifices (cf. ἐπὶ θυσιαῖς; Ps 49[50]:5), Lane concludes Heb 9:16-
17 is a self-maledictory rite embedded in OT legal practice.
17
 
Of final note, Lane occasionally comments on the form of legal expressions used 
by the author of Hebrews. Concerning Hebrews 6:13-16, Lane says, “The special use of 
κατά followed by a noun in the genitive to signify the guarantee of an oath (vv 13, 16) 
                                                 
14. Ibid., 149. 
 
15. See William L. Lane, Hebrews 9-13, Word Biblical Commentary 47B (Dallas, TX: Word, 
1991), 231n. p; see also notes q-s. Notice at 231n. p, Lane claims that “it is impossible . . . to harmonize the 
writer’s statements with any known form of hellenistic, Egyptian, or Roman legal practice.” Cf. J. J. 
Hughes, “Hebrews IX 15ff.,” 27-96. 
 
16. Lane, Hebrews 9-13, 231n. p. 
 
17. For example, the practice in Jer 34:17-20. Ibid., 242-3. This conclusion is followed, but with 
modification, by Gareth Lee Cockerill, The Epistle to the Hebrews, NICNT (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
2012). Cockerill briefly mentions the legal terminology of Hebrews, but his comments do not add to what 
has already been stated.  
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occurs both in the LXX (cf. Gen 22:16) and in legal papyri (MM 322).”18 Lane implies 
that εἰ μήν, an intensifier, regularly accompanies an oath in the LXX and papyri.19 He 
also observes that εἰς βεβαίωσιν (6:16) is a phrase that gives legal certification in 
transactions throughout the centuries.
20
  
Lane recognizes the abundance of legal terms in the Epistle to the Hebrews. 
Although he does not inquire as to where the author learned these terms, Lane provides 
many references for understanding their meaning. Most of his comments about the terms 
parallel those of Attridge and Johnson except for his discussion on διαθήκη, where he 
spends considerable time arguing for the Septuagintal meaning of covenant at Heb 9:15-
18.  Last, Lane draws attention to certain forms of legal expressions like those observed 
in 6:13-16. 
The final commentator to be mentioned is Craig R. Koester, who provides crucial 
insights to the origin of the legal terms in Hebrews.
21
 Koester does not discuss the 
collective use of legal terms in the epistle, nor does he offer a comprehensive theory as to 
where the author learned his knowledge of these terms. He does, however, discuss the 
legal terms as they are used in papyri, which provide the closet parallel to the legal 
practices found in Hebrews. 
Koester’s notes for Heb 6:13-20 offer examples of papyri that align the legal 
concepts of Hebrews with actual practices. One example is P. Oxy. 263.4-17, in which 
                                                 
18. Lane, Hebrews 1-8, 149. 
 
19. Ibid., 148n. d. 
 
20. Ibid., 149. Lane references MM, 108. Compare similar comments in Ellingworth, Hebrews, 
464. He observes for ἐπί νεκροῖς (9:17) that ἐπί with a dative is used in a “variety of legal contexts.”  
 
21. Craig R. Koester, Hebrews: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary, The 
Anchor Bible Commentaries 36 (New York: Doubleday, 2001). 
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the purchase of Sarapous, “an eight-year-old female slave,” worth 640 drachmae, follows 
a format in which the seller swears by Emperor Vespasian against defect and guarantees 
(βεβαιόω) the transaction.22 This papyrus exhibits the combination of βεβαιόω and ὀμνύω 
in a legal transaction during the late first century CE.  
Under his discussion of ἀμετάθετος (Heb 6:17), Koester cites P. Oxy. 491.3-4 to 
show that a living testator possessed power to alter his will. Eudaemon, the testator, 
proclaims “So long as I survive I am to have power over my own property, to make any 
further provisions or new dispositions (μεταδιατίθεσθαι) I choose. . . .”23 Koester then 
cites another letter where an anonymous man registers his inheritance and swears his 
integrity by Emperor Trajan after his father’s death in P. Oxy. 482.34-42. Both texts 
demonstrate a will that awards the inheritance after the death of the testator. The first 
shows the ability of the testator to alter the will, while P. Oxy. 482 shows that transfer of 
inheritance required the registration of the testator’s death.  
Koester provides helpful sources for understanding the Hellenistic will in 
correlation with ἀθέτησις (Heb 7:18).24 In P. Oxy. 3.492.9, Thatres the testator warns that 
“the person attempting to set aside (πρός ἀθέτησίν) aught of [the stipulations] shall . . . 
forfeit a fine of 1000 drachmae . . .” preventing the ἀθέτησις of the will.25 Koester also 
                                                 
22. P. Oxy. 263.4-17 (Grenfell and Hunt, The Oxyrhynchus Papyri: Edited with Translations and 
Notes [vol. 2; The Egypt Exploration Fund; Oxford, 1899], 232); Koester, Hebrews, 326-27. 
 
23. P. Oxy. 491.3 (Grenfell and Hunt, The Oxyrhynchus Papyri: Edited with Translations and 
Notes [vol. 3; The Egypt Exploration Fund. Oxford, 1903], 195); see Koester, Hebrews, 327. 
 
24. Koester, Hebrews, 355. 
 
25. Grenfell and Hunt, 3:199. 
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adds that the use of διαθήκη with ἔγγυος (Heb 7:22) is rare, while ἐπίτροπος is normally 
the title of the “executor of a will. . . .”26 
In contrast to Lane, Koester states the insufficiency of Kilpatrick’s and Hughes’s 
arguments for the consistent use of διαθήκη as covenant in Heb 9:16-17.27 Rather, 
Koester proposes 9:16-17 as a rhetorical reflexio, in which the author of Hebrews 
transposes the Hellenistic meaning of διαθήκη to the Septuagintal covenant.28 He also 
argues for the legal sense of φέρω (9:16), citing a letter where an heir presents a notice to 
a scribe so that the death of his father may be documented.
29
 He also suggests ἰσχύω 
(9:17) has a legal sense, citing MM 308.  Finally, Koester understands the διαθήκη of 
Heb 9:16-17 to refer to a Hellenistic last will and testament on account of the papyri. 
In conclusion, commentators have noticed the legal terminology of Hebrews and 
have supplied primary sources in order to understand the meaning of these terms. 
Nonetheless, not much has been advanced in understanding where the author of Hebrews 
learned the complex of legal terms in his epistle. Attridge has suggested that the terms 
make up a part of standard rhetoric, while Johnson has suggested that the terms are 
common Greco-Roman metaphors, yet neither has developed these claims. On the other 
hand, Koester has advanced research with his use of papyri. He shows that the legal terms 
in Hebrews align with actual Hellenistic legal practices, yet Koester never constructs a 
comprehensive theory of where Hebrews learned his collective use of legal terms. 
                                                 
26. Koester, Hebrews, 364. 
 
27. Ibid., 417; cf. 424-26. See G. D. Kilpatrick, “Διαθήκη in Hebrews.” ZNW 68 (1977): 263-5. 
Kilpatrick argues for a consistent use of covenant like Hughes. 
 
28. Koester, Hebrews, 425n. 301; cf. 425n. 300 in which Koester also suggests a similitudo. 
 
29. Koester, Hebrews, 418. See J. G. Winter, Life and Letters in the Papyri, Jerome Lectures (Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan, 1933), 132; A. S. Hunt and C. C. Edgar, Select Papyri, vols. 1-2, LCL 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1932-34), 2:334-35, both referenced by Koester. 
11 
  
Finally, Lane’s comments, particularly those on Heb 9:15-18, demonstrate the need to 
determine how the Septuagint influences the author of Hebrews when he uses these 
terms. It is necessary for this study to consider data from the LXX in addition to the 
Greco-Roman world. Thanks to these commentators, a framework has been provided 
from which to advance our knowledge of the legal terms in the Epistle to the Hebrews.  
Method 
 My primary aim, therefore, is to discover where the author of the Epistle to the 
Hebrews learned his knowledge of collective legal terms.
30
 In order to accomplish this, I 
conducted comparative word studies of select vocabulary used in the epistle. The word 
studies are not fully comprehensive – that is, where every instance of the word is 
accounted for and a thorough history of development presented. Rather, I chose 
references that I judged pertinent for understanding the Epistle to the Hebrews. I limited 
the scope of research to Greek texts written before the 5
th
 century CE. This includes 
works of literature, the LXX, ostraca, and papyri. Preferable are references that occur 
before the 2
nd
 century CE, but since some late references illuminated the epistle, they 
were accepted.   
While I examined papyri and various lexicons, I also relied on the Thesaurus 
Linguae Graecae search engine for gathering primary references. Where appropriate, I 
cite the exact parameters of a search. This was done in the spirit of repeatability. Citing 
search parameters will provide the basis for claiming that certain combinations are unique 
                                                 
30. I must confess at this point to needing a personal pronoun to reference the author. The 
masculine singular participle in Heb 11:32 creates the possibility that the anonymous author is male. I will 
occasionally refer to the author as “him.” I am aware of those who argue for a female author. Although I 
am not convinced by her ultimate claim, I find this article worthwhile: Ruth Hoppin, “The Epistle to the 
Hebrews Is Priscilla’s Letter,” Pages 147-86 in A Feminist Companion to the Catholic Epistles and 
Hebrews, ed. Amy-Jill Levine and Maria Mayo Robbins, Feminist Companion to the New Testament and 
Early Christian Writings 8 (London: T & T Clark, 2004; repr., Cleveland, OH: The Pilgrim Press, 2004), 
147-86. 
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to Hebrews. Furthermore, citation is an attempt to guard against any user error of mine by 
allowing readers to search other combinations. Additionally, I only offer relevant results, 
for sometimes a search lists a result that showcases the targeted words, but is unrelated. 
Last, I acknowledge that the available data for historical analysis of the Greek language is 
incomplete. Simply because results are negative does not mean the author of Hebrews 
was the only individual to use a certain term or phrase. Nonetheless, the results of a TLG 
search provide a reasonable basis for making philological claims.  
I did not include Latin, Hebrew, or any other non-Greek source because 
preliminary research showed it unnecessary. The work of Boaz Cohen shows that Jewish 
testamentary practices, which he gleans from Rabbinic sources, differ from the function 
of διαθήκη in Heb 9:16-17 and that διατίθημι later became a loanword in Rabbinic 
Hebrew. In addition, the Constitutio Antonina (212 CE) and the constitution of Severus 
Alexander (222-235 CE) show that the author of Hebrews could not have learned Heb 
9:16-17 from Latin sources. No Roman citizen could legally write a will in Greek until 
these third century edicts.
31
 Although these facts eliminate only Hebrew and Latin 
testamentary practices, they caution against finding the remaining terms of Hebrews in 
non-Greek parallels. As will be demonstrated, Greek primary references suffice to answer 
my question. 
At this point I want to be abundantly clear; I do not focus just on the use of 
διαθήκη, but the collective legal terminology of the epistle. That being said, the list of 
                                                 
31. Boaz Cohen, Jewish and Roman Law: A Comparative Study, 2 vols. (New York: The Jewish 
Theological Seminary of America, 1966); cf. Yosef Rivlin, “Gift and Inheritance Law in the Judaean 
Desert Documents,” Pages 165-83 in Law in the Documents of the Judaean Desert, ed. Ranon Katzoff and 
David M. Schaps, Supplements to the Journal for the Study of Judaism (Leiden: Brill, 2005). For the two 
Roman laws, see Winter, Life and Letters, 24, 29, 33; cf. Edward Champlin, Final Judgments: Duty and 
Emotion in Roman Wills 200 B.C.- A.D. 250 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 3-4.  
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terms considered legal has not been finalized. Johnson alone argues ἀπαράβατος (Heb 
7:24) and ἐντυγχάνω (7:25) find use in legal contexts, which raises the possibility of 
other terms in the epistle being legal. Bearing this in mind, I have investigated the various 
vocabulary throughout Hebrews, but with a focus on Heb 2:2-4; 6:13-18; 7:11-28; 8:6; 
9:15-22; and 10:9.  
By employing word studies, I have found parallels that will answer what 
influenced the rhetoric of the author. A reference has been considered a parallel when it 
included not only the same term, but a similar function and form as expressed in 
Hebrews. Using the parallel sources, I intended to match the author of Hebrews within a 
similar historical group that used the terms in the same manner. This is an attempt to 
understand the rationale of the author when he uses the legal terms. If the evidence did 
not allow for the author to be matched to a specific group, I have then tried to locate the 
author within at least a broader tradition. I have divided my task into six chapters. 
 This first chapter has introduced a problem in the Epistle to the Hebrews. Not 
many scholars have focused on the collective use of legal terms in the epistle, but what 
has been said is enough to provide a framework for further research. I have laid out my 
aim as well as a method for answering my primary question. The rest of this chapter will 
now describe the shape of the following chapters.  
Chapters 2-5 will showcase the above mentioned word studies. The legal terms 
under investigation seem to gather around a particular concept within a pericope. For 
example, what scholars label as legal terms in Heb 2:2-4 center on the two confirmed 
words (λόγος) of Heb 2:2 and 2:3. The following chapters will consecutively discuss each 
locus of legal terms in the epistle (Heb 2:2-4; 6:13-18; 7:11-19; 9:15-22). For each 
14 
  
chapter, I conducted a word study and asked two questions: (1) Are the terms of Hebrews 
actually legal terms as the author uses them? As has been shown, many reliable scholars 
have labeled them as such, but I needed to verify their labels in order to properly answer 
my question.  (2) From where did the author learn the terms in the particular pericope? 
This is my primary question, but focused upon a smaller pericope instead of the entire 
epistle.  
Chapter 6, my final chapter, combines the results from chapters 2-5 to determine 
if the author consistently employs the legal language – that is, if the author learned from 
one source or many. From this I discuss what the collective legal terms reveal about the 
author’s identity as well as the author’s theology. Finally, I state what contribution my 
thesis makes to the study of the New Testament as well as suggest areas for further 
research.
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CHAPTER II 
A WORD MORE SECURE THAN ANY LAW
A problem has been identified, the framework has been set, and the map has been 
revealed. It is now time to trudge through the literary landscape of the Greek language in 
order to understand the words written to a struggling community. This chapter will find 
the origin of the terms used to describe the two words of God in Heb 2:1-4, which Lane 
observes take a legal character.
1
 
The Two Reliable Words of Heb 2:2-4 
On account of the coming salvation about to be inherited (1:14), the author tries to 
persuade his audience to hold on to the word of the Lord that was passed down to them 
(2:4). To accomplish this task, the author compares the message of the Lord to the 
previous word of God. The word spoken through angels accomplished what it promised, 
namely righteous punishment, and was proven reliable (λόγος ἐγένετο βέβαιος; 2:2). The 
author reasons that if God’s previous word was reliable, then so is the more recent word, 
which was confirmed (ἐβεβαιώθη) by those who heard on account of the Lord (2:3). 
Investigating the origin of βέβαιος will help answer where the author learned his use of 
the other terms that center around the two reliable words of God.  
First it must be recognized that βέβαιος appears in many different contexts. For 
example, the term often appears in connection with ἀσφάλεια in the context of travel. 
Ceslas Spicq says, “These metaphors of land or sea routes . . . were traditional, like the 
                                                 
1. Recall William L. Lane, Hebrews 1-8, Word Biblical Commentary 47A (Dallas, TX: Word, 
1991), 35. From this point on, all biblical translations are mine unless otherwise noted. 
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union of two adjectives.”2 Heinrich Schlier refers to Plutarch to demonstrate the use of 
βέβαιος and ἀσφαλής. Portraying the capture of the city Pelusium, Plutarch says, 
“Antony was therefore sent with the cavalry, and he not only occupied the narrow pass, 
but actually took Pelusium, a large city, and got its garrison into his power, thus 
rendering its march safer for the main army and giving its general assured hope of victory 
(ἅμα καὶ τὴν ὁδὸν ἀσφαλῆ τῷ στρατεύματι καὶ τὴν ἐλπίδα τῆς νίκης ἐποίησε τῷ 
στρατηγῷ βέβαιον).”3 This reference, and others like it, show βέβαιος used in the context 
of safe travel, not law. 
βέβαιος is often paired also with ἀκλινής (cf. Heb 10:23). Ceslas Spicq claims 
they are synonymous adjectives and then cites Philo and 4 Maccabees, et al.
4
 Philo says 
the reasoning of Moses stood against “unreasoning passion . . . steadfastly and 
unswervingly (βεβαίως καὶ ἀκλινῶς). . . .”5 In 4 Maccabees, the speaker lauds the mother 
of the seven sons and describes her conviction as steady (ἀκλινής; 4 Macc 17:3) while 
“maintaining firm (βεβαίαν) an enduring hope in God.”6 This abridged sampling of the 
different contexts of βέβαιος in Hellenistic literature warrants caution when labeling the 
origin of the term in Hebrews. 
Similar to the Hellenistic world, the Epistle to the Hebrews exhibits a diverse use 
of βέβαιος. At Heb 6:19, the author uses the very nautical metaphors cited by Spicq.7 The 
                                                 
2. C. Spicq, “ἀσφάλεια, ἀσφαλής, ἀσφαλίζομαι, ἀσφαλῶς,” TLNT 1:212-219; here 218. See also 
1:283. Cf. Heinrich Schlier, “βέβαιος, βεβαίοω, βεβαίωσις,” TDNT 1:600-603. 
 
3. Plutarch Ant. 3.4 (Perrin, LCL); TDNT 1:600. Cf TLNT 1:218n. 34. 
 
4. Spicq, “ἀκλινής,” TLNT 1:59. 
 
5. Philo Somn. 2.278 (Colson and Whitaker, LCL). Cf. Philo Spec. Leg. 2.2. 
6. NRSV. 
 
7. Spicq, TLNT 1:218. 
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author also uses βέβαιος to describe the firm end (τέλους βεβαίαν; Heb 3:14) of which 
the congregation should not let go. The verb, βεβαιόω, is used in the paraenesis to 
encourage the strengthening of the heart (βεβαιοῦσθαι τὴν καρδίαν; Heb 13:9) against 
false teaching. It is clear that, just like its use in Hellenistic literature, βέβαιος does not 
exclusively carry a legal context in the Epistle to the Hebrews. In Heb 2:2-3, however, 
there are several possibilities, of either legal or non-legal sources, that could have 
influenced the author’s choice of the words “λόγος ἐγένετο βέβαιος.” 
Ceslas Spicq writes, “Bebaios . . . often modifies logos: an utterance that is well 
founded, authorized and thus convincing.”8 Spicq refers to Plato, who, while discussing 
the basic elements of the universe, requires a term (λόγος) “that is reliable and stable 
(οὕτως ὥστε τινὶ πιστῷ καὶ βεβαίῳ χρήσασθαι λόγῳ).”9 In another passage, Plato 
describes the ideal argument, “εἰ ὄντος δή τινος ἀληθοῦς καὶ βεβαίου λόγου καί δυνατοῦ 
κατανοήσαι (if there is any system of argument which is true and sure and can be  
learned. . . .)”10 Comparable to Plato, the rhetorician Lysias says, “καὶ μηδαμῶς τοῖς 
λέγουσι βεβαιώσητε λόγον τὸν πάντων πονηρότατον (And avoid giving any kind of 
confirmation to those who repeat the most wicked of all sayings).”11 Although expressed 
in a negative fashion, Lysias shows that a λόγος was something that could receive 
confirmation (βεβαιόω). In Greek literature, the combination of βέβαιος and λόγος is 
                                                 
8. Ibid., 1:280. Schlier also attests to the frequency of βέβαιος and λόγος, TDNT 1:600-603. 
 
9. Plato Tim., 49b (Bury, LCL); Spicq, TLNT 1:280n. 1; cf. Plato Resp., V, 461e (TDNT 1:600-
601). 
 
10. Plato Phaed., 90c (Fowler, LCL). 
 
11. Lysias 20.32 (Lamb, LCL); LSJ 312. Cf. Dionysius of Halicarnassus Lys.12; Sextus Empiricus 
Math. 8.321-24 (a.k.a. Against the Logicians 2.321-24; Bury LCL). 
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used in the context of argument. Sometimes the terms assess the quality of an argument, 
while other times a saying. Regardless, they are not legal terms. 
Hebrews 2:2 is not about a good argument, however, but about the word of God 
which was spoken through angels. This concept is found in other Second Temple Jewish 
literature, and is an idea that became associated with the giving of the Law to Moses on 
Mt. Sinai.
12
 Since the context of Heb 2:2 is the Mosaic Law, any source that uses βέβαιος 
to describe a νόμος might provide insight to what influenced the author. There are a few 
instances in Greek literature where βέβαιος is an attribute of a νόμος, but there are even 
more instances where the verb form is used (βεβαιόω).13 When the words βέβαιος and 
βεβαιόω are used to describe laws, they can then be labeled as legal terms. The sources 
which use βέβαιος and βεβαιόω to describe laws are numerous and spread throughout the 
centuries, thus making it difficult to make a connection to the author of Hebrews. There 
are, fortunately, three instances that show a similarity to the thought expressed in Heb 
2:2. 
 Exegeting the text of Exodus, Philo discloses the significance behind the 
statement of Exod 24:16 which says, “And the glory of God came down upon Mount 
Sinai.”14 Philo is quick to emphasize the immutability of the Deity (θεῖον) and thus 
declares that, clearly, the essence of God (οὐσιώδης) did not descend the mountain, but it 
                                                 
12. See LXX Deut 33:2 (LXX); Gal 3:19; Acts 7:38, 53; Jub. 1:27; 2:1; Josephus, Ant. 15.136; 
James W. Thompson, Hebrews, Paideia (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2008), 50; Craig R. Koester, 
Hebrews: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary, The Anchor Bible Commentaries 36 
(New York: Doubleday, 2001), 205. 
 
13. Βέβαιος: Plato Leg., 838d; 960e; Aristotle Protr. 49; Demosthenes, Timocr. 37; 43; [Neaer.] 
93; Philo Spec. 2.13. βεβαιόω: Isaeus De Astyphilo 34; Lysias In Andocidem 29; Demosthenes Mid. 30; 76; 
224; 1 Aristog. 99; Diodorus Siculus Bibliotheca historica 34/35.30a; Dionysius Halicarnassensis Ant. rom. 
3.23.19; 5.70.4; 5.74.3; Philo Spec. 3.182; Josephus, Ant. 16.1. 
 
14. Philo QE. 2.45 (Marcus, LCL). 
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was merely His glory (δόξα). Like the glory of a human king, the glory of the Deity 
demonstrated power and reassured the mind of the beholder with “the coming of God, 
Who was not there, as though He were coming for the firmest assurance of things about 
to be legislated (ὡς ἥκοντος θεοῦ πρὸς βεβαιοτάτην πίστιν τῶν μελλόντων 
νομοθετεῖσθαι).”15 The “things about to be legislated” is, obviously, the Law of Moses, 
which was attributed firm assurance by the glory of God coming onto Mt. Sinai. Here in 
Philo, it was not a λόγος that was certified, but the presence of God that signified 
certitude for that which was about to be legislated. Although the vocabulary and syntax 
differ, Philo QE 2:45 expresses an idea similar to the one in Heb 2:2. 
In another passage, Philo describes not what was legislated, but the one 
legislating. Moses, according to Philo, “was the best of all lawgivers in all countries (τε 
νομοθετῶν ἄριστος τῶν πανταχοῦ πάντων). . . .”16 He argues that the perfect Laws of 
God are better than the laws of any other country by this proof: anyone can observe 
history and see the numerous catastrophes that have shaken the customary laws (νόμιμος) 
of other locations (2.13). Even when a country experiences peace and luxury, the 
malcontent and greedy turn to violence (ὕβρις), which “is the enemy of law (ὕβρις δ’ 
ἀντίπαλον νόμῳ).”17 But only one, says Philo, is secure (τὰ δὲ τοῦτου μόνου βέβαια) and 
“remains stable from the day it was written until now.”18 Here, the subject of the sentence 
is slightly ambiguous since the author uses a demonstrative pronoun, but the line “ἀφ’ ἧς 
ἡμέρας ἐγράφη” suggests it is the written Law of Moses that is secure, unshaken, and 
                                                 
15. According to Codex Procopius; Philo QE 2.45 (Marcus, LCL; See pg. 251; cf. 90n. d).  
 
16. Philo, Mos. 2.12 (Colson, LCL); cf. Attridge, Hebrews, 65n. 30. 
 
17. Ibid., 2.13 (Colson, LCL). 
 
18. Ibid., 2.14. My translation. 
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immovable.
19
 That Philo uses βέβαιος to describe the Law of Moses in Mos. 2.14 is 
strengthened by 2.17 which says, “the laws . . . have been guarded securely through all 
time (πεφυλάχθαι τοὺς νόμους ἐν βεβαίῳ). . . .”20 Again, the idea is similar to Heb 2:2, 
although the vocabulary and syntax differ. An avid writer, Philo expresses the reliability 
of the Law of Moses in two different books.
21
 This suggests it was a staple idea for the 
Jewish writer and reveals a possible connection to Hebrews.
22
 
 Philo, however, is not the only Jewish writer to describe the Law of Moses as 
βέβαιος. Josephus defends the laws of Israel against Apion by focusing on the virtues of 
their lawmaker. The criteria of the best laws are as follows: the laws which are the oldest, 
the virtue of the lawmaker, and the ability of the lawmaker “to win over to the laws 
which he introduces those who are to live under them. . . .”23 In Ap. 2.156, Josephus 
argues Moses fulfilled the third criterion and says that, “after framing a code to embrace 
the whole conduct of their life, induced [Israel] to accept it, and secured . . . its 
observance for all time (καὶ βεβαιοτάτην εἰς ἀεὶ φυλαχθῆναι παρεσκεύασεν).24 The 
                                                 
19. Colson translates, “But Moses is alone in this, that his laws, firm, unshaken, immovable, 
stamped, as it were, with the seals of nature herself, remain secure from the day when they were first 
enacted to now . . .” Philo, Mos. 2. 14 (Colson, LCL). 
 
20. Colson, LCL. 
 
21. Note that both QE 2.45 and Mos. 2.12 use νομοθετέω and βέβαιος. Interestingly, not only does 
the author of Hebrews share similar vocabulary concerning the Law (βέβαιος; Heb 2:2), but the author is 
the only writer of the NT to exhibit the use νομοθετέω (Heb 7:11; 8:6). 
 
22. Several scholars have already suggested that these two passages are similar to Heb 2:2-4. 
Attridge says, “the formulation here [Heb 2:2] could reflect the common apologetic motif of the stability of 
the Jewish law.” Harold W. Attridge, The Epistle to the Hebrews: A Commentary on the Epistle to the 
Hebrews, Hermeneia (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1989), 65n. 30; cf. Koester, Hebrews, 206; James Moffatt,  A 
Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews, The International Critical Commentary 
(Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1924), 18; Paul Ellingworth, The Epistle to the Hebrews: A Commentary on the 
Greek Text, NIGTC (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1993), 138. 
 
23. Josephus Ap. 2. 153 (Thackeray, LCL).  
 
24. Josephus Ap. 2.156 (Thackeray, LCL). 
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superlative adjective, βεβαιοτάτην, describes neither the Law nor Moses, but the ability 
of Israel to keep the Law, afforded by Moses’s leadership during the Exodus. 
Nonetheless, Josephus Ap. 2.156 is an instance where βέβαιος is used in a discussion of 
Moses and the Law. 
Josephus then argues that Moses served as the exemplified lawmaker by 
maintaining piety and not abusing power (Ap. 2.157-159). He then uses βέβαιος again, 
but in a manner similar to Heb 2:2. According to Josephus, the piety and laws of Moses 
were the best way “to show great virtue and to offer the most secure help, by legislating 
(αὐτοῦ νομίζων), to those having had made him leader (ὅυτως αὐτός τε τὰ μάλιστα τὴν 
ἀρετὴν ἐπιδείξειν τὴν αὐτοῦ νομίζνων καὶ σωτηρίαν τοῖς αὐτὸν ἡγεμόνα πεποιημένοις 
βεβαιοτάτην παρέξειν).”25 In the context of lawmakers, νομίζω means “enact,” which is 
fitting for Ap. 2.159.
26
 Thus, the help that is most secure (βεβαιοτάτην) is the law that 
Moses enacted.
27
 Here, Josephus employs the superlative of βέβαιος to amplify the Law 
of Moses. Against Apion 2.156-159 differs in vocabulary and syntax, but presents an idea 
similar to the one found in Philo and Hebrews – that the word of God is reliable. 
 There are four sources in Greek literature that label the Law of Moses reliable 
using a cognate of βέβαιος: Philo QE 2.45; Mos. 2.14, 17; Josephus Ap. 156-159; and 
Heb 2:2-3. These three authors have one thing in common: a high competency in and 
regard for the LXX. Therefore, the reliable word spoken through angels originates from a 
                                                 
25. Josephus Ap. 2.159. My translation. Cf. Thackeray’s translation, “in the belief that this was the 
best means of displaying his own virtue and of ensuring the lasting welfare of those who had made him 
their leader” (LCL). 
 
26. LSJ 1179.2. 
 
27. That the subject of βεβαιοτάτην is referring to the Law receives support from the previous line 
when Josephus says, “[Moses] considered it incumbent on him to live piously and to provide for his people 
an abundance of good laws (εὐνομίαν). . . .” Josephus, Ap. 2.159 (Thackeray, LCL). 
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Jewish tradition that influenced the author of Hebrews.
28
 Not enough evidence exists to 
identify the author of Hebrews within a specific group that valued the LXX, but Heb 2:2-
3 has more in common with Philo and Josephus than Plato and Lysias.
29
  Sharing an 
instinct with Philo and Josephus, the author of Hebrews uses βέβαιος to remind the 
audience of the reliability of God’s word spoken on Sinai – that is, the Law of Moses. 
Ipso facto, this same sort of legal certitude is applied to the word spoken to the original 
hearers. This recent revelation is as reliable as the most secure of laws.  
Every Transgression and Disobedience 
According to the author of Hebrews, the reliable word spoken through angels 
punished every transgression and disobedience (Heb 2:2). Παράβασις and παραβαίνω are 
terms used to communicate the breaking of an agreement, as Johannes Schneider 
suggests.
30
 Originally, the words had a spatial meaning, but more often than not, they 
indicate transgression.
31
 Schneider notes the rarity of the spatial meaning in the papyri 
and says, “The word [παραβαίνω] is commonly used for breaking the stipulations in 
agreements, also in penal clauses and wills. . . .”32 As Schneider shows, these agreements 
can be laws (νόμος; Aeschines Ctes. 204), promissory notes (χειρογραφία; P. Amh. 2.35, 
30), oaths (ὅρκοι; P. Par. 46, 12), a person’s word (λόγος; P. Oxy. 3. 526, 10), and even 
                                                 
28. Note, this is not a claim about the author’s ethnic identity. Rather, it is a claim about what 
tradition influenced the author. It is a tradition from those who value the Bible. Also, this is not a new 
claim. Again, Attridge hints in his footnote that these three writers reflect a similar tradition, although 
Attridge does not expound in detail. See Attridge, Hebrews, 65n. 30; cf. Koester, Hebrews, 206. 
 
29. One cannot help but also see an overlap with the rhetorician’s assessment of an argument (ὁ 
λόγος βέβαιος) seen in Plato and others. See my pg. 17n. 11-12. 
 
30. J. Schneider, “παραβαίνω, παράβασις, παραβάτης, ἀπαράβατος, ὑπερβαίνω,” TDNT 5:736-
744; here 739. 
 
31. Ibid., TDNT 5:736, 739. 
 
32. Ibid., TDNT 5:737. 
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wills (διαθήκη; P. Oxy. 3.494, 28).33 Curiously, the attestation of παράβασις is rare 
outside the NT. Moulton and Milligan only list two papyri for the noun παράβασις and 
they were written in the fifth and sixth centuries CE. Schneider notes the papyri usually 
showcase the word παραβασία.  
Labeling παραβαίνω and παράβασις exclusively as legal terms misrepresents their 
use in the Hellenistic world. A transgression of a law can happen, but so can the 
transgression of oaths, agreements, and the words of an individual. Study of the papyri 
and Classical Greek sources is unable to isolate a particular source that influenced the 
author’s choice of παράβασις in Heb 2:2-4. The Septuagint, however, contains over 65 
instances of παραβαίνω.34 
Just like the non-Jewish literature, the Septuagint uses παράβασις and παραβαίνω 
in various contexts. Tobias asks the angel Raphael to inform his father about his recent 
wedding so that he does not break the oath (παραβῆναι τὸν ὅρκον αὐτοῦ) he swore to 
Raguel (Tobit 9:3, א). Also, παράβασις is used to communicate the transgression of oaths 
in 2 Macc 15:10 when Judas Maccabee decries “τὴν τῶν ὅρκων παράβασιν” by the 
Gentiles. Of course, there are many acts of transgression against the Law. For example, 
Isaiah warns of the desolation of the land (24:1) and explains this is because the 
inhabitants “transgressed the Law (παρέβησαν τὸν νόμον),” and altered the commands, 
the eternal covenant (διαθήκη).35 
                                                 
33. Schneider, TDNT 5:737 shares many of the same papyri references as MM 480, who confirm 
Schneider’s claims. 
 
34. See HRCS 2:1055-56.  
 
35. Isa 24:5; cf. Sir 19:24; 2 Macc 7:2; 3 Macc 7:12. 
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 Most revealing for the Epistle to the Hebrews, however, are instances when 
someone transgresses (παραβαίνω) against a λόγος or a διαθήκη in the LXX. In the 
famous scene where the Lord rejects his king, Saul petitions Samuel, “I have sinned 
because I have transgressed the word (παρέβην τὸν λόγον) of the Lord and your word 
(ῥῆμα) because I feared the people and I obeyed (ἤκουσα) their voice” (1 Kgdms 15:24). 
Saul asks forgiveness but is denied. Just like Heb 2:1-4, transgression happens by 
disobeying what was heard. This disobedience was followed by punishment.
36
 The same 
concept is operative in 4 Kgdms 18:12, but on a much larger scale. For the last time, the 
Northern Israelite king did evil in the sight of the Lord (17:1-2), so the Lord sent 
Shalmaneser, the king of Assyria, to take the people from the land and enslave them 
(18:9-11). The author explains why: “because they did not obey (ἤκουσαν) the voice 
(φωνῆς) of the Lord their God, and they transgressed His covenant (παρέβησαν τὴν 
διαθήκην), everything that Moses, the servant of the Lord, commanded (ἐντείλατο) – and 
they did not obey (ἤκουσαν) and they did not do (ἐποίησαν).”37 Recalling the covenant 
made under Moses, the author explains that the exile happened because the people did 
not listen, nor did they do what Moses commanded.  
The two passages are similar. There was a transgression (either of a λόγος, or a 
διαθήκη), in the context of what the Lord had spoken, followed by punishment. Fourth 
Kingdoms 18:12 is even more helpful for understanding Heb 2:1-4. The transgression is 
in the context of the covenant made on Mt. Sinai as well as the commands (ἐντείλατο) of 
Moses, and the explanation for the Exile is twofold: they did not listen, and they did not 
                                                 
36. For other instances of λόγος and παραβαίνω in the LXX, cf. 1 Es. 4:5; Sir 39.31. 
 
37. For other instances of διαθήκη and παραβαίνω in the LXX, cf. Josh 7:11, 15; 23:16; 8:1; Ezek 
16:59; 17:15, 16, 18, 19; 44:7. 
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do. This is a synonymous parallelism, but instrumental for understanding Heb 2:2-4, 
which says righteous punishment happened for transgression (παράβασις) and 
disobedience (παρακοή) of the word (ὁ λόγος), spoken on Mt. Sinai. 
 Hebrews 2:1-4, however, is not a direct quotation of 4 Kgdms 18:12, nor is it an 
immediate allusion. Rather, the use of παράβασις at Heb 2:2 reflects a tradition that 
imitates the Septuagint. Many times both Philo and Josephus use the words παράβασις 
and παραβαίνω to describe the breaking of the Law of Moses. After listing the first five 
of the Ten Commandments, Philo turns to discuss the punishment of their transgression 
(παράβασις).38 After describing the tabernacle, Josephus writes about the garment of the 
high priest and that the stones upon it lit up when God was present. He concludes that the 
stones no longer shine because God became “displeased at the transgressions of his laws 
(τῇ παραβάσει τῶν νόμων).”39 Similar to 4 Kgdms 18:12, there was a transgression of the 
Law followed by punishment. The παράβασις of the Mosaic Law that garners punishment 
is also seen in the work of the Apostle Paul when he says, “where there is no Law 
(νόμος), neither is there transgression (παράβασις)” (Rom 4:15b, cf. 2:23; Gal 3:19). 
Although παράβασις and παραβαίνω are terms sometimes used in Hellenistic legal 
contexts, the use of παράβασις in Heb 2:2 results from the LXX, which is imitated by 
those who value the Law. Transgressing the Law of Moses results in punishment, and 
punishment happens to those who do not listen or do.    
 That final clause of 4 Kgdms 18:12 segues into a brief discussion of παρακοή, 
which Attridge says, “is particularly appropriate in this context where the law is 
                                                 
38. Philo Spec. Leg. 2. 242. For the use of παραβαίνω, see Mos. 2. 49. Cf. the references in 
Schneider, TDNT 5:736-40. 
 
39. Josephus Ant. 3.218; cf. 214-218. For the use of παραβαίνω in Josephus, see Ant. 8.115. 
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portrayed as God’s speech, since etymologically it means a failure or refusal to hear.”40 
According to Spicq, παρακοή is “unknown in the LXX and in the papyri earlier than the 
eighth century.”41 He observes the verb παρακούω is well-attested in literature, but the 
noun is not. The few occurrences in the NT are sufficient for understanding the term’s 
meaning.
42
 The παρακοή (disobedience) of Adam made the many sinners (Rom 5:19), 
whereas every disobedience (πᾶσαν παρακοήν) of the Corinthian church receives 
punishment (ἐκδικῆσαι; 2 Cor 10:6). Similar to the use of παράβασις, the use of παρακοή 
in Heb 2:2 imitates the idea found in the LXX that punishment resulted from 
transgressing or disobeying what Moses commanded.  
 In summary, the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews learned the synonyms 
παράβασις and παρακοή from the LXX. The author’s use of παράβασις comes from the 
LXX, while the author’s use of παρακοή results from the concept of disobedience found 
in the LXX. For those who love the Law, παράβασις and παρακοή recall a familiar means 
of communicating disobedience to God’s voice. This disobedience can happen to God’s 
laws, oaths, covenants, or words. In the case of Heb 2:2, the transgression and 
disobedience happened to the word of God spoken on Mt. Sinai. Hebrews 2:2 imitates the 
LXX and recalls the conditions that led to exile. 
Received Just Recompense 
 Understanding where the author learned ἔλαβεν ἔνδικον μισθαποδοσίαν requires 
focus on ἔνδικον because no known source uses μισθαποδοσία before the writing of 
                                                 
40. Attridge, Hebrews, 65. 
 
41. Spicq, “παρακοή,” TLNT 3:28-29; here pg. 28. 
 
42. See Gerhard Kittel, “παρακοή,” TDNT 1:223. 
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Hebrews and λαμβάνω is frequent.43 One might conjecture that ἔνδικον is a textual 
variant because of the overwhelming use of ἔκδικος and its cognates in the Greek Bible, 
but there are no variants according to the NA
28
 and Paul uses it in Rom 3:8.
44
 It turns out 
that ἔνδικος is a very old word; its first recorded instance is in Pindar. 
 In Olympia, Pindar uses ἔνδικος to describe the praise “which rightly (ἐνδικάς) 
[came] from the tongue of Adrastos the seer.”45 This passage has nothing to do with law, 
but is a way of expressing what is deserved. The word ἔνδικος, however, finds use in a 
legal context in Plato Leg. 915d.
46
 Concerning the disputed ownership of livestock, 
priority shall be given to the “substantial and lawful owner (ἀξιόχρεών τε καὶ ἔνδικον).”47 
The word ἔνδικος means that which is right, but certain contexts have behind them the 
weight of law.
48
 
 I was unable to find a context in which ἔνδικος occurs with λαμβάνω, or even 
μισθοδοσία or μῖσθος (cognates of μισθαποδοσία).49 There is an instance, however, 
where λαμβάνω occurs with δίκη, the cognate of ἔνδικος, that provides context for 
understanding ἔνδικος. Demosthenes accuses Aeschines of accepting bribes and 
                                                 
43. H. Preisker and E. Würthwein, “μισθός, μισθόω, μίσθιος, μισθωτός, μισθαποδότης, 
μισθαποδοσία, ἀντιμισθία,” TDNT 4:695-728; see pg. 697.  
 
44. Gottlob Shrenk, “ἐκδικέω, ἔκδικος, ἐκδίκησις,” TDNT 2:442-446. 
 
45. Pindar Ol. 6.12; my translation; cf. Pyth. 5.103, “τε κοινὰν χάριν ἔνδικόν.” Also Plato, Phileb. 
12d. 
 
46. Cf. Attridge, Hebrews, 65n. 34; He also suggests IG 5(2).6.33 (4
th
 century BCE); IG 
2(2).46c56; IG 3.23; 11.22. See also Plato Leg. 954a.  
 
47. Plato Leg. 915d (Bury). 
 
48. LSJ 560. 
 
49. TLG Advanced Lemma “λαμβανω” and “ενδικος” 1 lines near first (All Forms); Advanced 
Lemma “ενδικος” and “μισθος” 1 lines near first (All Forms); Advanced Lemma “ενδικος” and 
“μισθαποδοσια” 1 lines near first (All Forms); Advanced Lemma “λογος” and “ενδικος” 1 lines near first 
(All Forms). 
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commands the court, “pronounce him guilty and exact a penalty adequate to his crimes 
(καταψηφίσασθ’ αὐτοῦ καὶ δίκην ἀξίαν τῶν ἀδικημάτων λάβετε).”50 Demosthenes shows 
δίκη in the legal context of a given (λαμβάνω) punishment, which suggests that the 
combination of δίκην and λαμβάνω is a legal phrase. With the papyri, Moulton and 
Milligan show that δίκη becomes the word for lawsuits in the Hellenistic era.51 This 
suggests its cognates have a similar bearing. The cognates of ἔνδικος, the similar use of 
λαμβάνω in Demosthenes, and the context of the Mosaic Law (Heb 2:2) show ἔλαβον 
ἔνδικον μισθαποδοσίαν has a legal sense. It is difficult to determine where the author 
learned the terms and idea of ἔλαβον ἔνδικον μισθαποδοσίαν because the use of ἔνδικος 
spans many centuries and μισθαποδοσία does not appear before the writing of Hebrews. 
There is one reference, however, that provides traction for understanding what influenced 
the author at Heb 2:2. 
 The already mentioned use of ἔνδικος in Romans 3:8 parallels Hebrews. Arguing 
that God shows no partiality (Rom 1:16; 2:9-11), Paul speaks of the advantages held by 
the Jews (Rom 3:1-2) and that the faithlessness of some demonstrates the faithfulness of 
God (3:3). He anticipates the accusation of promoting evil (3:8a) and refutes such a 
position with a strong condemnation: “ὧν τὸ κρίμα ἔνδικόν ἐστιν (of which their 
judgment is just)” (Rom 3:8b). The source of judgment in the immediate vicinity here 
comes from God (3:5), but Rom 3:3-8 sits in a wider context of punishment that results 
from the Law (Rom 2:17-29; cf. 3:2, τὰ λόγια τοῦ θεοῦ), which is a major theme featured 
throughout the rest of the letter (e.g., 5:20; 7:7). Thus, Paul’s use of ἔνδικος describes the 
punishment that accompanies the disobedience of God’s Law.  
                                                 
50. Demosthenes Fals. leg. 8 (C. A. Vince and J. H. Vince, LCL). 
 
51. MM 163. 
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 No other source parallels the exact wording ἔλαβεν ἔνδικον μισθαποδοσίαν, but 
the passage in Rom 3:8 suggests a shared tradition with Hebrews.
52
 Both Heb 2:2 and 
Rom 3:8 speak of a just punishment resulting from the disobedience of God’s Law. There 
is no evidence to suggest that the author of Hebrews learned ἔνδικον μισθαποδοσίαν from 
Paul. Rather, both authors reflect a Septuagintal idea – that disobedience of God’s word 
warrants righteous punishment (e.g., Deut 28:15) – despite the fact that the LXX does not 
use ἔνδικος.53 What source influenced the author’s choice of μισθαποδοσία, or the choice 
of ἔλαβεν ἔνδικον, is impossible to determine with certainty. Nonetheless, this idea of a 
just punishment for transgression of the Law is fitting within a tradition that values the 
LXX and the Law of Moses. 
While God Corroborated by Signs and Wonders 
 In Heb 2:3, the author chose a peculiar word to assure that God corroborated what 
the audience had heard. Συνεπιμαρτυρέω is found nowhere else in the NT, nor even the 
LXX. Harold W. Attridge labels it as “legal language,” due to the other legal terms in 
Heb 2:2-4 (e.g., βέβαιος, ἐβεβαιώθη, ἔνδικον), although fully aware of the non-legal 
sense of “confirm” as used in Philo Mos. 2.123 and Ep. Arist. 191.54 Attridge supports his 
claim through the etymological linking of συμμαρτυρέω, which finds expression in a 
legal formula in BGU 1.86.40 (MM 610). 
                                                 
52. Curiously, there is an idea similar to Heb 2:2 in a fragment of Euripides, “λόγων δίκαιον 
μισθὸν ἄν λόγους φέροις.” See A. Nauck, Tragicorum Graecorum fragmenta (Leipzig: Teubner, 1889; 
repr., Hildesheim: Olms, 1964), fragment 890. The phrase translates roughly into “the just reward of the 
words is in what the words bear.” This passage is repeated by Aristotle (Eth.eud. 1244a.11) and even finds 
itself in a third century CE private letter (P. Oxy. 55.3811). Perhaps this is a Greek proverb that originated 
in Euripides’s play, but no evidence exists to conclusively demonstrate this influenced Hebrews.  
 
53. Again, ἐκδίκησις, the cognate of ἔνδικον, appears in biblical literature. See 2 Cor 10:6 
(ἐκδικέω); Mic 7:4; Ezek 16:41. 
 
54. Attridge, Hebrews, 67n. 59, where Attridge labels the term as having a “quasi-technical [legal] 
sense.” Cf. Koester, Hebrews, 207; H. Strathmann, “μάρτυς, μαρτυρέω, μαρτυρία, μαρτύριον, 
ἐπιμαρτυρέω, συμμαρτυρέω, συνεπιμαρτυρέω, κτλ.,” TDNT 4:474-514; here 510. 
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Surveying the use of συνεπιμαρτυρέω in Greek literature, however, reveals a 
more precise context within which the verb is used. Two sources exist that use 
συνεπιμαρτυρέω in the context of a court of law. Polybius uses the term to show that the 
Roman Senate received confirmation of an enemy troop report. He writes, παρόντων δέ 
καὶ Θετταλῶν καῖ συνεπιμαρτυρούντων τοῖς Δαρδανίοις (“The Thessalians arrived and 
confirmed [the message of] the Dardanians”).55 Likewise, Diodorus Siculus writes that 
the testimony of Gracchus and his “fellow commissioners” confirmed (συνεπιμαρτυρέω) 
the message of the Olympiad envoys and convinced the Senate to welcome the Roman 
alliance with king Ariarathes.
56
 Both passages are historical narratives about actions of 
the Roman Senate and show the term is appropriate for a legal setting.  
Nonetheless, the majority of sources use συνεπιμαρτυρέω to express proof in non-
legal arguments.
57
 In the midst of a cosmological argument Aristotle says, “And all ages 
bear witness to this fact (συνεπιμαρτυρεῖ δὲ καὶ ὁ βίος ἅπας), and allot the upper region 
to God. . . .”58 Here συνεπιμαρτυρέω communicates a logical deduction in a non-legal 
argument. Theophrastus, the 4
th
-3
rd
 century BCE philosopher, uses the term similarly. In 
Caus. plant. 5.14.2, Theophrastus uses συνεπιμαρτυρέω to demonstrate a logical proof 
when discussing the correlation between weather and ice. In the same manner, he uses 
συνεπιμαρτυρέω to demonstrate a logical proof in the mixing of wine (Caus. plant. 
                                                 
55. Polybius Historiae 25.6.4, my translation. 
 
56. Diodorus Siculus Library of History 31.28 (Walton, LCL). 
 
57. See Critodemus 112.33 (W. Kroll, Codices Romani, Catologus Codicum Astrologorum 
Graecorum, vol. 5.2 [Brussels: Lamertin, 1906]); Let. Aris. 191; Philo Mos. 2.123; 1 Clem. 23.5.2; 43.1.5; 
Plutarch Frat. amor. 486c; De laude 539d; 542c; Galen 9.748.6; 11.703.15; 15.583.1; 17b.480.6; Vettius 
Valens 2.35.16; 2.38.29, 217; 4.7.51; 4.20.32; 4.23.33; 4.25.37; 7.6.50 (D. Pingree, Vettii Valentis 
Antiocheni anthologiarum libri novem [Leipzig: Teubner, 1986]); Athenaeus Deip. 8. 595e; Porphyry 
Comm. harm. 37.25 (3
rd
 CE); Oribasius Collectiones medicae 14.7.3. The remaining majority are late 
Christian theology, some medical works and some astrological works, none of which have legal contexts.  
 
58. Aristotle Mund. 400a, 15 (Forster and Furley, LCL). 
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6.16.6). These sources demonstrate συνεπιμαρτυρέω in contexts of advanced 
argumentation. 
Sextus Empiricus exemplifies this use of συνεπιμαρτυρέω when he discusses the 
confirmation of a λόγος. The word occurs only once in the known corpus of Sextus 
Empiricus, during a dense epistemological discussion about the non-evident (ἄδηλον). As 
a part of his argument, the philosopher offers an example in which a person declares it is 
daytime. Sextus then explains how the speaker arrived at the true belief. He writes, “Then 
by referring the statement [“It is daytime”] to the fact (τὸ πρᾶγμα) and learning that the 
fact’s existence is confirmatory (συνεπιμαρτυροῦσαν) of the statement (τῷ λόγῳ), we say 
that the statement is true.”59 Unlike other instances where multiple proofs confirm 
something (e.g., Polybius Historiae 25.6.4), συνεπιμαρτυρέω here describes only one 
proof in Math. 8.323: the self-evident fact. The context of this passage is not legal, but of 
argumentation. Writing a century after Hebrews, Sextus Empiricus reflects a 
philosophical tradition that is concerned with assessing arguments. Συνεπιμαρτυρέω is 
the language of those who know how to argue and reflects the background of someone 
educated in argument.  
The use of συνεπιμαρτυρέω in other contexts – such as rhetoric, astrology, and 
medicine – inhibits discovering precisely where the author learned the term. Given its 
rarity and its use in refined arguments, however, it is probable that the term is used by 
those trained in argumentation – that is, rhetoric. Nevertheless, before fully 
comprehending the significance of the author’s choice of συνεπιμαρτυρέω, the origin of 
the phrase “signs and wonders (σημείοις τε καὶ τέρασιν; Heb 2:4)” needs consideration. 
                                                 
59. Sextus Empiricus Math. 8.323 (a.k.a Against the Logicians 2.323; Bury, LCL). 
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The author of Hebrews is distinctive in using συνεπιμαρτυρέω, but he is not the 
only NT writer who uses a cognate of μαρτυρέω to articulate God’s proof by signs and 
wonders. The formula of signs and wonders has its roots in the LXX. A likely candidate 
of origin is Deut 4:34 or 6:22, which speaks of the σημείοις and τέρασιν that 
accompanied the Exodus.
60
 Another candidate is Joel 3:3, “and I will give wonders 
(τέρατα) in the heavens and upon the earth,” which Luke quotes in Acts 2:19 adding, 
“σημεῖα (signs) ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς.”61 Regardless of whichever LXX passage originated the 
phrase, it became a Christian tradition. Comparing how the formula is expressed in other 
NT texts will show the significance behind the use of συνεπιμαρτυρέω in Hebrews. 
The combination of σημεῖον and τέρας happens sixteen times in the NT, most of 
which occur in Acts.
62
 Four of these instances add δύναμις to the formula.63 There is, 
however, only one passage that uses the formula σημεῖον καὶ τέρας in combination with 
μαρτυρέω.64 Paul and Barnabas arrived at the Iconium synagogue and win a great 
multitude of Jews and Gentiles to belief. There was, however, a group of those 
unconvinced who eventually incited the entire city of Iconium into division (Acts 14:4). 
Before that city-wide division happened, the Apostles had continued to preach, “being 
emboldened in speech by the Lord, who testified His message of grace by giving signs 
and wonders (παρρησιαζόμενοι ἐπὶ τῷ κυρίῳ τῷ μαρτυροῦντι [ἐπὶ] τῷ λόγῳ τῆς χάριτος 
                                                 
60. See Attridge, Hebrews, 67; Koester, Hebrews, 207; Lane, Heb 1-8, 40, Thompson, Hebrews, 
58. Cf. Deut 13:1-2(2-3); Matt 24:24 and Mark 13:22. 
 
61. The third hand of Codex Sinaiticus (Joel 3:3) has “ουρ. ανω και σημ[ε]ια,” but likely resulted 
from a scribe harmonizing to Acts. See Rahlfs-Hanhart, 2:522. Cf. Acts 2:22, 43. 
 
62. Acts 2:19, 22, 43; 4:30, 5:12, 6:8; 7:36; 14:3; 15:12; Matt 24:24; Mark 13:22; John 4:48; Rom 
15:19; 2 Cor 12:12; 2 Thess 2:9; Heb 2:4.  
 
63. Acts 2:22; 2 Thess 2:9; Rom 15:9; 2 Cor 12:12. 
 
64. Interestingly, there are no instances of μαρτυρέω and σημειον in the LXX: TLG Advanced 
Lemma “μαρτυρεω” and “σημειον” 1 lines near first (Septuaginta; All Forms). 
33 
  
αὐτοῦ, διδόντι σημεῖα καὶ τέρατα). . . .” (14:3). Luke uses language similar to Hebrews 
2:4 to describe the testimony of God. This correlation of language does not necessarily 
mean that Luke influenced the author of Hebrews, however. The vocabulary and syntax 
differ; Heb 2:4 includes δύναμις similar to the formula in Rom 15:19 and 2 Cor 12:12, 
and many NT authors use the formula of signs and wonders. Both Acts and Hebrews 
share an early Christian tradition that originated from the LXX and communicates the 
confirming actions of God.  
In summary, the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews learned the phrase σημείοις 
τε καὶ τέρασιν from an early LXX/Christian tradition, which the author appropriated for 
his own purposes. This is rather obvious and not a new claim.
65
 The use of 
συνεπιματυρέω, however, says something about the author. The word occurs nowhere 
else in the Bible, whereas μαρτυρέω and its cognates appear over fifty times in the NT.66 
Even Luke, the ever gifted writer, uses μαρτυρέω to speak of God’s testimony (Acts 
14:3). The author’s use of συνεπιμαρτυρέω reflects a learned background in rhetoric, 
which he has added to a Christian tradition. The term contributes to the legal character of 
Heb 2:1-4 and further characterizes the word spoken by the Son as secure as law, 
confirmed by God’s demonstrative power. 
Conclusion 
 Hebrews 2:2-4 exhibits a collection of vivid vocabulary terms that results from 
various sources. The discussion of the two reliable words results from a Jewish tradition 
                                                 
65. See Attridge, Hebrews, 67-68; Koester, Hebrews, 207, 211; Lane, Heb 1-8, 39-40; Thompson, 
Hebrews, 51; Ellingworth, Hebrews, 141-3; Moffatt, Hebrews, 19-20; Luke Timothy Johnson, Hebrews: A 
Commentary, The New Testament Library (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2006), 88-89 . 
 
66. See Alfred Schmoller, Handkonkordanz zum griechischen Neuen Testament, 8
th
 ed. (Stuttgart: 
Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 1989; repr., 2008), 324-5; 186; 467. 
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that praises the Law of Moses, which uses Hellenistic terminology associated with the 
reliability of law. The author’s use of παράβασις and παραβαίνω imitates the idea of 
transgression and disobedience found in the LXX. Determining the origin of ἔλαβεν 
ἔνδικον μισθαποδοσίαν is difficult, but use of the term is expected of someone who 
values the Law. Last, the use of “signs and wonders” shares a Christian tradition that 
imitates the LXX, but it is one the author infuses with the influence of rhetoric. All-in-all, 
the author employs these legal terms in order to convey that the word spoken by the Son, 
which includes a promise of salvation, is more secure than any other law.
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CHAPTER III 
GOD, THE HEAVENLY RHETORICIAN OF HEB 6:13-20
The Common Practice of Oath Making 
The sender of P. Oxy. 3.482, whose name has been lost, had inherited property in 
the village of Senemeleu after the passing of his father Demogenes.  Demogenes 
benefited his son through a will he made at the record-office (ἀγορανομείου) “in the 
month Tubi, of the first years of the deified Nerva. . . .”1 The son received only a small 
fraction of a house and a courtyard, but it was property that required registration 
nonetheless. Writing to the βιβλιοφύλακες in 109 CE, the son observes that the will was 
unaltered at the time of Diogenes’s death (ἐφ’ ᾗ καὶ ἀμεταθέτῳ ἐτελεύται; 35-36), and 
concludes, καὶ ὀμνύω Αὐτοκράτορα Καίσαρα̣ Νερούαν Τραιανὸν Σεβαστὸν Γερμανικὸν 
Δακικὸν μὴ ἐψεῦσθαι (37-41). This papyrus exhibits a custom not unfamiliar to those 
having lost a family member, but this particular process required a formulaic oath sworn 
to somebody greater, through which the son confesses not to have lied. 
 Papyrus Oxyrhynchus 482 represents only one of the many oaths used in 
everyday Hellenistic life.
2
 Different oaths were used for various occasions. Johannes 
Schneider has written a wonderful chapter about Greek oath-making, which chronicles 
the different forms of oaths beginning with Homer up to the Roman period.
3
 Samples 
                                                 
1. P. Oxy. 3.482, 29-35 [Grenfell and Hunt, 3:171]; Cf. P. Oxy. 10. 1266; 46.3275, 35-40. 
 
2. Cf. also for example, P. Oxy. 240, 246, 251, 253, 255, 257, 258, 259, 260, 262, 263. Note, a few 
of these are lacunae (e.g., P. Oxy. 253), and the editors insert the oath formula used. 
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from the Oxyrhynchus Papyri collection demonstrate the various occasions for oaths. In 
P. Oxy. 3.482, an oath is used in the context of inheritance, while P. Oxy. 2.259 
demonstrates an oath in the context of surety (ἔγγυάω). Oaths are also used when an 
official takes office (e.g., P. Oxy. 972), in the notification of a death (e.g., P. Oxy. 1030), 
or in the notification of payment (e.g., P. Oxy. 382). Oaths were commonplace in the 
Greco-Roman world.  
 Not only were they common, oaths carried a sociological weight unfamiliar to 
post-modern societies.
4
 The oath gained credence from the threat of the gods. This 
understanding of the oath can be observed when Diodorus Siculus explains why people 
swore an oath at the geysers of Pelici (11.89.5-8). He writes, “Since so divine a majesty 
pervades the sacred area [made obvious by the loud geysers], the most sacred oaths are 
taken there and men who swear falsely are immediately overtaken by the punishment of 
heaven.”5 Of course, rhetoricians warned against the manipulation of an oath (Aeschines 
In Ctes. 208.9), but the oath maintained its sociological function in antiquity. The oath 
even counted as viable evidence in ancient law courts and was a means to resolve a 
certain type of case.
6
 
                                                                                                                                                 
3. Johannes Schneider, “ὅρκος, ὁρκίζω, ὁρκωμοσία, ἐνορκίζω, ἐξορκίζω (ἐξορκιστής), ἐπίορκος, 
ἐπιορκέω,” TDNT, 5:457-467; Hom. IL., 15. 37-38. 
 
4. At least the society I experience, where countless TV villains have sworn on their mother’s 
grave. The closest contemporary parallel to the weight of an ancient oath is in the present-day court of law, 
where perjury receives a fine or other punishment. 
 
5. Diodorus Siculus 11.89.5 (Oldfather, LCL). Reference found via Waser, “Eid,” PW 5.2076-
2084; here 5.2083. 
 
6. For examples of the oath in the ancient law court, see the Law of Gortyn III.1-12; IV.1-8; 
IX.36f.; XI.26-31; Lygdamis Inscriptions of Halicarnassus 1.16-25. Cf. R. F. Willetts, The Law Code of 
Gortyn (Kadmos Supplemente 1; Berlin: De Gruyter, 2013); R. Dareste, B. Haussoullier, Th. Reinach, 
Recueil des Inscriptions Juridiques Grecques: Texte, Traduction, Commentaire, ed. Ernest Leroux, Premier 
Fascicule (Paris, 1891); A. C. Merriam, “Review of R. Dareste, B. Haussoullier, and Th. Reinach, Recueil 
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 Despite the various instances of the oath in antiquity, scholars have already 
identified a source which closely parallels Heb 6:13-18.
7
 Attridge writes, “The language 
for the description of an oath’s function [Heb 6:16] involves common Hellenistic legal 
terminology and is paralleled in Philo’s discussion of oaths.”8 Almost all scholars refer to 
Philo’s analyses of oaths when discussing Heb 6:13-18.9 A few scholars, however, have 
offered an additional source that provides insight into Heb 6:13-18. Spicq, deSilva, and 
Thompson all turn to classical rhetoric for understanding an oath’s function. This chapter, 
therefore, begins with the place of the oath in rhetoric and ends with a comparison of Heb 
6:13-18 and Philo’s analyses of oaths. The aim of this chapter is to answer where the 
author learned the highlighted terms of Heb 6:13-18. 
The Oath as the Rhetorician’s Proof 
A Brief Review of Scholarship 
What scholars have already written about the relationship of rhetoric and Heb 
6:13-18 requires review. Ceslas Spicq is the earliest commentator to turn to rhetorical 
treatises as a means of understanding Heb 6:16. Spicq writes:  
                                                                                                                                                 
des inscriptions juridiques grecques: texte, traduction, commentaire,” The American Journal of 
Archaeology and of the History of the Fine Arts 7 (1891): 68-71; cf. 69-70.  
 
7. Following the author’s argument, Heb 6:13-20 makes a pericope. In this section, however, I 
often reference Heb 6:13-18 because scholars claim technical legal terms are in these verses. Verses 19 and 
20 seem to lack legal terms, although they complete the pericope.  
 
8. Harold W. Attridge, The Epistle to the Hebrews: A Commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews, 
Hermeneia (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1989),  180. 
 
9. James Moffatt,  A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews, The 
International Critical Commentary (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1924), 86; Luke Timothy Johnson, Hebrews: 
A Commentary, The New Testament Library (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2006), 169-70; Craig R. 
Koester, Hebrews: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary, The Anchor Bible 
Commentaries 36 (New York: Doubleday, 2001), 325-7; Paul Ellingworth, The Epistle to the Hebrews: A 
Commentary on the Greek Text, NIGTC (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1993), 336; William L. Lane, Hebrews 
1-8, Word Biblical Commentary 47A (Dallas, TX: Word, 1991), 149-50; Johannes Schneider, “ὀμνύω,” 
TDNT 5:176-185; here 183; Attridge, Hebrews, 179-80. 
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Ainsi, en cas de contestation entre adversaires . . . l’autorité sacrée invoquée 
conclut toute discussion . . . et le serment intervient comme une garantie. Aristote, 
Rhét. 1, 15, 1375 a mentionne le serment comme l’une des cinq preuves 
judiciaires extra-techniques, à côté des textes de lois, des dépositions des témoins, 
des conventions, et des aveux arrachés sous la torture.
10
 
 
Spicq cites Aristotle Rhet. 1.15.1, which describes the oath as one of five inartificial 
proofs. He also cites Anaximenes Rhet. ad Alex. 17.1, which discusses the function of an 
oath and how to argue with or against it. Spicq goes on to acknowledge the use of 
βεβαίωσις in Heb 6:16 as a technical legal term that expressed a legally backed 
guarantee, often found in the papyri.
11
 Although only a brief reference to rhetoric, Spicq 
plants a seed for understanding Heb 6:13-18. 
 The seed is cultivated by David A. deSilva, who offers a thorough sociological 
and rhetorical criticism of the epistle. He also references Aristotle and Anaximenes, but 
deSilva gives a more detailed explanation of an oath’s place in rhetoric. He writes: 
Oaths are regularly offered as proofs in forensic speeches, alongside the evidence 
of witnesses, legal contracts, and the like. While rhetorical handbooks do present 
the possibility of raising doubts, in a legal battle, concerning the reliability of 
oaths, it appears to have been a truism that oaths carried great weight toward the 
establishment of certainty with regard to the ‘facts’ of a case. According to Philo 
(Somn. 1.12), “the uncertain things are confirmed and the things lacking 
conviction receive confirmation (τὰ ἀβέβαια βεβαιοῦται καὶ τὰ ἄπιστα λαμβάνει 
πίστιν)” by means of oaths.12 
 
DeSilva uses rhetorical categories and Philo Somn. 1.12 to emphasize the effect of an 
oath on the audience as a means of assurance. Further, deSilva’s observation of how an 
oath functions in a forensic speech compares to the function of oaths in Heb 6:16. This 
                                                 
10. Spicq, Ceslas. L’Épitre aux Hébreux, 2 vols. (Paris: Librairie Lecoffre, 1952), 2:161. 
 
11. Citing Gustav Adolf Deissmann, Bible Studies: Contributions Chiefly from Papyri and 
Inscriptions to the History of the Language, the Literature, and the Religion of Hellenistic Judaism and 
Primitive Christianity, trans. Alexander Grieve (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1901; repr., Peabody, MA: 
Hendrickson, 1988), 104-9. 
 
12. David A. deSilva, Perseverance in Gratitude: A Socio-Rhetorical Commentary on the Epistle 
“to the Hebrews” (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000), 249; cf. 249n. 93. Italics mine. 
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suggests that rhetorical theory can answer the question of where the author learned his 
understanding of oaths.
13
 
James W. Thompson also supports the investigation of rhetorical theory as a 
means to understanding Hebrews when he demonstrates how the categories of inventatio 
operate in Hebrews 1-4. He identifies the exordium, the narratio, refutatio, and 
confirmatio, as well as the rhetorical devices employed such as synkrisis and maxims. 
Thompson cites Aristotle Rhet. 1.15 in order to demonstrate the various proofs (πίστεις) 
available for an argument.
14
 While later arguing that the earliest Christians viewed 
Scripture as an acceptable proof, Thompson turns to the author’s use of oaths and writes, 
“The readers would have been aware of the significance of oaths as supporting 
arguments. Here one may compare Philo’s frequent appeal to oaths.”15  
These scholars make rhetoric sound like a promising candidate for where the 
author learned his terms in Heb 6:13-18. An oath counts as an acceptable proof in the art 
of argument, whereas the author of Hebrews says, καὶ πάσης αὐτοὶς ἀντιλογίας πέρας εἰς 
βεβαίωσιν ὁ ὅρκος (“and to them the oath is a conclusion of an entire dispute for 
confirmation . . .” [6:16b]). The similarity in concept demands a closer inspection of the 
language used in rhetorical theory. Before examining the primary sources, however, a 
contemporary debate concerning rhetoric’s influence on another NT author must be 
acknowledged. 
                                                 
13. Koester Hebrews, 334 references Rhet. ad Alex. 17 to make the point that an oath could be 
contested, but the audience of Hebrews would not contest an oath of God. It is a brief reference, and 
Koester does not go into detail about the function of oaths. Pg. 333 briefly acknowledges an oath can settle 
a dispute. 
 
14. James W. Thompson, “Argument and Persuasion in the Epistle to the Hebrews,” PRSt 39.4 
(2012): 361-77; here, 363. 
 
15. Ibid., 370. Italics mine. 
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 Carl Joachim Classen attempts to settle whether or not the Apostle Paul had 
formal training in rhetoric. He identifies several technical rhetorical terms in the corpus 
of Paul. In Phil 1:7, Classen argues that βεβαίωσις is a technical term from rhetoric. He 
writes, “Commentators call ἀπολογία and βεβαίωσις ‘forensic technical terms’. . . . I 
would rather say that βεβαίωσις belongs to the rhetorical terminology developed for 
procedures used by orators in the courts of law.”16 While disagreeing with Classen’s 
primary claim, Ryan S. Schellenberg argues that the use of βεβαίωσις in Phil 1:7 carries a 
generic sense of “confirm.” Although disagreeing with Classen’s take on Paul, 
Schellenberg still concedes that βεβαίωσις “certainly is technical in the Rhetorica ad 
Alexandrum (32.1; 36.17, 19), where it denotes a discrete section of a speech that follows 
the statement of facts and provides confirmation thereof.”17  
While unable to agree on Paul’s rhetorical background, these two scholars at least 
agree that βεβαίωσις is a technical rhetorical term. No one has yet applied this knowledge 
to the Epistle to the Hebrews. Rather, most commentators have argued the εἰς βεβαίωσιν 
of Heb 6:16 is a technical legal phrase originating from the Attic legal practice of 
guaranteeing sales found in papyri up to the 7
th
 century CE.
18
 Thanks to the work of 
previous commentators and the debate concerning Paul’s background, I will now argue 
that the author’s use of εἰς βεβαίωσιν in Heb 6:16 and the accompanying terms of Heb 
                                                 
16. Carl Joachim Classen, “Paul and the Terminology of Ancient Greek Rhetoric,” in Rhetorical 
Criticism of the New Testament, ed. C. J. Classen, WUNT 128 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2000), 29-44; 
here, 33n. 25. 
 
17. Ryan S. Schellenberg, “Rhetorical Terminology in Paul: A Critical Reappraisal,” ZNW 104, 
no.2 (2013): 177-91; here, 182. Credit for recommending this source as well as the overall direction into 
rhetorical theory must be given to Dr. James Thompson, without whom I would have missed entirely the 
influence of rhetoric on Heb 6:13-18. Any error belongs to me. 
 
18. Attridge, Hebrews, 180n. 25; Moffatt, Hebrews, 87; Koester, Hebrews, 327; Ellingworth, 
Hebrews, 340; Johnson, Hebrews, 170; Lane, Hebrews, 1-8, 149; Schlier, TDNT 1:602-603; Spicq, TLNT 
1:280n.3; Ibid., Hébreux, 2:161; James W. Thompson, Hebrews, Paideia (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 
2008), 138. 
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6:13-18 results from a formal background in rhetoric. My argument starts with the use of 
βεβαίωσις in Rhetorica ad Alexandrum 32 and 36. 
Rhetorica ad Alexandrum 
 Rhetorica ad Alexandrum begins as if it were a letter of Aristotle addressed to his 
student, Alexander the Great. Perhaps a later hand added the introduction, but the 
handbook is not the work of Aristotle, as is evident from differences of technical terms 
and style and a lack of a philosophical analysis on rhetoric. Authorship is attributed to 
Anaximenes of Lampsacus on account of a reference by Quintilian (Inst. 3.4.9). The 
rhetorical handbook of Anaximenes instructs its readers how to argue, and it divides 
oratory into three genres: deliberative (δημηγορικόν), epideictic (ἐπιδεικτικόν), and 
forensic (δικανικόν). Anaximenes further divides each genre into seven species: 
exhortation, dissuasion, eulogy, vituperation, prosecution, defense, and investigation.
19
 
While discussing the arrangement of a forensic speech, Anaximenes writes about 
the part of a speech called confirmation. Anaximenes places it after the narrative of facts. 
It is an opportunity to confirm what has been immediately argued. Anaximenes writes:   
Τὰ δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα ἔσται βεβαίωσις, ἂν μὲν ἀντιλέγηται τὰ πράγματα ὑπὸ τῶν 
ἀντιδίκων, ἐκ τῶν πίστεων, ἄν δὲ ὁμολογῆται, ἐκ τῶν δικαίων καὶ τῶν 
συμφερόντων καὶ ἐκ τῶν τούτοις ἀκολούθων. τάττειν δὲ δεῖ τῶν μὲν πίστεων 
πρώτας τὰς μαρτυρίας καὶ τὰ ἐκ τῶν βασάνων ἡμῖν ὁμολογηθέντα, ἄν ὑπάρχῃ. 
ἔπειτα βεβαιοῦν, ἄν μὲν πιθανὰ ᾖ, γνώμαις καὶ ἐνθυμήμασιν, ἐὰν δὲ μὴ παντελῶς 
πιθανὰ ᾖ, τῷ εἰκότι, ἔπειτα τοῖς παραδείγμασι καὶ τοῖς τεκμηρίοις καὶ τοῖς 
σημείοις καὶ τοῖς ἐλέγχοις, τελευταῖον δὲ τοῖς ἐνθυμήμασι καὶ ταῖς γνωμολογίαις. 
ἐὰν δὲ ὁμολογῆται τὰ πράγματα, τὰς μὲν πίστεις ἐατέον, τῇ δὲ δικαιολογίᾳ ὥσπερ 
ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν χρηστέον. καὶ τοῦτον μὲν τὸν τρόπον βεβαιώσομεν (Rhet. ad 
Alex. 36.17-18) 
                                                 
19. See [Aristotle] Rhetorica ad Alexandrum, trans. H. Rackham, LCL (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1937; repr. 1957), 258-65 for the general background of Anaximenes Rhet. ad Alex. In 
addition to Rackham, my paragraph summarizes the work of George A. Kennedy, “Historical Survey of 
Rhetoric,” in Handbook of Classical Rhetoric in the Hellenistic Period 330 B.C.-A.D. 400, ed. Stanley E. 
Porter (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 3-41. Cf. Kennedy, The Art of Persuasion in Greece (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1963), 114-24; Kennedy, A New History of Classical Rhetoric (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1994), 49-51. I will refer to the author of Rhet. ad Alex as Anaximenes. 
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H. Rackham translates: 
 
The next section will be confirmation. This will be based on proofs if the facts are 
denied by the opposite, but on considerations of justice and expediency and the 
like if they are admitted. First among the proofs must be placed the evidence of 
witnesses and confessions that we have obtained by torture, if any be available. 
Next this evidence must be confirmed by means of maxims and general 
considerations, if it be convincing, or if not entirely convincing, by probability, 
and then by examples, tokens, signs and refutations, and by considerations and the 
enunciation of maxims to finish with. If the facts are admitted, proofs may be 
passed over, and legal arguments employed, as in the earlier passages. This is the 
way in which we shall effect confirmation. (LCL; my italics) 
 
 The term here translated “confirmation” is βεβαίωσις. Anaximenes argues that 
βεβαίωσις is useful when the opposing party disputes (ἀντιλέγω) the facts (πρᾶγμα) of a 
case. He writes that if the facts are opposed, then the rhetorician should argue with proofs 
(ἐκ τῶν πίστεων), prioritizing witnesses (μαρτυρία) and evidence from torture (βάσανος). 
He expresses a similar sentiment when discussing the place of confirmation in a 
deliberative speech. He writes, “After [the narrative of facts (διηγήσεις)] comes 
confirmation, the method by which we shall confirm the facts already stated as being of 
such a nature as we undertook to show them to be, by means of proofs and considerations 
of justice and expediency.”20 
 The astute reader might notice that the discussions of confirmation in Rhet. ad 
Alex. 32.1 and 36.17 lack mention of an oath, which is the centerpiece of Heb 6:13-18. 
As has already been observed with Spicq, an oath is one of five inartificial proofs (τῶν 
ἀτέχνων πίστεων) according to Aristotle (Rhet. 1.15.1). Anaximenes also considers the 
oath as a type of proof. He defines an oath as “an unproved statement supported by an 
                                                 
20. Anaximenes, Rhet. ad Alex. 32.1 (Rackham, LCL). Note, ibid. 31.3 is the only occurrence of 
διηγήσεις in the entire treatise. Rhetorica ad Alexandrum normally uses ἀπαγγελία, δήλωσις, and 
πρόρρησις for the “narrative” (30.1, 11). For a summary guide for the parts of a speech  in rhetoric, see 
Hans-Josef Klauck, Ancient Letters and the New Testament: A Guide to Context and Exegesis, co-transl. 
Daniel P. Bailey (Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2006), 218. 
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appeal to the gods,” and concludes the wider section, “We have now carried out our 
intention of summarily reviewing all the kinds of proof (τὰς πάσας πίστεις). . . .”21 In the 
forensic speech Anaximenes prioritizes proof from witnesses and torture for 
confirmation, but confirmation is not restricted to these two proofs (36.17-18). Likewise, 
Anaximenes prioritizes “the customary course of events, examples, considerations, and 
the opinion of the speaker” for the deliberative speech, but allows room for “any other 
proof available.”22 Anaximenes emphasizes what proofs works best for confirmation, but 
the oath is one of the available proofs in the rhetorician’s repertoire.  
 In Rhet. ad Alex. 32.1f. and 36.17-18, βεβαίωσις functions as a technical 
rhetorical term for a part of a speech (forensic or deliberative). One of the many types of 
proof that the rhetorician uses to make a βεβαίωσις is an oath. As will be demonstrated, 
the various components of confirmation are accounted for in Heb 6:13-18. Furthermore, 
Anaximenes’ category of βεβαίωσις explains parts of Heb 6:13-18 that are more difficult 
to reconcile exegetically (e.g., πρᾶγμα; 6:18). Before arguing that βεβαίωσις is a 
technical rhetorical term in Heb 6:16, I must first address the consensus that εἰς 
βεβαίωσιν in Heb 6:16 is a technical legal phrase for a guarantee. This is necessary, for 
Rhet. ad Alex. 32.1 and 36.17 lack the preposition εἰς, whereas εἰς βεβαίωσιν is often 
found in the papyri for a legal guarantee. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
21. Respectively: Rhet. ad Alex., 17.1, 3 (Rackham, LCL). Italics mine. 
 
22. Ibid., 32.1 (Rackham, LCL). 
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The Problem of εἰς βεβαίωσιν 
Often cited is the work of Gustav Adolf Deissmann, who demonstrates from the 
papyri that βεβαίωσις is a technical legal term lasting at least seven centuries.23 He claims 
that the author of Hebrews intentionally evokes this legal sense of “guarantee” when 
writing that an oath is εἰς βεβαίωσιν (Heb 6:16). Deissmann writes, “We do not need to 
give it the same sharply-defined sense which it had in Attic jurisprudence (guarantee in 
regard to a sale): it must be interpreted more generally; at all events it is still a technical 
expression for a legal guarantee.”24 Deissmann reaches his conclusion by arguing that 
βεβαίωσις was a widely used technical term in Egyptian Greek, the author of Hebrews is 
Alexandrian, and the context of Heb 6:16 is “permeated by juristic expressions. . . .”25  
Non-papyrological sources (i.e., literary), however, reveal the diverse range of εἰς 
βεβαίωσιν. Philo recognizes the legal nuance of a sale εἰς βεβαίωσιν when he comments 
on Lev 25:23.
26
 He quotes Lev 25:23 and then uses loan language to communicate that 
“possession (κτῆσις) [of] things are God’s, and only as a loan (χρῆσις) do they belong to 
created beings.”27 That Philo understands εἰς βεβαίωσιν as a legal term of commerce in 
Cher. 109 is substantiated by his return to Lev 25:23 in Cher. 118-123, when the 
                                                 
23. Deissmann, BS, 105. Deissmann cites P. Par. 62 (2
nd
 BCE) and P. Par. 20 (600 CE). The 
formula in P. Par. 62 is “εἰς τὴν βεβαίωσιν ὑποθήκας.” See Raphael Taubenschlag, The Law of Greco-
Roman Egypt in the Light of the Papyri 332 B.C. – 640 A.D., rev. and enl. ed. (Warszawa: Państwowe 
Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1955), 326; cf. Index. For commentators who cite Deissmann, see my 40n. 18. 
 
24. Deissmann, Bible Studies, 107. 
 
25. Ibid. 
 
26. Ibid., 106 discusses Lev 25:23, but not Philo. Deissmann argues that the non-literal LXX 
translation perfectly communicates the theological idea behind the original Hebrew – that a legally 
guaranteed sale of the promised land is prohibited because it belongs to God. Cf. MM 108. 
 
27. Philo Cher. 109 (Colson and Whitaker, LCL). For χρῆσις as loan terminology, see MM 692; 
cf. LSJ, 2006 4.III.  
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groveling lower beings (ὠνουμένους and πιπράσκοντας; 122) are juxtaposed against God, 
who expects no gain from His gifts (122-23).  
Philo uses εἰς βεβαίωσιν again in Mut. 155, but without any legal context. In an 
attempt to avoid attributing unbelief to Abraham, Philo explains away the laughter of the 
patriarch in Gen 17:17 and writes, τὸ δ’εἰς εὐσεβείας βεβαίωσιν διὰ τὸ μόνον χαρίτων καὶ 
ἀγαθῶν νομίζειν τὸν θεὸν αἴτιον (“he laughs to shew that the thought that God alone is 
the cause of good and gracious gifts makes strong his piety”).28 The syntax of τὸ δ’εἰς 
εὐσεβείας βεβαίωσιν parallels that of the previous clause, τὸ μὲν εἰς πίστιν, which is 
often synonymous with βέβαιος.29 This passage lacks a legal context; rather it discusses 
the virtues of the patriarch.   
In another passage, Philo discusses the role of Moses as a prophet and reprehends 
the one blaspheming God.
30
 Philo belittles his interlocutor and writes, “Answer me, thou 
man, Does anyone curse God? Then what other god does he call on to make good the 
curse (εἰς τὴν τῆς ἀρᾶς βεβαίωσιν), or is it clear that he invokes the help of God against 
Himself?”31 The use of εἰς βεβαίωσιν offers nothing to suggest the phrase operates as a 
technical legal term here.
32
 Instead, the phrase is a means of invoking a higher power to 
guarantee a curse. A legal guarantee does not fit the context.  
                                                 
28. Philo Mut. 155 (Colson and Whitaker, LCL). 
 
29. TLNT 1:280n. 1; Cf. Plato, Tim. 49b. 
 
30. For context see Philo, On Abraham. On Joseph. On Moses, trans. F. H. Colson, vol. 6, LCL 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1935; repr., 1950), 275. 
 
31. Philo Mos. 2.199 (Colson, LCL). 
 
32. Although in the previous section, Philo mentions the lawless (ἔκνομος, ἄθεσμος; 198), the 
context is of those who disobey God and εἰς βεβαίωσιν attributes the curse.  
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Philo, however, is not the only author to use εἰς βεβαίωσιν in a generic (non-
legal) manner. Josephus offers a lengthy account of Vespasian’s rise to power in Jewish 
War. Vespasian realized the strategic importance of Alexandria and was “eager to obtain 
control [there], with a view to the stability of the empire at large (εἰς βεβαίωσιν τῆς ὅλης 
ἡγεμονίας).”33 Writing to the governor, Tiberius Alexander, Vespasian gained control of 
Alexandria through peaceful means (616-618). Camping in Antioch, Vespasian 
deliberated the next step of his campaign, and “he decided that affairs in Rome were 
more important than a march to Alexandria, seeing that the latter was secured (τὴν μὲν 
βέβαιον οὖσαν ὁρῶν), whereas at Rome Vitellius was creating general disorder.”34 As the 
cavalry of Vespasian approached Rome, Antonius defeated Vitellius (647-654) and 
captured Rome for Vespasian. Josephus writes about the victory, “The people, freed at 
length from terrors, acclaimed Vespasian emperor, and celebrated with one common 
festival both his establishment in power (τήν τε τούτου βεβαίωσιν) and the overthrow of 
Vitellius.”35 Josephus uses βεβαίωσις and βεβαιόω to describe Vespasian’s ascension to 
Emperor. In J. W. 4. 616, εἰς βεβαίωσιν describes the national security available through 
obtaining Alexandria, not a legal guarantee. The word βεβαίωσις is used again to describe 
the establishment of Vespasian in J. W. 4.655. The use of βεβαίωσις does not work here 
as the technical legal term Deissmann observed in the papyri. 
Sextus Empiricus also uses εἰς βεβαίωσιν in a non-legal manner. He uses the noun 
twice in order to assess the quality of an argument. Discussing the place of a sign 
(σημεῖον) in epistemology, he argues, “that which is taken as a proof for the 
                                                 
33. Josephus, J. W. 4.616 (Thackeray, LCL). 
 
34. Ibid., 4.631 (Thackeray, LCL). 
 
35. Ibid., 4.655 (Thackeray, LCL). 
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establishment of sign (εἰς τὴν τοῦ σημείου βεβαίωσιν) is either sensible or intelligible.”36 
Later in his treatise, Sextus Empiricus similarly uses εἰς βεβαίωσιν to discuss the generic. 
He writes, “I mean, to establish a certain particular proof in order to confirm the generic 
(εἰς βεβαίωσιν τῆς γενικῆς).”37 Twice, Sextus Empiricus employs εἰς βεβαίωσιν in the 
context of argument, not as a technical legal term.
38
 
Summarizing, the above passages show that εἰς βεβαίωσιν is not always a 
technical legal term. Fascinatingly, Philo exhibits awareness of εἰς βεβαίωσιν as a 
technical legal term in Cher. 109, but he does not use the same phrase as a technical legal 
term in Mut. 155 and Mos. 2. 199. In addition, Josephus and Sextus Empiricus show that 
more than one author used εἰς βεβαίωσιν non-legally. To borrow a phrase from James 
Barr, one questions if εἰς βεβαίωσιν is “semantically bound” to the concept of a legal 
guarantee as observed by Deissmann.
39
 Returning to Hebrews 6:16, Deissmann’s claim, 
that εἰς βεβαίωσιν is “a technical expression for a legal guarantee” in Heb 6:16, stands on 
the ubiquitous use of εἰς βεβαίωσιν as a technical legal term.40 The use of βεβαίωσις in 
                                                 
36. Sextus Empiricus Math. 8.182 (a.k.a. Against the Logicians 2.182; Bury, LCL). 
 
37. Ibid., Math. 8.350 (a.k.a. Against the Logicians 2.350; Bury, LCL). 
 
38. Having not yet mentioned Philo Spec. Leg. 2.24, all of the above sources are the only 
occurrences of εἰς βεβαίωσιν in literary sources before Christian literature (e.g., Clement of Alexandria 
Protr. 10.94.3): TLG Advanced Lemma Search “βεβαιωσις” and “εις” 6 words near first (All Forms). 
 
39. James Barr, The Semantics of Biblical Language (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961; 
repr., London: SCM Press, 1987), 251. There is not space here to incorporate the work of Barr, but his 
criticisms of the TDNT have encouraged the current conversation. The phrase semantically bound occurs 
when Barr criticizes Kittel’s use of “new content” for Biblical Greek. Barr refers to the idea of ἀλήθεια as a 
technical term and says, “many Greek words which are used in the great philosophic systems are still not so 
technical to such usage as to become semantically bound to it.” Essentially, not every appearance of a 
technical term (i.e., a word or phrase that has a special meaning) constitutes the technical meaning. In 
Barr’s context, not every instance of ἀλήθεια constitutes the “Greek metaphysical usage,” nor does it 
always mean “God alone being the truth” (251). Context determines if a technical term is used. 
 
40. As well as Lev 25:23 and some places in Paul. For the quotation, see Deissmann, Bible 
Studies, 107. 
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the literary sources, however, shows that context determines semantic range and that not 
every occurrence of the phrase is a legal guarantee. 
The Αrgument for βεβαίωσις as a Part of a Speech in Heb 6:16-18 
Having now demonstrated that the meaning of εἰς βεβαίωσιν is not restricted to 
the legal guarantee argued by Deissmann, I can now show that the part of a speech, which 
Anaximenes labels βεβαίωσις, operates in Heb 6:16-18. This is because components of 
βεβαίωσις can be identified in Heb 6:16-18. In addition to answering where the author 
learned the terms, Rhetorica ad Alexandrum also explains the author’s use of πάσης 
αὐτοὶς ἀντιλογίας πέρας (Heb 6:16) and δύο πραγμάτων ἀμεταθέτων (6:18).41 
 According to Anaximenes, the βεβαίωσις of a forensic speech has several 
components. If the opposition disputes (ἀνιτλέγω) the πρᾶγμα, then the rhetorician argues 
from proofs (ἐκ τῶν πίστεων) followed by maxims, enthymemes, and examples. (Rhet. 
ad Alex 36.18).  Hebrews 6:16b features these components of βεβαίωσις. The author 
already has a proof, which was provided by God’s oath in Gen 22:16-17. Recall that 
Anaximenes includes the oath as a viable proof (Rhet. ad Alex. 17.1) and does not restrict 
the proofs of a forensic βεβαίωσις to witnesses and torture (36.17; cf. 32.1). Additionally, 
the author of Hebrews features Anaximenes’s aspect of dispute. According to 
Anaximenes, proofs are used when there is a dispute. No one disputes God in Heb 6:16. 
                                                 
41. A brief word about ἀμετάθετος (Heb 6:17, 18): Again, my primary task is to answer where the 
author of Hebrews learned his knowledge of legal terms. Scholars label ἀμετάθετος as a legal term (e.g., 
Lane, Hebrews 1-8, 149) as found in the papyri (P. Oxy. 3.482.35-36). Unfortunately, I was unable to find a 
parallel use of ἀμετάθετος that shared the surrounding concepts and terminology of Heb 6:13-20. It appears 
that the author has inserted a legal term into his discussion which is not immediately related to the context 
of Heb 6:13-20. For that reason, although a legal term, ἀμετάθετος does not receive discussion in the main 
body. Here are the searches conducted via TLG: Advanced Lemma “ορκος” and “αμεταθετος” 3 lines near 
first (All Forms); Advanced Lemma “αμεταθετος” and “ορκος” 2 lines near first (All Forms); Advanced 
Lemma “αμεταθετος” and “διαθηκη” 2 lines near first (All Forms); “αμεταθετος” and “νομος” 2 lines near 
first (All Forms); Advanced Lemma “βουλη” and “αμεταθετον” 1 lines near first (All Forms); “βουλομαι” 
and “αμεταθετον” 1 lines near first (All Forms); Advanced Lemma “αμεταθετον” and “μεσιτευω” 1 lines 
near first (All Forms); Advanced Lemma “αμεταθετον” and “πραγμα” 5 words near first (All Forms). 
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Rather, the ἀντιλογία is a theoretical dispute enlisted by the author to demonstrate the 
theoretical function of an oath. The author’s theory of an oath, which is for confirmation 
(6:16b), matches Anaximenes’s theory of βεβαίωσις. 
 Another component of Anaximenes’s confirmation can be identified in Heb 6:18 
as well. Scholarship has had difficulty determining the precise meaning of the δύο 
πραγμάτων ἀμεταθέτων in Heb 6:18. When following the author’s argument, the δύο 
πραγμάτων appear out of place, and it is not immediately clear what two items the author 
is referencing. This is further compounded by the non-descriptive meaning of πρᾶγμα.42 
A majority of scholars conclude that the two πράγματα are the oath and the promise of 
God.
43
 The rhetorical terminology of Heb 6:16, however, offers an alternative meaning. 
Recognizing that βεβαίωσις in Heb 6:16 is a technical rhetorical term designating a part 
of a speech then makes sense of the author’s use of πρᾶγμα in Heb 6:18, which no longer 
appears out of place.  
Again, when the βεβαίωσις of a forensic speech consists of proofs, it is because 
the opposite party (ἀντιδίκοι) disagrees with τὰ πράγματα. If the opposition agrees (ἐὰν 
δὲ ὁμολογῆται), then the “proofs may be passed over, and legal arguments employed . . .” 
(Rhet. ad Alex. 36.18 [Rackham, LCL]; cf. 32.4). Enlisting proofs (πίστεις) in a βεβαίωσις 
serves the explicit purpose of confirming disputed facts (πράγματα) that the speaker has 
                                                 
42. See the various English translations provided by BDAG 858-859. “Thing,” although a useful 
noun, is non-descriptive at best. 
 
43. For those who claim the πράγματα are the oath and promise, see Brooke F. Westcott, The 
Epistle to the Hebrews: The Greek Text with Notes and Essay, 3d. ed. (New York: Macmillian,  1903), 161; 
Christian Maurer, “πρᾶγμα,” TDNT 6.639; Spicq, Hébreux, 2.162; Lane, Hebrews 1-8, 152; Ellingworth, 
Hebrews, 342; Koester, Hebrews, 328; Thompson, Hebrews, 139. Cf. Attridge, Hebrews, 181: the word 
and oath of God. Cf. Johnson, Hebrews, 171: God’s word and deed. Rather creatively, David R. Worley 
suggests the two things are God’s oath-taking and oath-witnessing. See David R. Worley, “Fleeing to Two 
Immutable Things, God’s Oath-Taking and Oath-Witnessing: The Use of Litigant Oath in Hebrews 6:12-
20,” RQ 36 (1994): 223-36. 
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already presented in the narrative (ἀπαγγελία; 36.16). What Anaximenes labels 
ἀπαγγελία (and sometimes δηλώσις or προρρήσις depending on the time of the 
narrative’s subject matter; 30.11) comes after the proem (29.1) and is an opportunity to 
present the facts (πράξεις/πράγματα) of a case.44 A πρᾶγμα is a concrete reality opposite 
of ὄνομα, which is the language used to describe a fact (πρᾶγμα; 30.8).45 These facts 
(πρᾶγμα) are what constitute the narrative (ἀπαγγελία) of a speech, which are confirmed 
in the βεβαίωσις that follows.46 
Understanding βεβαίωσις as a part of a speech in Heb 6:16 eliminates the oath 
and the promise of God as the content of the δύο πράγματα in 6:18. In βεβαίωσις, the 
proof serves to confirm the πράγματα, which have been previously argued by the speaker 
according to Anaximenes’s rhetorical theory. The proof does not function to confirm 
another proof in βεβαίωσις, which would be the implication if the δύο πράγματα were 
defined as the oath and promise of God. Instead, it serves to confirm what has been 
previously argued. Therefore, following Anaximenes’s paradigm of βεβαίωσις, the δύο 
πράγματα of Heb 6:18 must be the narrative of God – that is, what God has already 
spoken. In Heb 6:13-20, the only speech of God is, εἰ μὴν εὐλογῶν εὐλογήσω σε καὶ 
πληθύνων πληθυνῶ σε (6:14), which is marked off by the participle λέγων. Although Heb 
                                                 
44. As has already been noted, Anaximenes labels this part of speech the διήγησις once in Rhet. ad 
Alex. 31.3. For this and references to δηλώσις and προρρήσις see my pg. 42n. 20. When discussing the 
narrative (30-31), Anaximenes uses πρᾶξις and πρᾶγμα interchangeably. These two words are 
morphologically related and synonymous. See Christian Maurer, “πράσσω, πρᾶγμα, πραγματεία, 
πραγματεύομαι, διαπραγματεύομαι, πράκτωρ, πρᾶξις,” TDNT 6.632-44; cf. LSJ 1457 and 1459 
 
45. For an example that helps explain the relationship between πρᾶγμα and ὄνομα, see 
Demosthenes 3 Philip. 15. 
 
46. Anaximenes anticipates his discussion of βεβαίωσις during his exposition of the narrative in 
Rhet. ad Alex. 30.5, which further demonstrates that the disputed πρᾶγμα of 36.17 are those told by the 
speaker during the narrative. Anaximenes urges his reader to be brief and precise so that “the audience may 
grasp the facts we are stating (τὰ λεγόμενα πράγματα),” and so that they “may not reject our narrative 
before we have supported our statement with proofs and justification (μὴ πρὸ τοῦ ταῖς πίστεσι καὶ ταῖς 
δικαιολογίαις βεβαιῶσαι; 30.5 [Rackham, LCL]). 
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6:14 looks like a synonymous Hebrew parallelism, the author of Hebrews views them as 
two separate points.
47
 The claim to bless Abraham and to multiply his descendants are the 
two πράγματα referenced by the author of Hebrews in 6:18. 
Viewing the πράγματα of 6:18 as the content of God’s speech (6:14) fits the 
passage because the content of the πράγματα must be something spoken by God, due to 
the immediate relative clause, ἐν οἷς ἀδύνατον ψεύσασθαι [τὸν] θεόν . . . (6:18). God’s 
promises of blessing and multiplication are confirmed by the oath in which the deity is 
unable to lie. Rhetorical theory also explains why the δύο πράγματα are unalterable 
(ἀμετάθετος; 6:18). God’s word is unalterable de facto, but the specific πράγματα have 
received that status because they have been confirmed by the oath of God, which is the 
focus of the entire passage (6:13-20).  
The sequence of events in Heb 6:13-14 and Gen 22:16-17, however, might 
present a challenge to my claim that the δύο πραγμάτων of Heb 6:18 are the contents of 
God’s narrative (6:14). According to Anaximenes’s arrangement, the narrative of facts is 
offered first, followed by the confirmation (βεβαίωσις), which consists of proofs if the 
facts are disputed. According to the sequence of events in the LXX, God first swears an 
oath and then presents the contents of the oath (Gen 22:16ff).
48
 This does not disprove 
that the author of Hebrews views 6:14 as two πράγματα of a part of a speech (ἀπαγγελία), 
for the author did not invent (inventatio) the story of Gen 22. Rather, the author retells a 
story valued as sacred Scripture by his community, interpreting it with rhetorical 
                                                 
47. This suggests the author believes in the plentitude of scripture, which Ellingworth begins to 
propose, but then prefers to define the πράγματα of Heb 6:18 as the oath and promise (Ellingworth, 
Hebrews, 334-5). 
 
48. In fact, the word ἐπαγγελία is not present in the text of Gen 22. Gen 22:16-17 is all an oath. 
The idea of “promise” is attributed to the text by the author of Hebrews. 
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terminology in order to communicate the weight of God’s oath to his audience.49 The 
author cannot help if the proof (the oath) comes before the narrative of facts.  
In summary, the author has recognized the oath of God in Gen 22:16-17 as a 
proof according to rhetorical terminology. The author sees this proof as confirming the 
content of God’s speech that Abraham and his heirs will multiply and receive God’s 
blessing. The author of Hebrews did not construct a βεβαίωσις, but rather has identified 
the components of a βεβαίωσις in the story of Gen 22:16-17.50 
The Eschatological Implication of God’s Narrative 
Having observed technical rhetorical terminology in Heb 6:16-18 and having 
identified the unalterable πράγματα (6:18) as the two points of God’s speech, to bless and 
to multiply Abraham’s family, we may now see the author’s eschatology more clearly. 
The primary focus of Heb 6:13-20 is the example of Abraham and the reliability of God’s 
oath.
51
 The details of God’s oath to Abraham, however, still carry tremendous value for 
the author and his audience.
52
 What Abraham achieved still applies to the community, the 
heirs of the promise (6:17). Furthermore this oath, although ancillary to the author’s main 
                                                 
49. It is another question altogether whether or not the audience would understand the technical 
rhetorical terminology. Regardless, this does not disprove my claim that the author uses technical rhetorical 
terminology in Heb 6:13-18. 
 
50. The author does not construct a βεβαίωσις, but references rhetorical theory in an abbreviated 
retelling of a known story. Therefore, determining if God has made a forensic or deliberative speech is 
moot. In addition, determining if the narrative of Heb 6:14 is an ἀπαγγελία, δηλώσις, or πρόρρησις, is 
unnecessary even though πρόρρησις, which prepares the audience for future events, is fitting (Rhet. ad 
Alex. 30.11; cf. 30.1). I have chosen to call the narrative “ἀπαγγελία” in my body because it is the term that 
Anaximenes primarily uses for the narrative in his treatise (30-31). 
 
51. The author focuses on Abraham’s example in order to complete the exhortation in 5:11-6:12 
and to demonstrate the reward of faithful endurance (6:12). The author focuses on the reliability of God’s 
oath in order to prepare the audience for the author’s exposition of God’s oath in Ps 110:4 (Heb 7:21). Of 
note, the author has not yet revealed that Ps 110:4 contains on oath. 
 
52. See Koester, Hebrews, 72, 111. 
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argument that focuses on Ps 110:4 (7:21), is one important aspect that drives the agenda 
of the author’s epistle.53  
Clarifying the content of the two πράγματα (6:18) allows for observation of how 
Gen 22:16-17 informs the author’s eschatology. The author focuses on the components of 
multiplication and of blessing, but these two items are not the only points of the oath in 
Gen 22:16-17. The third fact (πρᾶγμα) of God’s narrative is that Abraham’s “seed will 
inherit the cities of their opponents (τὰς πόλεις τῶν ὑπεναντίων; Gen 22:17).”54 For the 
author, the fulfillment of the oath is incomplete. Abraham and his heirs have achieved 
blessing and multiplication, but they have not achieved a city of heavenly rest. The author 
of Hebrews addresses this unfulfilled fact in the climax of his epistle.  
Starting in Heb 11:8, the author recalls Abraham and his family who “By faith 
sojourned in the land of the promise as a foreigner dwelling in tents with Isaac and Jacob, 
the co-heirs of the same promise. For, they awaited a city having foundations of which 
God is the designer and creator” (11:9-10). In Heb 11:12, the author quotes Gen 22:17 to 
signify that the fact (πράγμα) of multiplication was delivered. The author’s quotation of 
Gen 22:17 within the context of a future city (πόλις) demonstrates that this unfulfilled 
fact of God’s speech informs the author’s eschatology. The city not yet obtained is an 
important motif of the third part of the epistle (11:1-12:29) and the epilogue (13:1-21), 
which claims, “For while remaining here, we do not have a city, but we seek out the one 
coming” (13:14).55 The city motif prevails in the Epistle to the Hebrews because it is a 
                                                 
53. Actually, Ps 110:4 is the focus of Heb 4:14-10:18, but space here prevents me from arguing 
how. 
 
54. According to the text of the LXX. a fourth fact may be identified in Gen 22:18, that all the 
nations may be blessed by Abraham’s seed. 
 
55. For the other instances of πόλις, see also Heb 11:16; 12:22. 
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part of God’s oath to Abraham (and thus his heirs), which remains unfulfilled. In Heb 
6:13-20, therefore, the author intentionally omits God’s promise for the family of 
Abraham to inherit cities because it is not yet the community’s reality. The author 
understands the unfulfilled fact (πρᾶγμα) of God’s narrative as an eschatological promise 
to the community, although it is not at the forefront of his argument. 
Addendum: Answering Where the Other Terms Originated 
Before completing this section, three more points need acknowledgement. My 
primary goal is to answer where the author learned the legal terms of a given passage. As 
I have demonstrated, the author learned his use of βεβαίωσις, πρᾶγμα, πᾶς ἀντιλογία, and 
ὅρκος from technical rhetorical theory. Three more terms exist in Heb 6:13-20 that the 
author learned from rhetorical terminology. 
First, the author’s use of πέρας (6:16) reflects rhetorical terminology. There is no 
other occurrence of the phrase πάσης ἀντιλογίας πέρας, but the term πέρας is found in 
rhetoric to designate a conclusion.
56
 At the end of his discussion on βεβαίωσις in an 
epideictic speech, Anaximenes writes, “When you have now made sufficient use of 
maxims, round off the exhortation (τὴν προτροπὴν) with a conclusion (πέρατι)” (Rhet. ad 
Alex. 32.9 [Rackham, LCL]; cf. 35.15). The entire phrase, “a conclusion of an entire 
dispute,” comes from rhetorical terminology. Furthermore, the phrase “πάσης ἀυτοῖς 
ἀντιλογίας πέρας” (Heb 6:16) should be translated as, “and to them [it is] a conclusion of 
an entire dispute,” not “every dispute.”57 The phrase πᾶς ἀντιλογία is used to designate 
                                                 
56. See Aristotle Rhet. 1357b, τὰ γὰρ τέκμαρ καὶ πέρας ταὐτόν ἐστι κατὰ τὴν ἀρχαίαν        
γλῶτταν. . . . For the combination of πᾶς ἀντιλογία πέρας: TLG Advanced Lemma “περας” and “αντιλογια” 
6 words near first (All Forms). 
 
57. Against Attridge, Hebrews, 178; Moffatt, Hebrews, 86. Cf. Johnson, Hebrews, 168; Koester, 
Hebrews 325; Thompson, Hebrews, 138; Lane, Hebrews 1-8, 147. 
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the entirety of a single argument in Plutarch Fac. 928e.
58
 Given the rhetorical nature of 
Heb 6:16, the translation “an entire dispute” best suits the context of the passage, for the 
author of Hebrews does not mean that a type of proof (ὁ ὅρκος) ends every 
disagreement.
59
 
Second, the author of Hebrews writes that God swore an oath to Abraham, 
“desiring to show the heirs of the promise the unchangeable nature of his plan . . .” (Heb 
6:17). The phrase βούλομαι ἐπιδείκνυμι, albeit common, is used by rhetoricians. 
Compare Demosthenes, [2] Steph., 12.2, βούλομαι δ’ ὑμῖν καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἐπιδεῖξαι, ὡς 
οὔτε διέθετο ὁ πατὴρ ἡμῶν διαθήκην οὐδεμίαν οὔθ’ οἱ νόμοι ἐῶσιν.  Anaximenes uses a 
similar phrase in Rhet. ad Alex. 30.10, saying that if any improbable occurrence must be 
mentioned, it should be accomplished with a promise to eventually “demonstrate 
(ἐπιδείξειν) their truth in the course of your speech, pleading that you wish first to prove 
(πρῶτον βούλει ἀποδεῖξαι) the statements” already made (Rackham, LCL). The use of 
βούλομαι ἐπιδείκνυμι in Heb 6:17 reflects the terminology of rhetoricians, which is 
attributed to the intention of God.
60
 The phrase is not exclusive to rhetoricians (cf. Aesop 
Fab. 196.1.3), but because it is used often by rhetoricians and because Heb 6:13-18 
                                                 
58. The phrase “πᾶς ἀντιλογία” is also found in Deut 21:5 and designates any and every argument, 
which is to be settled by the Levitical priests. The occurrences of πᾶς ἀντιλογία are rare. Besides the above 
reference see Heb 7:7 and The Clementine Homilies 2.13.3: TLG Advanced Lemma search “αντιλογια” and 
“περας” 1 line near first (All Forms).  
 
59. Space prohibits the full exposition of χωρὶς δὲ πάσης ἀντιλογίας in Heb 7:7, but this is a 
phrase found in “formal promises to pay money . . .” (MM 48). See the 2nd century CE O. Claud 3.540 (cf. 
3.431; 3.548; 3.550; 3.553; 3.555; 3.616). It is possible that this is a legal formula. Hebrews 7:7 is probably 
indicative of how the author operates: rhetoricians often took phrases from the realm of law in order to 
amplify their argument (see Thompson, Hebrews, 139). This is fitting, for Heb 7:1-10 offers no legal 
context. Cf. The Clementine Homilies 2.13.3. 
 
60. For other examples of βούλομαι and ἐπιδείκνυμι, see Isocrates Areop. 70; Callim. 2; Panath. 
24; Xenophon Hier. 11.10; Lysias Against Simon 44; Demosthenes Aristocr. 102; Josephus Ant. 5.337; 
11.190; 20.26. Philo Spec. 2.214; Conf. 83; Post. 144; QE 2.46; QG 4.51a; Abr. 5: TLG Advanced Lemma 
“επιδεικνυμι” and “βουλομαι” 1 line near first (All Forms).  
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reflects a rhetorical background, βουλόμενος . . . ἐπιδεῖξαι, (Heb 6:17) can be labeled as a 
rhetorical phrase.
61
 
Last, a final item in Heb 6:18, which has only been observed by Worley, often 
accompanies the rhetorician’s nomenclature of oath making.62 The term that describes the 
act of relying on an oath in a formal argument is καταφεύγω. It is a metaphor that 
exhibits the sociological strength of the oath.
63
 Sometimes the verb is used pejoratively 
when opponents rely on an oath (Anaximenes Rhet. Alex. 17.2; Demosthenes [Euerg.] 
31; Philo Spec. Leg. 4.40). Other times the verb positively describes the actions of the 
speaker (Isocrates Callim. 29; Philo Sacr. 93). For example, Philo says, “Now men have 
recourse to oaths to win belief, when others deem them untrustworthy (τοῦ γε μὴν 
πιστευθῆναι χάριν ἀπιστούμενοι καταφεύγουσιν ἐφ’ ὅρκον ἄνθρωποι)” (Sacr. 93 [Colson 
and Whitaker, LCL], italics mine). Scholars have observed that the image created by οἱ 
καταφυγόντες in Heb 6:18 remains undeveloped, but recognizing the nomenclature 
                                                 
61. Here is a good point to discuss the origin of μεσίτευω (Heb 6:17). Many scholars reference this 
as a legal term (e.g., Attridge, Hebrews, 181). Hebrews 6:17 is the only occurrence of μεσιτεύω in the 
Greek Bible, which means finding a parallel source would benefit research tremendously. Frustratingly, I 
was unable to find a parallel source which adequately explained Heb 6:17. Here are the searches I 
conducted using the TLG search engine: TLG Advanced Search “μεσιτευω” and “ορκος” 2 lines near first 
(All Forms); Advanced Search “μεσιτευω” and “ορκος” 5 lines near first (All Forms); Advanced Search 
“μεσιτευω” and “αντιλογια” 3 lines near first (All Forms); Advanced Search “βουλη” and “μεσιτευω” 1 
lines near first (All Forms); Advanced Search “βουλομαι” and “μεσιτευω” 1 lines near first (All Forms); 
Advanced Search “αμεταθετον” and “μεσιτευω” 1 lines near first (All Forms); Advanced Search 
“μεσιτευω” and “επαγγελια” 1 lines near first (All Forms); Advanced Search “μεσιτευω” and 
“κληρονομος” 1 lines near first (All Forms). Papyrological and literary sources that have the verb μεσιτεύω 
do not share the same vocabulary present in Heb 6:13-18. Cf. BGU 3.906.7. Interestingly, Worley (“Fleeing 
Two Immutable Things,” 226-7) proposes Philo Spec. Leg. 4.31 as analogous for explaining Heb 6:17. I 
disagree that God’s witness to His oath (μεσίτευω) is on of the δύο πραγμάτων in Heb 6:18 (Worley, 227). 
Nonetheless, Spec. Leg. 4.31 is the closest parallel that demonstrates the meaning of μεσίτευω: God 
oversees His oath and guarantees it. Specialibus Legibus 4.31, however, is the only text like it and it is 
difficult to ascertain whether it influenced the author of Hebrews.  
 
62. Worley, “Fleeing Two Immutable Things,” 224-5, 228; cf. LSJ 919.3. 
 
63. Recall my comments on pg. 36. 
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accompanying oaths clarifies the author’s intention.64 The author and the audience are 
refugees, but they take refuge in the hope made available through God’s oath to Abraham 
(Gen 22:16-17), which has been fulfilled through Jesus, allowing the audience to follow 
their forerunner (6:20). The author learned his use of καταφεύγω (Heb 6:18) from 
rhetoric.
65
 
A Comparison with Philo’s Rhetorical Knowledge of Oaths 
Having demonstrated that Heb 6:13-18 contains technical rhetorical terminology, 
most notably βεβαίωσις as a part of a speech, it is now time to compare Heb 6:13-18 with 
Philo’s analyses of oaths.66 Not only does Philo comment twice on Gen 22:16-17 (Abr. 
273; Alleg. Interp. 3.203-208), but he often uses βεβαίωσις and πρᾶγμα in his discussions 
on oaths.
67
 Usually, the object of βεβαίωσις (or its cognate) is the oath itself (Alleg. 
Interp. 204-207; Spec. Leg. 2.8-25; Plant. 82; Sacr. 91). These instances differ from Heb 
6:16, where the oath provides βεβαίωσις. Three times, however, Philo uses βεβαίωσις in 
a manner similar to Heb 6:16, two of which discuss Gen 22:16-17 (Abr. 273; Alleg. 
Interp. 3.203; Somn. 1.12). This section will investigate if Philo also recognizes 
βεβαίωσις as a part of a speech when discussing oaths. Before investigating, it must be 
                                                 
64. Attridge, Hebrews, 182; Lane, Hebrews 1-8, 153. The idea becomes developed in Heb 11. 
 
65. This claim rests on having already established a rhetorical background in Heb 6:13-18. 
Compare the 4
th
 century church father Athanasius, Homila de passione et cruce domini in Patrologiae 
cursus completus, series Graeca 28, edited J.-P. Migne (Paris: Migne, 1857-1866), 185-249; here 189, line 
35, Μέχρι τούτου οἱ ἐν Χριστῷ βεβαιούτωσαν ἑαυτῶν τοὺς λόγους, καὶ μὴ, περαιτέρω βαίνοντες, εἰς 
ὅρκους καταφεύγωμεν. . . . Athanasius writes this while discussing Christ’s teachings on oaths and asks his 
audience to keep Matt 5:37. The reference demonstrates that καταφεύγω was understood as a term 
accompanying oaths at least up to the 4
th
 century CE.   
 
66. Scholarship has rightly identified a relationship with Philo’s analyses of oaths, but to what 
degree remains undetermined. See my pg. 37n. 8-9 for reference. Instead of reviewing previous 
scholarship, my section will singularly ask if Philo uses βεβαίωσις as a part of a speech, when discussing 
oaths. 
 
67. Philo discusses oaths often. See also Spec Leg. 2.1-38; Somn. 1.12; Dec. 82-96; Plant. 82; 
Sacr. 93.  
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observed that Philo recognizes the oath as a type of inartificial proof (ἄτεχνος; Spec. Leg. 
4.40; Cf. Plant. 173-76) according to the nomenclature of Aristotle (Rhet. 1.15), which 
demonstrates Philo possessed knowledge of rhetorical theory.
68
 Comparing these two 
authors’ rhetorical knowledge of oaths will illuminate the author of Hebrews. 
In Abr. 273, Philo discusses the highest virtue, faith in God (πίστις; 270). To 
make his point, Philo refers to Abraham and divides Gen 22:16-17 into the oath and the 
promise (ὑπίσχνέομαι) of God like Heb 6:13-18. He writes, ὅς τῆς πρὸς αὐτὸν πίστεως 
ἀγάμενος τὸν ἄνδρα πίστιν ἀντιδίδωσιν αὐτῷ, τὴν δι’ ὅρκου βεβαίωσιν ὧν ὑπέσχετο 
δωρεῶν . . . (Abr. 273). The use of βεβαίωσις here looks similar to that in Heb 6:16. 
According to Philo, this oath provided confirmation for the promise. Despite the apparent 
likeness to Heb 6:16, the use of βεβαίωσις does not reflect a part of a speech. This is 
because Philo uses βεβαίωσις synonymously with πίστις. The primary meaning of πίστις 
in Abr. 260-273 is faith (cf. the use of πίστις in Abr. 269-271), but it is likely that Philo 
means proof (πίστις) in the rhetorical sense (Aristotle Rhet. 1.15; cf. Philo Spec. Leg. 
4.40) when Philo writes, πίστιν ἀντιδίδωσιν. Βεβαίωσις cannot mean the part of a speech 
in Abr. 273, for the part of a speech consists of proofs (πίστις; Rhet. ad Alex. 36.17), 
whereas Philo says the confirmation, available through an oath, is the proof God repaid 
Abraham. In addition, Philo already has used ἀβέβαιος (269) to designate the 
materialistic pursuits that do not last. De Abrahamo 269 suggests that Philo intends 
something more akin to “firm” vs. “not firm” rather than rhetorical categories of 
speeches.  
                                                 
68. For reference, see Thomas M. Conley, “Philo of Alexandria,” in Handbook of Classical 
Rhetoric in the Hellenistic Period 330 B.C.-A.D. 400, ed. Stanley E. Porter (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 695-713. 
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In Alleg. Leg. 3.203 Philo again quotes Gen 22:16-17 and writes, εὖ καὶ τὸ ὅρκῳ 
βεβαιῶσαι τὴν ὑπόσχειν. . . . Again, the oath confirms the promise. The language is 
similar to Abr. 273, where βεβαίωσις is synonymous with πίστις (although the verb 
βεβαίοω is used here and πίστις [faith/proof] is not used until Alleg Leg. 3.204). The 
language similar to Abr. 273 makes it unlikely that Philo intends to mean a section of a 
speech. This can be corroborated intrinsically by how Philo uses the various cognates of 
βέβαιος in the rest of the passage, in which the oath is the object that receives 
confirmation by God.
69
 Of note, the words πίστις and βεβαιόω are also synonyms in 
Somn 1.12, another instance where the oath creates confirmation. Here Philo explains the 
significance of the well named ὅρκος (Gen 26:33), τὰ ενδοιαξόμενα τῶν πραγμάτων 
ὅρκῳ διακρίνεται καὶ τὰ ἀβέβαια βεβαιοῦται καὶ τὰ ἄπιστα λαμβάνει πίστιν. . . . Philo’s 
ability to say that an oath provides confirmation and that an oath receives confirmation is 
indicative of how Philo uses βέβαιος (and cognates) while discussing oaths; it is not a 
section in a forensic or epideictic speech, but a way of communicating that an action has 
received support. 
Often in his discussion of oaths, Philo uses πρᾶγμα to express the point about 
which the oath is made. Philo uses ἀμφισβητέω (Alleg. Interp. 3.205) or ἐνδοιάζω (Somn. 
1.12) to describe these doubted matters, not ἀντιλέγω or ἀντιλογία.70 In Alleg. Interp. 
3.205, πρᾶγμα is singular (περὶ πράγματος) and accompanies a general discussion of an 
oath’s function. There is nothing in the immediate context to suggest that Philo refers to 
                                                 
69. Expressed through various cognates, see βεβαίοω (Alleg. Leg. 3.204); βεβαίως (206); 
βεβαιωτής (207); βεβαιοτάτη (208).  
 
70. Indeed, Philo never uses ἀντιλογία or ἀντιλέγω in his discussion of oaths: TLG Advanced 
Lemma “αντιλογια” and “ορκος” 1 lines near first (Philo Judaeus; All Forms); Advanced Lemma 
“αντιλεγω” and “ορκος” 1 lines near first (Philo Judaeus; All Forms); Advanced Lemma “αντιλογια” and 
“ομνυω” 3 lines near first (Philo Judaeus; All Forms); Advanced Lemma “αντιλεγω” and “ομνυω” 3 lines 
near first (Philo Judaeus; All Forms). 
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the specific points of a speech in a manner similar to Heb 6:13-18 (i.e., δύο πράγματα). 
The general sense in which Philo uses πρᾶγμα can be especially observed in Spec. Leg. 
2.6, when Philo denigrates those who take lightly the items which are customary to swear 
by and never examine if μὴ τὰ πράγματα εἰ μεγάλα (“if the matters [sworn by] are    
great. . . .” My translation). Here again, Philo does not reference the specific facts of a 
narrative.  
It is not apparent in any case, where the oath is the subject of βεβαίωσις in Philo’s 
corpus, that Philo intends to refer to a section of a speech according to Rhet. ad Alex.
71
 If 
cognates of βέβαιος and πρᾶγμα often accompany discussions of swearing, what then 
allows for the distinction that the author of Hebrews refers to a part of a speech (Heb 
6:16)? First, Philo never uses ἀντιλογία to describe the πρᾶγμα. The use of ἀντιλογία is 
the crucial point in Heb 6:16 that allows for the connection to Rhet. ad Alex. 36.17, 
without which the parallel to Rhet. ad Alex. 36:17 would be undetectable. Second, Philo 
uses βεβαίωσις (and cognates) synonymously with πίστις, whereas in Heb 6:16 the proof 
(i.e., the oath) creates βεβαίωσις, aligning with Rhet. ad Alex. 36.17. Third, Philo uses 
πρᾶγμα in a general sense, but the author of Hebrews writes of δύο πράγματα (Heb 6:18). 
The assignment of a number reveals the author intended something specific (as opposed 
to a general reference). The contents of these two πράγματα (6:18) are best understood 
when rhetorical categories of a speech are applied. These three differences allow for the 
distinction that the author of Hebrews refers to a part of a speech, whereas Philo does not. 
These differences receive warrant from the fact that πρᾶγμα and βεβαίωσις are not static 
terms. As observed with εἰς βεβαίωσιν, not every occurrence of βεβαίωσις has the same 
                                                 
71. It should be noted at this point that using βεβαίωσις to discuss the function of oaths can be 
observed in other authors (Josephus Ant. 17.42; Thucydides Hist. 4.87.1; Hermogenes On Method of 
Forceful Speaking, 20; 3 Macc 5:42). 
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nuance.
72
 The same follows for πρᾶγμα, which carries different nuances even in Rhet. ad 
Alex.
73
 Philo uses similar language to Heb 6:13-18 (e.g., βεβαίωσις and πρᾶγμα), but 
does not reference parts of a speech. This does not disprove that Heb 6:13-18 aligns with 
the parts of a speech found in Rhetorica ad Alexandrum for the above reasons.  
As scholarship has already observed, Philo shares many similarities with Heb 
6:13-18. Both comment on Gen 22:16-17, both say that oaths are sworn to something 
greater, and both infer that falsehoods should be avoided when swearing. The author of 
Hebrews nonetheless differs from Philo, for the author recognizes God as having made a 
speech, which includes a narrative and a confirmation, and portrays God as a rhetorician, 
who attempts to persuade Abraham and his heirs of the reliability of God’s word. 
Epilogue 
The use of βεβαίωσις as a technical rhetorical term designating a part of a speech 
is rare in rhetorical theory. What Anaximenes calls βεβαίωσις, Aristotle calls πίστις 
(Rhet. 3.13.2-4; 3.17 [πίστεις]), Cicero calls confirmatio (Inv. 1.14.19; 1.24.1), Quintilian 
calls probatio (Inst. 3.9.1), and Aelius Theon labels κατασκευάζω (Progymn. 60.1).74 Of 
course each author has his unique variations and disagreements, but the function of 
confirmation (the part of a speech) is similar. Furthermore, when the word βεβαίωσις 
occurs elsewhere in rhetorical theory, it has a different nuance, as Schellenberg notes.
75
 
                                                 
72. See my pp. 44-8. Even rhetorical treatises do not use βεβαίωσις monolithically. See my 
epilogue. 
73. For example, sometimes πρᾶγμα can mean the entire subject of a speech (e.g., Rhet. ad Alex. 
29.3), other times it can mean an event (e.g., 8.2), or even the τά τῶν πραγμάτων ἔθη, which means “the 
way things normally run,” and counts as a proof (32.1-2; cf. 10.2). On this point, not every instance of 
πρᾶγμα in the Epistle to the Hebrews (10:1; 11:1) needs to be understood as the facts of a narrative as it is 
in Heb 6:18. 
 
74. Lausberg §430, which lacks discussion of Rhet. ad Alex. 32 and 36.  
 
75. Schellenberg, “Rhetorical Terminology in Paul,” 182n. 28. 
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In the late Ps.-Hermogenes Meth. 20,28, βεβαίωσις is a rhetorical figure that offers proof 
(πίστις) as opposed to a part of speech.76 In Ps.-Hermogenes Progymn. 5, βεβαίωσις is 
used to define κατασκευή, a student exercise in which a historical narrative is 
confirmed.
77
 These later instances differ from the use of βεβαίωσις in Arist. ad Rhet. 32.1 
and 36.17. Therefore, for a writer to use βεβαίωσις designating a part of a speech, that 
individual must have learned it from a rhetorical school more akin to Anaximenes than 
Aristotle. The author of the Epistle to the Hebrews learned a tradition of the parts of a 
speech that originated from Rhetorica ad Alexandrum.
78
  
In conclusion, a contemporary debate concerning the rhetorical background of 
Paul allowed for a further investigation of rhetoric’s influence on Heb 6:13-20. Hebrews 
6:13-18 shares an exegetical tradition with Philo, but reflects rhetorical knowledge that 
originated from Anaximenes’s Rhetorica ad Alexandrum. The author of Hebrews learned 
the terms πᾶς ἀντιλογίας πέρας, βεβαίωσις, ὅρκος, βούλομαι ἐπιδείκνυμι, πρᾶγμα, and 
καταφεύγω from rhetorical categories. In an attempt to exhort a beleaguered community, 
the author has used these rhetorical terms to depict God as a rhetorician persuading the 
heirs of Abraham about the unalterableness of God’s promises, even if partially obtained. 
                                                 
76. George A. Kennedy, Invention and Method: Two Rhetorical Treatises from the Hermogenic 
Corpus, Writings from the Greco-Roman World 15 (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2005), 251n. 
57. 
 
77. Similar to Aelius Theon Progymn. 60.1. The pair ἀνασκευή and κατασκευή are found in other 
progymnasmata as well. With βεβαίωσις: Aphthonius Progymn. 6; without βεβαίωσις: Theon  Progymn. 
60.1; Cf. Quintilian Inst. 2.4.18-19, who discusses the terms ἀνασκευή and κατασκευή. See Lausberg 
§§1122-1125.  For reference see George A. Kennedy, Progymnasmata: Greek Textbooks of Prose 
Composition and Rhetoric, Writings from the Greco-Roman World 10 (Atlanta: Society of Biblical 
Literature, 2003). 
 
78. This does not mean that the author of Hebrews learned all of his rhetoric from Rhetoric ad 
Alexandrum. What this means, however, is that the author understood the parts of a speech according to the 
terminology of Anaximenes, against that of Aristotle or even Aelius Theon (Progymn.). Not enough 
evidence exists to map the tradition’s progression from Rhet. ad Alex. to Hebrews – that is, if the author 
read the treatise or learned from a school with Rhet. ad Alex. as curriculum, or whatever possible scenario 
imaginable – but,  regardless, Heb 6:16-18 reflects rhetorical knowledge that originated from Rhet. ad Alex. 
63 
  
Where scholars have said that the vocabulary of Heb 6:13-20 are legal terms, stealing a 
line from Classen, “I would rather say [these terms belong] to the rhetorical terminology 
developed for procedures used by orators in the courts of law.”79
                                                 
79. Classen, “Paul,” 33n. 25. 
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CHAPTER IV 
A RHETORICIAN’S ASSESSMENT OF GOD’S LAW
A Change of Law 
In chapter 7 of the Epistle to the Hebrews, the author makes a startling claim 
about the Law. These claims have perplexed scholars and have stimulated conversations 
concerning Hebrews and supersessionism.
1
 The author’s discussion is unique to the NT 
corpus and uses vivid terminology to communicate a change in the Law. This chapter 
will discuss the terminology associated with law in Heb 7:11-19.
2
 Note, the terms 
                                                 
1. See Luke Timothy Johnson, Hebrews: A Commentary, The New Testament Library (Louisville: 
Westminster John Knox, 2006), 33-34; 210-15. See also Richard B. Hays, “Here We Have No Lasting 
City: New Covenantalism in Hebrews,” in The Epistle to the Hebrews and Christian Theology, ed. Richard 
Bauckham et al. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2009), 151-73. Cf. Oskar Skarsaune, “Does the Letter to the 
Hebrews Articulate a Supersessionist Theology? A Response to Richard Hays,” in The Epistle to the 
Hebrews and Christian Theology, ed. Bauckham et al. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2009), 174-82; Mark D. 
Nanos, “New or Renewed Covenantalism? A Response to Richard Hays,” in The Epistle to the Hebrews 
and Christian Theology, ed.  Bauckham et al. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2009), 183-8. See Witherington’s 
completionist argument in Ben Witherington III, Letters and Homilies for Jewish Christians: A Socio-
Rhetorical Commentary on Hebrews, James and Jude (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2007), 25-
26. 
 
2. Hebrews 7:1-28 makes a tightly woven unit, but my focus is on the legal terms of 7:11-19. Parts 
can be divided into 7:1-10; 11-19; 20-28. Mary Schmitt argues that the thrice “μὲν . . . δέ” construction of 
7:18-25 suggests this a separate unit within 7:1-28. Although plausible, a sharp break between 7:17 and 
7:18 is artificial; the author smooths the edges of his “outline” with rhetorical artistry. Regardless, she is 
correct to argue that ὁ νόμος (7:19) refers to the laws concerning priesthood, not the Mosaic Law. The 
focus of Heb 7:11-28 is Levitical regulation. Regardless, even if the translation of “set aside” is preferred 
(Schmitt, 189n. 2), the author of Hebrews understands the Levitical regulations to have been cancelled and 
replaced by the new covenant of Jesus (Ps 110:4; Heb 7:28; Schmitt 198n. 26 is incorrect). In addition, the 
priesthood according to Melchizedek is in opposition to what Moses spoke (Heb 7:14). When the author 
writes “a change of Law happened” (7:12), he means laws concerning priests, but these laws still make up 
huge parts of Mosaic Law (in agreement with William L. Lane, Hebrews 1-8, Word Biblical Commentary 
47A [Dallas, TX: Word, 1991], 181f.; against Schmitt). My capitalization of “Law” will reflect this. A 
thorough understanding of the author’s theology of the Mosaic Law is wanting, but Schmitt demands 
consideration. See Schmitt, “Restructuring Views on Law in Hebrews 7:12,” JBL 128.1 (2009): 189-201. 
Cf. James W. Thompson, Hebrews, Paideia (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2008), 155.  
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διαθήκη and ἔγγυος (7:22) have been reserved for chapter 5, which focuses on 
testamentary language found in the epistle.  
The Legal Terms of Heb 7:11-19 
Beginning in Heb 7:11 the author claims the Levitical priesthood, an institution 
legislated (νομοθετέω) into existence, failed. The author claims that when the Aaronic 
priesthood changed (μετατίθημι), “out of necessity a change (μετάθεσις) of Law also 
happened” (Heb 7:12). Attridge says, “The parallel terms for a change in Law and 
priesthood reflect common parlance for the alteration of a law or the removal of a priest 
from office. . . .”3 Attridge cites [Aristotle] Mund. 6, which describes god as the 
unalterable law, and Josephus Ant. 12.387, which describes the transfer of priesthood to 
Alcimus.
4
 Although an inflammatory and memorable claim (contradicting Philo’s beliefs 
of an unchangeable Torah [Mos. 2.34]), the terminology is too common to identify the 
author within a specific group. Using μετάθεσις in a discussion of law requires no special 
knowledge. 
In the following verses (Heb 7:13-15), the author explains how a change of Law 
happened. The Law of Moses required descendants of Levi to serve as priests, but since 
the different high priest came from Judah, the Law has changed. Continuing the 
explanation, this new high priest has arisen, “not according to the law of a command 
about fleshly things, but according to the power of life irrepealable” (7:16). Although 
used pejoratively, the term for fleshly (σάρκινος) is not an attribute used to describe the 
law (i.e., the law is fleshly and therefore weak), but rather the phrase ἐντολῆς σαρκίνης is 
                                                 
3. Harold W. Attridge, The Epistle to the Hebrews: A Commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews, 
Hermeneia (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1989), 200. 
 
4. Attridge, Hebrews, 201n. 36-7, respectively. For other occurrences of a change (μετάθεσις) in a 
law, cf. Xenophon Mem. 4.4.14; Isocrates Ad Nic.17; Demosthenes Timocr. 84. 
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a genitive of apposition.
5
 It explains the content of the νόμος, which was a command 
about physical descent (the subject of Heb 7:13-15).
6
 To state the obvious, σάρκινος 
therefore is not a technical law term.
7
 The term juxtaposed against σάρκινος, however, is 
a technical legal term.  
The word ἀκατάλυτος (irrepealable) is the alpha-privative of κατάλυσις. The verb 
καταλύω often describes the annulment of a law.8  In several cases, καταλύω describes 
the annulment of a system of government, whether a democracy (Josephus Ant. 19.173), 
a monarchy (Dionysius Halicarnassensis Ant. rom. 2.27.3), or the position of tribune 
(ibid., 10.31.5; δημαρχίας ἀκατάλυτον). Instances of ἀκατάλυτος (and cognates) that 
have no legal context exist (e.g., 4 Macc 10:8-11), but the context of Heb 7:16 allows for 
labeling ἀκαταλύτου as a technical legal term. Recognition of ἀκαταλύτου as such allows 
for a clearer understanding of how a change of Law happened.  
On the one hand, the term’s association with the abolishment of governing 
institutions is apt because the new priest has obtained a priesthood that lasts forever (8:6). 
On the other hand, the term’s association with law further elucidates how the Law 
changed. The author contrasts priestly inauguration via the law concerning genealogy 
against inauguration via the power of life irrepealable: 
                                                 
5. In agreement with Schmitt, “Restructuring Views on Law,” 194; cf.  Attridge, Hebrews, 202.  
 
6. The NRSV adequately captures the idea, “a legal requirement concerning physical descent.”  
 
7. In fact, the term σάρκινος never occurs with νόμος or ἐντολή outside later Christian Literature: 
TLG Advanced Lemma “σαρκινος” and “νομος” 1 lines near first (All Forms); Advanced Lemma 
“σαρκινος” and “εντολης” 1 lines near first (All Forms); cf. Advanced Lemma “νομοθετεω” and 
“σαρκινος” 1 lines near first (All Forms); Advanced Lemma “νομοθετεω” and “σαρκινος” 1 lines near first 
(All Forms). 
 
8. See Matt 5:17; 2 Macc 2:22; 4 Macc 4:24; Philo Spec. Leg. 3.183; Thucydides Historiae 8.76.6; 
Isocrates Archid. 66; Xenophon Mem. 4.4.14; Plato Leg. 864d; Demosthenes Timocr. 154; Dionysius 
Halicarnassensis Ant. rom. 2.52.1; cf. Cassius Dio 40.55.2; F. Büchsel, “καταλύω, κατάλυμα, ἀκατάλυτος,” 
TDNT, 4:338-339. 
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   οὐ κατὰ νόμον ἐντολῆς σαρκίνης 
    
κατὰ δύναμιν ζωῆς ἀκαταλύτου (7:16) 
 
The attribution of δύναμιν ζωῆς ἀκαταλύτου to Jesus results from the author’s 
understanding of Ps 110:4, σὺ ἱερεὺς εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα κατὰ τὴν τάξιν Μελχισέδεκ, quoted in 
Heb 7:17. The author understands εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα to mean that this priestly line has 
indestructible life (ζωῆς ἀκαταλύτου).9 The use of ἀκατάλυτος, a legal term, suggests the 
author understands Ps 110 as law, which has proscribed a new priesthood that overrides 
the Law’s requirement of Aaronic priesthood.10  This later law (Ps 110:4) is one 
irrepealable and lasting forever (7:28).   
After quoting Ps 110:4, the author explains that an abrogation (ἀθέτησις; 7:18) of 
the previous command happened. This strong term finds ample use in the papyri to 
designate the cancellation of legal agreements and testaments.
11
 In P. Oxy. 3.493.9, 
Pasion gives authority (κυρόω) of the will to his wife Bernice if widowed, and then 
claims that “authority belongs to no one else in the entire world to bring any of these 
[stipulations] to abrogation (μὴ οὔσης μηδενὶ τῶι καθόλου ἐξουσίας πρὸς ἀθέτησίν τι 
                                                 
9. Attridge, Hebrews, 202-3. 
 
10. Against Attridge’s statement, “Christ, on the other hand, is a priest not according to a new law, 
but ‘in power’ . . . deriving from ‘indestructible life . . .” (Hebrews, 202). The author of Hebrews never 
calls Ps 110 “law.” Instead, the author calls it an oath and the new priesthood is the result of oath making 
(Heb 7:20-22). It seems, however, that the author treats God’s oath, promises, law, and covenant as 
synonyms – that is, all of these concepts are various expressions of God’s speech (ὁ λόγος). The author 
treats the word of God, especially Scripture, as if it is law. Cf. similar sentiments in Philo Alleg. Interp. 3. 
204.  
 
11. See MM 12, Spicq, “ἀθετέω, ἀθέτησις,” TLNT 1:39-40; Christian Maurer, “ἀθετέω, ἀθέτησις,” 
TDNT 8:158-159; LSJ 31; BDAG 24; Gustav Adolf Deissmann, Bible Studies: Contributions Chiefly from 
Papyri and Inscriptions to the History of the Language, the Literature, and the Religion of Hellenistic 
Judaism and Primitive Christianity, trans. Alexander Grieve (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1901; repr., Peabody, 
MA: Hendrickson, 1988), 228-29; James W. Thompson, “The New Is Better: A Neglected Aspect of the 
Hermeneutics of Hebrews,” CBQ 73.3 (2011): 547-561; here 557. The papyri show that Heb 7:17 should be 
translated as “abrogation” against Schmitt’s preference for the milder “set aside” (“Restructuring Views on 
Law,” 189n. 2).   
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τούτων ἄγειν). . . .”12 This clause prevents any other party from altering the notarized 
will. Perhaps the author could have been influenced by the LXX (Ezek 22:26; Isa 24:16), 
but it is more likely the author took a phrase from common legal terminology found in 
business practice (e.g., BGU 44). In Greek literary sources the noun, ἀθέτησις, never 
occurs with νόμος, ἐντολή, or νομοθετέω.13  This suggests the noun does not normally 
accompany discourse concerning change of law. Rather, the author has inserted a term 
from the realm of property and business into a discussion of law. In a manner similar to 
μετάθεσις, the common use of ἀθέτησις prevents identifying the author within a specific 
group and requires no special knowledge. Regardless, the author believes a change of 
Law happened, which cancelled the previous commandment. 
The author then explains that the older commandment was cancelled “on account 
of it being weak and useless (διὰ τὸ αὐτῆς ἀσθενὲς καὶ ἀνωφελές)” (7:18b). The two 
adverbs, ἀσθενής and ἀνωφελής, only occur together in Christian literature after 
Hebrews.
14
 The term ἀνωφελές almost never describes a law (νόμος) or a commandment 
                                                 
12. My translation; cf. P. Oxy. 492.9. Note, Koester, Hebrews, 355 contains a misleading error 
concerning P. Oxy. 492.9. His quotation, “So long as I live . . .” comes from line 492.4, not line 9 as he 
references. Furthermore, line 4 does not use ἀθέτησις. Rather, the term for what Koester translates as “to 
abrogate,” is ἀκύρωσιν. Although synonyms, the speakers of P. Oxy. 492 and 493 do not claim the power 
to abrogate their own will using the term ἀθέτησις. 
 
13. This adds to the probability that the author learned the term from common business practice 
(e.g., BGU 44). TLG Advanced Lemma “νομος” and “αθετησις” 1 lines near first (All Forms); Advanced 
Lemma “εντολη” and “αθετησις” 3 lines near first (All Forms); Advanced Lemma “νομοθετεω” and 
“αθετησις” 8 lines near first (All Forms). Interestingly, the word also never occurs with μετάθεσις, 
ἀσθενής, or ἀνωφελής: TLG Advanced Lemma “αθετησις” and “μεταθεσις” 5 lines near first (All Forms); 
Advanced Lemma “αθετησις” and “ασθενες” 3 lines near first (All Forms); Advanced Lemma “αθετησις” 
and “ανωφελες” 1 lines near first (All Forms). Compare the verb ἀθετέω, which is used to describe the act 
of transgressing or cancelling a law (Polybius Historiae 36.9.17; Ezek 22:26; Isa 24:16; Heb 10:28; cf. Gal 
2:21). 
 
14. TLG Advanced Lemma “ασθενες” and “ανωφελες” 2 lines near first (All Forms). 
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(ἐντολή), whereas the term ἀσθενής attributes νόμος only once outside later Christian 
literature, but never ἐντολή. 15  
Considering possible parallels, the Apostle Paul’s use of ἀσθενέω to describe 
Torah in Rom 8:3 requires attention.
16
 Although similar, Heb 7:11-28 differs from Paul’s 
theology of Law. While the author of Hebrews focuses on priesthood, Paul analyzes 
Torah as a whole. Furthermore, Paul claims that the Law could not stop sin because of 
human nature (σάρξ), but magnified sin and its punishment (cf. Rom 7:7-25). Hebrews 
blames the priesthood’s humanity. On account of these minor differences, therefore, it is 
difficult to establish that the author of Hebrews learned from Paul the capacity to call law 
weak (ἀσθενής).17  
Aristotle, however, provides a stronger direction for understanding Heb 7:18. 
Beginning in Pol. 1267b.22, Aristotle analyzes the system of polity proposed by 
Hippodamus. Aristotle deliberates the merit of a law that rewards jurors inventing 
advantageous legislation for the state (1268b.22f.). Aristotle’s criticism brings him to ask 
if it is at all advantageous to alter the laws of any constitution (1268b.25). He concludes 
that it is commendable, but only if done for the community’s benefit and with 
discernment. Aristotle does caution frequent change of law, for the laws gain their 
                                                 
15. TLG Advanced Lemma “ασθενεω” and “νομος” 1 lines near first (All Forms); Advanced 
Lemma “νομοθετεω” and “ασθενεω” 1 lines near first (All Forms); Advanced Lemma “ασθενεω” and 
“εντολη” 8 words near first (All Forms); Advanced Lemma “ασθενες” and “νομος” 8 words near first (All 
Forms); Advanced Lemma “εντολη” and “ασθενες” 2 lines near first (All Forms); Advanced Lemma 
“νομθετεω” and “ασθενες” 1 lines near first (All Forms); cf. Advanced Lemma “αθετησις” and “ασθενες” 
3 lines near first (All Forms); Advanced Lemma “εντολη” and “ανωφελες” 2 lines near first; Advanced 
Lemma “ανωφελες” and “νομος” 1 lines near first. 
 
16. See the references in Erich Gräßer, An die Hebräer, 3 vols, EKKNT 17 (Zurich: Benziger, 
Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukerirchener Verlag, 1990-1997), 2:47.  
 
17. Although an inviting direction, establishing the relationship between Paul and Hebrews 
requires significant work, which my thesis will only begin to touch. Ben Witherington III creates a starting 
point in his “The Influence of Galatians on Hebrews,” NTS 37 (1991): 146-52. For another scholar who 
observes a difference between Paul’s theology of Law and Hebrews, see Attridge, Hebrews, 204-5.  
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strength from customs (ἔθος) that have taken time to develop, “so that lightly to change 
from the existing laws to other new laws is to weaken the power of the law (ἀσθενῆ 
ποιεῖν ἐστι τὴν τοῦ νόμου δύναμιν).”18  Here in a discussion about governance, Aristotle 
uses ἀσθενής to assess the effectiveness of a law in a manner that parallels Heb 7:18. 
This weakness is contrasted with the strength (ἰσχύς) of a law in the previous line 
(1269a.20). Within a broader discussion of political theory, Aristotle uses the antonyms 
ἀσθενής and ἰσχύς to anticipate the effectiveness of a law.  
Changing the parameters of the search from instances of ἀσθενής and νόμος in 
Greek literature to instances of ἰσχύρος and νόμος garners more results. Cognates of 
ἰσχύρος commonly attribute laws.19 Demosthenes In Midiam 224 offers an instructive 
example, in which Demosthenes persuades the audience to uphold the laws: 
And what is the strength (ἰσχὺς) of the laws? If one of you is wronged and cries 
aloud, will the laws run up and be at his side to assist him? No; they are only 
written texts and incapable of such action. Wherein then resides their power 
(δύναμις)? In yourselves, if only you support them and make them all-powerful to 
help him who needs them. So the laws are strong (ἰσχυροὶ) through you and you 
through the laws. (Vince, LCL) 
 
This reference aligns with other sources that speak of maintaining or keeping strong 
(ἰσχύς) the laws in a court of law.20 Other sources also describe a law as strict, or strong, 
while using the term ἰσχύρος.21 The abundant use of ἰσχύρος demonstrates the word as 
common terminology for laws, which consequently makes its opposite, ἀσθενής, a 
technical legal term as well. Therefore, when the author of Hebrews describes the priestly 
                                                 
18. Aristotle Pol. 1269a.23-24 (Rackham, LCL). 
 
19. Cf. LSJ 843. 
 
20. Demosthenes Contra Phaenippum 15; Polybius Historiae 24.9.8. 
 
21. Herodotus Hist. 7.102; Lysias Against Alcibiades 9; Plato Leg. 853d; Demosthenes [Neaer.] 
92; 1 Aristog. 24; [Macart.] 72.1; Anaximenes Rhet. ad Alex. 2.17. 
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regulations (ἐντολή) as weak, the author pulls from a legal tradition which assesses the 
strength of laws and is often found in the work of rhetoricians. What the author intends 
by describing the priestly regulations as ἀσθενής parallels Aristotle Pol. 1269b.23-24, 
which criticizes the effectiveness of a law and its ability to accomplish the task for which 
it was drafted.  
Not only does the author call the commandments (ἐντολή) weak, the author calls 
them useless (ἀνωφελής). As noted above, ἀνωφελής rarely describes νόμος or ἐντολή 
outside Heb 7:18 and later Christian literature.
22
 Imitating the study of ἀσθενής and 
ἰσχύρος, however, provides evidence suggesting that cognates of ἀνωφελής are technical 
legal terms. The evidence is slim, but two sources exist that use ὠφελέω to describe a 
law. 
The Attic orator, Antiphon, uses the term to protest his imprisonment, which he 
claims illegal. The prosecution prevented Antiphon’s three sureties (ἐγγυητός), to which 
Antiphon decries that even foreigners (ξένος) are lawfully allowed surety. For rhetorical 
effect, Antiphon adds, “So that this [law] being common to all others failed to help only 
me (Ὥστε καὶ οὗτος κοινὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσιν ὤν ἐμοὶ μόνῳ ἐπέλιπε μὴ ὠφελήσαι).”23 In 
Antiphon’s case, the laws written to help even foreigners failed to help the citizen.  
Reference to Antiphon helps study of Heb 7:18 because it establishes another context, 
even if one 500 years before Heb 7:18, where a law is described as useless. 
The second instance of ὠφελέω and νόμος offers more insight into the discourse 
of Heb 7:11-19. The term ὠφελέω finds use in Rhet. ad Alex. 36.22, where Anaximenes 
                                                 
22. Plato Hipp. maj. 284e, an important text for my purposes, features ἀνωφελής and νόμος. 
Somehow I missed this text. Dr. Curt Niccum kindly pointed out this text during my thesis defense, which 
is why, regrettably, I am unable to offer its necessary treatment. 
  
23. Antiphon De caede Herodis 17. Translation mine.  
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discusses theory for writing forensic speeches. After writing about the form and function 
of the confirmation (βεβαίωσις; 36.17f.), Anaximenes offers several strategies concerning 
laws when anticipating the opposition’s argument, which constitutes a separate section of 
a speech that follows the βεβαίωσις (36.19). In a scenario in which the laws are 
seemingly bad, Anaximenes instructs the speaker to capitalize on this disparity and 
convince the jury (δικαστής) that their judgment will overturn the bad law. Anaximenes 
writes:  
If the position is that the action committed was contrary to laws that seem to be 
bad ones, we must say that a regulation of that sort is not law but the negation of 
law, inasmuch as the law is laid down for the public benefit, but this law is 
injurious to the state (ὁ μὲν γὰρ νόμος ἐπὶ τὸ ὠφελεῖν τίθεται, οὗτος δὲ βλάπτει 
τὴν πόλιν). And we must also say that if the jury give a verdict contravening this 
law, they will not be acting illegally but legislating (νομοθετήσουσιν) to prevent 
the execution of resolutions that are bad and illegal. (Rhet. ad Alex. 36.22 
[Rackham, LCL]) 
 
While discussing rhetorical strategy, Anaximenes states that laws (ὁ νόμος) are enacted 
in order to help (ὠφελέω) the state (πόλις). Consequently, if the laws are useless, then 
they must be changed. In his context Anaximenes hopes to effect this change through the 
indiscretion of laws revealed in lawsuits, but surely this reflects a wider parlance of 
discourse concerning law. The author of the Epistle to the Hebrews emulates this type of 
discourse when he says, “For an abrogation of the previously issued command happened 
on account of it being weak and useless” (Heb 7:18). While laws should help (ὠφελέω) 
the people governed, the commandment spoken by Moses was useless (ἀνωφελής), thus 
requiring a change of Law and an abrogation of a commandment. Ἀνωφελής is a 
technical legal term (although one not requiring expertise), that the author learned from 
other discourse that assesses law, often found in the work of rhetoricians.
24
  
                                                 
24. See Plato Hipp. maj. 284c-e. 
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In summary, five words stand out as legal terms in Heb 7:11-19: μετάθεσις, 
ἀκατάλυτος, ἀθέτησις, ἀσθενής, and ἀνωφελής. Both μετάθεσις and ἀθέτησις occur 
frequently in literature (ἀθέτησις more so in papyri), while ἀσθενής and ἀνωφελής are 
minimal. The antonyms of the latter reveal the terms as part of common legal jargon, 
albeit instances of ὠφελέω with νόμος are still rare. Despite the sparse frequency of 
ὠφελέω, it is difficult to identify the author of Hebrews within a specific group because 
the term is somewhat common sense. The same follows for μετάθεσις, ἀκατάλυτος, 
ἀθέτησις, and ἀσθενής, which do not require expertise. Nonetheless, these five terms find 
use in discourse concerning laws. 
The Rhetorician’s Method for Arguing Law 
Scholarship has already recognized μετάθεσις and ἀθέτησις as technical legal 
terms signifying a change of law (or priesthood). The terms ἀκατάλυτος, ἀσθενής, and 
ἀνωφελής have remained unnoticed as technical legal terms (at least in printed 
publications). These terms are often found in the works of rhetoricians, although not 
collectively. Thompson and deSilva have already observed a parallel between Heb 7:11-
19 and the rhetorical handbooks that discuss law.
25
 The recognition of ἀκατάλυτος, 
ἀσθενής, and ἀνωφελής as technical legal terms sharply increases the likelihood that Heb 
7:11-19 is the reflection of a person trained in rhetorical theory.
26
 
                                                 
25. Thompson, “The New Is Better,” 559-60; David A. deSilva, Perseverance in Gratitude: A 
Socio-Rhetorical Commentary on the Epistle “to the Hebrews” (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000), 269. 
Concerning the hermeneutic of Hebrews, see G. B. Caird, “The Exegetical Method of the Epistle to the 
Hebrews,” CJT 5 (1959): 44-51. 
 
26. deSilva aptly notes, “With 7:11, the author is moving into a topic familiar from rhetorical 
handbooks (and thus from typical disputes in law courts or counsel chambers)” (Hebrews, 269). Given that 
the strongest examples I located of ἀσθενής and ἀνωφελής as technical legal terms come from early 4th 
century BCE, it is more likely that Heb 7:11-19 reflects theory more than legal practice. A comparison with 
P. Oxy. 2.237, an actual legal proceeding somewhat contemporary to the epistle (186 CE), makes it unlikely 
that Heb 7:11-19 reflects real-life experience in the law courts.  
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The rhetorical principles which Thompson and deSilva review are best 
exemplified by Cicero. Of the various methods of dealing with two conflicting laws, 
Cicero claims the rhetorician “should consider which law was passed last, for the latest 
law is always the most important. . . .”27 Other theorists offer similar guidelines.28 As 
Thompson says, “it was a common topos in rhetorical theory that the most recent law was 
considered binding.”29 None of the available primary sources shares the same language as 
Heb 7:11-19, but the principles involved parallel the epistle. In addition, anyone trained 
in rhetoric would have been prepared to argue with or against laws; the progymnasmata 
handbooks have sections preparing students for argument in law.
30
 
The terms in Heb 7:11-19 reflect this rhetorical regimen. The author understands 
Ps 110:4 as a decree that changes (μετάθεσις) the legal regulations that restrict priesthood 
to Aaron’s descendants. As the author argued in 6:13-20, God’s oaths are the most secure 
promises, and, as the author begins to argue (7:20-28), Ps 110:4 contains a later oath 
(7:28) that promises a new order of high priest. Consequently, a change of Law happened 
(7:12, 28). This overriding oath (which an oath made by God is as sure as law; cf. Philo 
Alleg. Interp. 3.204), is irrepealable (ἀκατάλυτος). Cognates of ἀκατάλυτος communicate 
the abolishment of law, often by another law. The “power of life irrepealable,” 
juxtaposed against the νόμον ἐντολῆς σαρκίνης, resulted not from the resurrection, but 
from the promise of a priest εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα κατὰ τὴν τάξιν Μελχισέδεκ, found in Ps 110:4, 
                                                 
27. Cicero Inv. 2.145 (Hubbell, LCL); quoted in Thompson, “New Is Better,” 560. 
  
28. Cf. Aristotle Rhet. 1.15.25; [Cicero] Rhet. Her. 2.15; Quintilian Inst. 3.6.46; 5.11.32; 7.5.7; 
7.7.8; [Hermogenes] Inv. 2.3; cf. Lausberg, §§218-223. 
 
29. Thompson, “New Is Better,” 560. 
 
30. Aelius Theon Progymn. 12; [Hermogenes] Progymn. 12; Nicolaus the Sophist Progymn. 13. 
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which the author quotes immediately after Heb 7:16.
31
  The author has understood Ps 
110:4 as a later law, which abrogates the older commandments and proscribes a 
priesthood that is irrepealable. 
The author then explains the abrogation (ἀθέτησις) of the priestly commandments 
happened because they were weak and useless (7:18). Aristotle, Pol. 1269a.23-24, 
encourages the change of faulty laws, but cautions that frequent change will make laws 
weak (ἀσθενής), i.e., unable to accomplish their task. In Rhet. ad Alex. 36.22, the 
rhetorical theorist encourages the speaker to persuade the jurors to legislate new law if 
the current law does not help but rather injures the polity. The terms ἀσθενής (ἰσχύρος) 
and ἀνωφελής (ὠφελέω) reflect discourse concerning law that sometimes involves its 
alteration. 
It is probable that Heb 7:11-19 is the reflection of a trained rhetorician, but some 
caution is at hand. These terms (μετάθεσις, ἀθέτησις, ἀκατάλυτος, ἀσθενής, ἀνωφελής) 
derive from common sense and do not demonstrate expertise in the practice of law. If the 
terms of Heb 7:11-19 were the only available evidence, they could not conclusively prove 
the author a trained rhetorician; perhaps the author simply learned from daily life.
32
 
Regardless of my input, consensus has already identified the epistle as the work of a 
rhetor based on its artistry and use of rhetorical figures like synkrisis.
33
 It is possible to 
claim Heb 7:11-19 is the reflection of a rhetorician, but only if having elsewhere 
                                                 
31. Of course the resurrection has influenced the author’s reading of Scripture. My comment, 
“resulted not from the resurrection,” serves to highlight the weight of Ps 110:4 and its influence as primary 
in the writing of Heb 7:11-19. 
 
32. This sentiment reflects the concern in Ryan S. Schellenberg, “Rhetorical Terminology in Paul: 
A Critical Reappraisal,” ZNW 104, no.2 (2013): 177-91; here, 177-8. 
 
33. E.g., Attridge, Hebrews, 20-21; Johnson, Hebrews, 1, 13-15; James W. Thompson, “Argument 
and Persuasion in the Epistle to the Hebrews,” PRSt 39.4 (2012): 361-77. 
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established the author as rhetor, like in Heb 6:13-20. Although the terms result from 
rhetorical discourse concerning law, the common nature of these terms prevents 
identifying the author of Hebrews within a particular school of rhetoric.  
Nonetheless, any rhetorician would have been prepared to argue with and assess 
law. The terms and ideas presented in Heb 7:11-19 demonstrate some familiarity with 
legal argument. Thompson, however, appropriately cautions, “The argument cannot be 
reduced to the legal frame of reference, inasmuch as it is intertwined with the 
eschatological claim that God has spoken in these last days, reflecting points of contact 
with pesher exegesis.”34 Although present, the rhetorical background is not primary in the 
author’s understanding of God’s Law. The reflections of Heb 7:11-19 can be expected 
from a rhetorician, but the primary force driving the author’s theology is his 
understanding of scripture, particularly Ps 110:4 (and later Jer 31[38]:31-34). Rereading 
scripture through the Christ event allows the author to see Ps 110 as a later law that 
cancels out the Law governing Levitical priesthood (Heb 7:19, 28) and establishes an 
irrepealable hope that allows the church to draw near to God.
                                                 
34. Thompson, “The New Is Better,” 560. 
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CHAPTER V 
AN INHERITANCE GUARANTEED BY GOD’S BETTER ΔΙΑΘΗΚΗ
Introduction: A Covenant or a Will? 
 After discussing how and why the Law changed, the author of Hebrews claims 
that, on account of the oath making (ὁρκωμοσία) in Ps 110:4, Jesus “has become the 
guarantor (ἔγγυος) of a better covenant (διαθήκη)” (Heb 7:22). The author here 
introduces the term διαθήκη, which becomes a prevalent theme throughout the rest of the 
epistle. Most controversial, as observed in my first chapter, is the use of διαθήκη in Heb 
9:16-17: 
Ὅπου γὰρ διαθήκη, θάνατον ἀνάγκη φέρεσθαι τοῦ διαθεμένου· διαθήκη γάρ ἐπὶ 
νεκροῖς βεβαία, ἐπεὶ μήποτε ἰσχύει ὅτε ζῇ ὁ διαθέμενος. 
 
“For where there is a testament,” the author reminds his audience, “it is a necessity that 
the death of the testator be brought, for a testament is ratified after death since it is not 
yet in force while the testator lives.” Although sill debated, most scholars recognize that 
a last will and testament is in view while others, such as the recent commentators 
Cockerill and O’Brien, maintain διαθήκη as covenant in 9:16-17.1  
                                                 
1. For the most recent in favor of covenant, see Gareth Lee Cockerill, The Epistle to the Hebrews, 
NINCNT (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2012); Peter T. O’Brien, The Letter to the Hebrews, (The Pillar New 
Testament Commentary (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2010); cf. Frederick Gardiner, “On διαθήκη in Heb. ix. 
16,17,” JSBL 5 (1885): 8-19;  K. M. Campbell, “Covenant or Testament? Heb. 9:16, 17 Reconsidered,” EQ 
44 (1972): 107-11; G. D. Kilpatrick, “Διαθήκη in Hebrews,” ZNW 68 (1977): 263-5. For those who argue 
for testament, see G. Vos, “Hebrews, the Epistle of the Diatheke,” PTR  13 (1915): 587-632 and 14 (1916): 
1-61; James Swetnam, “A Suggested Interpretation of Hebrews 9,15-18,” CBQ 27 (1965): 373-90; E. A. C. 
Pretorius, “Διαθήκη in the Epistle to the Hebrews,” Neot. 5 (1971): 37-50; recall the comments of Attridge, 
Lane, Johnson, Ellingworth in my first chapter. 
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 Components of Heb 9:15-18 may be identified with the Septuagintal διαθήκη 
(covenant). Often the verb διατίθημι expresses the creation of a διαθήκη (covenant; e.g., 
Jer 38:33), and the transgression (παράβασις; Heb 9:15) of a covenant may occur (4 
Kgdms 18:12), but it is unclear that the death of the one who made the covenant must 
occur before the covenant takes effect.  In contrast, a Hellenistic testament serves the 
explicit purposes of distributing inheritance after the testator’s death.  
 Instructive is the Will of Eudaemon (P. Oxy. 3.491). This document first declares 
the date and location where the will was made, and then uses the formula, διέθετο νοῶν 
καὶ φρονῶν Εὐδαίμων Θωνασύχιος (491.2), followed by the declaration of the authority 
to alter his will (491.3-4).
2
 Eudaemon then discloses what property is to be distributed 
and to whom after his death (τελευτάω; 491.4). His sons Thonis, Horus, and Eudaemon 
(κληρονόμος; 491.4) would receive their father’s buildings, estates, and slaves. In 
addition to distributing property, Eudaemon’s will includes strict instructions for the 
heirs, specifically Thonis, who may choose whatever property he would like given that 
Thonis observes the following clauses:  
that the said Thonis pays any debts which may be proved against me and gives to 
his brothers Horus and Eudaemon, if they have at the time of my death completed 
20 years, one year after my death, and if they are not so old, then to each of them 
when he has completed the 20 years, 500 drachmae, making for both of them 
together 1000 drachmae. . . . (Grenfell and Hunt, 3:195) 
 
The remaining instructions prohibit the heirs from selling any of the property before the 
age of twenty-five, appoint guardians for Horus and Eudaemon who had not yet reached 
twenty years of age, and provide directions in case one of the heirs dies childless (491.7-
10). Furthermore, if the sons or anyone else transgress (παραβαίνω) these clauses, that 
person must “forfeit to the party abiding by [these clauses] the damages and a fine of 
                                                 
2. Cf. P. Oxy. 1.104; 105; 3.490; 492; 493; 494; 495; 6.968. 
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1000 drachmae of silver and to the Treasury an equal sum . . .” (Grenfell and Hunt, 
3:196).
3
 
 Made in the streets of Oxyrhynchus in 126 CE, the Will of Eudaemon 
demonstrates that the last will and testament functioned to reduce the social anxieties 
created by death. Even if he had an untimely death, Eudaemon would provide for his 
family. Furthermore, Eudaemon’s will exemplifies the general form and function of the 
Hellenistic διαθήκη, a common practice with a lengthy history.4 For the author of 
Hebrews to refer to a last will and testament when explaining the new διαθήκη 
inaugurated by Jesus, no great effort would be required. Nonetheless, some commentators 
insist that διαθήκη consistently means covenant in Heb 9:16-17. Reviewing their 
arguments will establish the difficulties in interpreting Heb 9:16-17 and will provide a 
platform for then answering where the author learned the terms associated with διαθήκη 
by responding to the proponents of διαθήκη as covenant in Heb 9:16-17. 
The Argument against Διαθήκη as Testament in Heb 9:16-17 
 Scholars who argue against translating διαθήκη as testament in Heb 9:16-17 
generally follow the detailed work of J. J. Hughes.
5
 Hughes provides internal evidence –
lexical, syntactical, and semantic – and external evidence that discredits translating 
                                                 
3. For the use of παραβαίνω with other wills, see P. Koeln 2.100; P. Lips. 2.149; P. Sijp. 43. 
 
4. See Plato Leg. XI, 923c-3; cf. Raphael Taubenschlag, The Law of Greco-Roman Egypt in the 
Light of the Papyri 332 B.C. – 640 A.D., rev. and enl. ed. (Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 
1955), 190-207. 
 
5. John J. Hughes, “Hebrews IX 15ff. and Galatians III 15ff.: A Study in Covenant Practice and 
Procedure,” NovT 21 (1979): 27-96. Recall the comments of William L. Lane, Hebrews 9-13, Word 
Biblical Commentary 47B (Dallas, TX: Word, 1991), 231n. p-s (my page 7). See also Scott W. Hahn, 
“Covenant, Cult, and the Curse-of-Death: Diathēkē in Heb 9:15-22,” in Hebrews: Contemporary Methods 
– New Insights, ed. Gabriella Gerlardini, Biblical Interpretation Series 75 (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 65-88; 
Scott W. Hahn, “A Broken Covenant and the Curse of Death: A Study of Hebrews 9:15-22,” CBQ 66 
(2004): 416-36; Jared M. Compton, “Psalm 110 and the Logic of Hebrews,” (Ph.D. diss., Trinity 
Evangelical Divinity School, 2013), 161-9 
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testament in Heb 9:15-22. Regarding lexical evidence, Hughes argues that covenant is the 
dominant use of διαθήκη in the LXX, the NT, and the other twelve times the author of 
Hebrews uses διαθήκη (7:22; 8:6; 8, 9, 10; 9:4, 15, 20; 10:16, 29; 12:24; 13:20). 
Consequently, “one should at least be exceedingly cautious in attributing a meaning to 
διαθήκη in ix 15-22 that is so foreign to the author’s use of the word elsewhere. . . .”6 
Concerning syntax, Hughes argues the tight structure of 9:15-18 prevents a new meaning 
of διαθήκη from being used in 9:16-17.  
Regarding semantics, Hughes rightly observes that Heb 9:1-22 is a contrast 
between two covenantal orders, wherein the first order foreshadows the latter.
7
 From this, 
Hughes argues that the words of Heb 9:15-18 – such as διατίθημι, φέρω, ἐπὶ νεκροῖς – 
should be understood semantically within the concept of covenant. Hughes’s comments 
highlight the challenges of translating φέρεσθαι (9:16) and ἐπὶ νεκροῖς (9:17) as 
testamentary terms, and those challenges are repeated and expanded by proponents of 
διαθήκη as covenant. Hughes argues that φέρω “is not used in the extra-biblical literature 
in conjunction with διαθήκη or διατίθημι,” and suggests that φέρεσθαι (9:16) should be 
understood to mean a representative sacrifice has been brought.
8
 Concerning Heb 9:17, if 
ἐπὶ νεκροῖς referred to the death of the testator, according to Hughes, νεκρός would need 
to be singular. Hughes considers translating the phrase, “A will is legally valid at death,” 
but dismisses such an option due to the lack of parallel evidence.
9
 Hughes additionally 
criticizes the testament view because “It is simply not true to the historical facts to 
                                                 
6. Hughes, “Hebrews IX 15ff.,” 32-33. 
 
7. Ibid., 38. 
 
8. Ibid., 65. Cf. 42-43. 
 
9. Ibid., 44. 
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maintain that a will became operative on the basis of dead people or of a dead person. It 
became operative as soon as it was properly drafted, witnessed and notarized. . . .”10 
Hughes’s objections to φέρεσθαι and ἐπὶ νεκροῖς as testamentary terms overlap 
with his external evidence.
11
 Essentially, Heb 9:16-17 does not align with Hellenistic 
legal practice, for a will became valid upon registration and sometimes heirs could 
receive inheritance before their benefactor’s death. Hughes also adds that μεσίτης (Heb 
9:15) is not associated with testaments (διαθήκη) in extra-biblical literature.12 J. J. 
Hughes understands Heb 9:16-17 to refer to a covenant ratification ceremony in which 
animal sacrifices symbolize the death of the ratifier if the covenant was broken.
13
 
Hughes’s covenant argument receives endorsement from later scholars who add 
their own modifications. Scott W. Hahn endorses διαθήκη as covenant in Heb 9:16-17, 
but acknowledges two main weaknesses of Hughes’s argument. First, Hahn states that no 
monolithic form of covenant making existed, casting doubt on the strong interpretation 
“that a covenant is never secured until the ratifier has bound himself to his oath by means 
of a representative death.”14 Hahn attempts to avoid this objection by nuancing that the 
                                                 
10. Hughes, “Hebrews IX 15ff.,” 44. 
 
11. Ibid., 60-61; 65-66. 
 
12. Ibid., 64-65. 
 
13. Ibid., 46. 
 
14. Lane, Hebrews 9-13, 243; italics mine. Quoted by Hahn, “Covenant, Cult, and the Curse-of-
Death,” 80. Although Hahn claims that no monolithic concept of covenant ratification existed, he still 
discusses the ANE covenant ceremony as a monolithic concept, which the author of Hebrews clearly 
recognized (pp. 65-68; 75-79). Adding difficulty to Hahn’s argument, the animal sacrifices that accompany 
covenant agreements in the OT do not serve the same function. While the covenant made to Abraham in 
Gen 15 could possibly be a self-curse ritual, the ram sacrificed in Gen 22:13 (LXX) is a whole burnt-
offering (ὁλοκάρπωσις). Hahn understands all animal sacrifices associated with covenants as the self-curse 
rituals, proven by the statement, “each of the biblical covenants that concern the author of Hebrews 
involves a [self-curse ritual] symbolizing the curse-of-death” (79). According to Hahn, this includes the 
Sinai covenant, in which it is unclear that a self-curse ritual is intended in Ex 24:3-8, and the covenant 
made to Abraham. Hahn sees the splitting of animals (Gen 15:9-10), circumcision (17:10-14, 23-27), and 
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specific covenant of Exod 24:3-8 was “ratified by a bloody [self-curse ritual] (Heb 9:18-
22). . . .”15 Second, Hahn rightly objects to the claim that the statements θάνατον ἀνάγκη 
φέρεσθαι τοῦ διαθεμένου and ὅτε ζῇ ὁ διαθέμενος mean a figurative death of the ratifier. 
Rather, “The author does appear to be speaking of the actual death of the covenant 
maker.”16 Hahn instead suggests that Heb 9:16 is a statement about the impending death 
of Israel who had broken the Sinai covenant. Hebrews 9:17 then explains that the 
effectiveness of a covenant depended on the covenant fulfilling the obligation of death if 
broken (i.e., it would not be a covenant if it did not enforce its legal penalties).
17
 Israel 
was therefore cursed to die, but Jesus took their place as substitute.
18
 
 Hahn reiterates challenges against the testament view, as well as pointing out 
some weaknesses to the traditional covenant argument. Hahn’s interpretation has recently 
garnered support among some scholars.
19
 Jared M. Compton, however, has challenged 
Hahn’s position. Compton first dismisses the testament argument following the scheme 
                                                                                                                                                 
the binding of Isaac (22:13) all as examples of a self-curse ritual that refer to the same covenant. The author 
of Hebrews was surely aware of Gen 15:9-10, but never references it. Rather, the author operates with Gen 
22 in his homily and never signifies that he observes a self-curse present in the text of Gen 22:16-17 (Heb 
6:13-20; 11:8-12;17-19). For another scholar who argues against a monolithic concept of covenant, see 
Scott R. Murray, “The Concept of διαθήκη in the Letter to the Hebrews,” CTQ 66.1 (2002): 41-60. 
 
15. Hahn, “Covenant, Cult, and the Curse-of-Death,” 82. Cf. ibid., “A Broken Covenant and the 
Curse of Death,” 428. 
 
16. Hahn, “A Broken Covenant and the Curse of Death,” 431. 
 
17. Hahn, “Covenant, Cult, and the Curse-of-Death,” 85. 
 
18. Hahn translates Heb 9:16-17, “Since there is a covenant, it is necessary for the death of the 
covenant maker to be borne [when transgressions have taken place]; a [broken] covenant is confirmed upon 
dead [bodies] since it certainly is not in force while the covenant-maker lives” (“A Broken Covenant and 
the Curse of Death,” 431-4). In “Covenant, Cult, and the Curse-of-Death,” Hahn proposes that Israel broke 
their covenant during the golden calf incident (never mentioned in Hebrews), but that their curse was 
suspended for some 2,000 years until the death of Israel’s representative, Christ (86-87). 
 
19. Calling it a “truly ground-breaking study. . . .” See Cockerill, Hebrews, 405. For another 
recent commentator who endorses Hahn but with qualifications, see O’Brien, Hebrews, 331-32.  
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of Hughes.
20
 Next, Compton offers sharp reasons for the inadequacy of the traditional 
self-curse argument: (1) “A [self-curse ritual] contemplates future sin,” but Heb 9:15-22 
discusses past sin. (2) The self-curse argument forces a foreign concept into the text, 
“which the grammar simply will not allow.” (3) If Heb 9:16-17 is about a self-curse 
ritual, then Jesus was the superior self-curse sacrifice that provided forgiveness in Heb 
9:23. This is problematic, for “The symbolism of the [self-curse ritual] was not dependent 
on the quality of the symbol.”21 Compton adequately shows the difficulties of the 
traditional covenant view.  
Similarly, Compton provides five solid reasons against Hahn’s position: (1) Heb 
9:18-22 shows the author understands the sacrifices in Exod 24:5 as means to forgiveness 
(ἄφεσις), not symbols of a self-curse. (2) The use of ἐγκαινίζω in Heb 9:18 demonstrates 
the focus on covenant inauguration, not the penal satisfaction of a broken covenant. (3) 
Hebrews 9:23 also problematizes Hahn’s solution; the effectiveness of the self-curse 
ritual still does not depend on the sacrifice’s quality. (4) Hebrews 9:6-14 and 9:18-10:18, 
the surrounding context of Heb 9:15-17, suggest Israel’s problem – thus their need for 
redemption – was the insufficiency of the priest’s sacrifices, not a delayed curse. (5) 
Finally, Hahn’s argument does not solve the problems that he himself identifies with the 
traditional self-curse argument view. Hahn’s nuance, that Exod 24:3-8 was a specific 
self-curse ritual, fails because Heb 9:16-17 “[appears] to describe what is true in every 
                                                 
20. Compton, “Psalm 110,” 161. 
 
21. All three points are quoted from Compton, “Psalm 110,” 163. 
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case.”22 Furthermore, Hahn’s position still presents Heb 9:16-17 as meaning a figurative 
death although Hahn himself criticizes this.
23
 
 After dismissing previous arguments, Compton suggests an alternative worth 
consideration. According to Compton, Heb 9:16-17 envisions the type of covenant made 
between humans and God, which “required something to be done about the human 
condition before a covenant could be ratified and its benefits enjoyed.”24 Attempting to 
interpret Heb 9:16-17 through the events described in 9:18-22, Compton sees 9:16-17 as 
stating that covenant inauguration required sacrifice, not to function as a symbolic 
warning, but to allow the human party to draw near to God (Heb 9:14). Citing Lev 17:11 
(et al.), Compton claims that through sacrifice the sinner representationally forfeited his 
or her life in order to live in the presence of God.
25
 Compton’s solution has merit because 
it encapsulates the author’s effort to demonstrate the available access to God through 
Jesus’s blood (9:14; 10:19). Additionally, Compton highlights the focus on covenant 
inauguration in Heb 9:15-18. The difficulty, however, is that Compton’s solution still 
requires understanding 9:16-17 as a representative death, when the syntax suggests 
something more concrete.  
 These three variations on the covenant view show the difficulty of interpreting 
Heb 9:15-18. Hughes presents obstacles (repeated by Hahn and Compton) to 
understanding Heb 9:16-17 as a reference to testamentary practice. As Hahn and 
Compton argue for their reiterations of the covenant view, they each reveal the 
                                                 
22. Compton, “Psalm 110,” 164. 
 
23. All the above points from ibid., 163-4. 
 
24. Ibid., 160. 
 
25. Ibid. 
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inadequacy of Hughes’s proposal. Compton reveals the weakness in Hahn’s argument, 
but Compton still cannot account for 9:16-17. 
Having now discussed Hughes, Hahn, Compton, and the difficulties inherent in 
exegeting Heb 9:16-17, I will offer several word studies in response to the proponents of 
covenant in order to answer where the author learned his knowledge of terms. 
The Argument for Διαθήκη as Testament in Heb 9:16-17 
Investigating the Terms of Heb 9:16 and 9:17 
Heb 9:16 
 Understanding the author’s unique use of φέρω presents a challenge for 
interpreting Heb 9:16. Koester understands φέρω to refer to the common legal practice 
whereby an heir notifies a public official about the death of the testator. As evidence, 
Koester quotes P. Mich. inv. 2841, “I therefore present the notice in order that his name 
may be enrolled in the list of the dead.”26 As Hahn aptly observes, however, Koester’s 
evidence does not “mention a will or inheritance as being at issue in the notice of 
death.”27 Moreover, neither does P. Mich. inv. 2841 use the term φέρω. Instead, it uses 
ἐπιδίδωμι for “present.” While discussing Heb 6:13-20, Koester does cite a registration of 
death within the context of inheritance, but P. Oxy. 3.482 uses the term ἀπογράφω.28 The 
registration of dead persons was a required legal practice in the Hellenistic world, but 
                                                 
26. Craig R. Koester, Hebrews: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary, The 
Anchor Bible Commentaries 36 (New York: Doubleday, 2001), 418; italics mine. Koester references and 
quotes the translation in J. G. Winter, Life and Letters in the Papyri, Jerome Lectures (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan, 1933), 132. Cf. P. Mich. inv. 853/795. Koester also references Hunt and Edgar, 
Select Papyri, 2:310 (pg. 334-5). 
 
27. Hahn, “Covenant, Cult, and the Curse-of-Death, 74n. 32. In fact neither do P. Mich. inv. 
853/795 nor Hunt and Edgar, Select Papyri, 2:334-35.  
 
28. Koester, Hebrews, 327. 
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none of the papyri use φέρω as the principal term for registration.29 If the author of 
Hebrews had intended to refer to the necessary legal registration of the dead, the verb 
ἀπογράφω would have been more appropriate. The author clearly knows this sense of 
ἀπογράφω, for he uses it in reference to the ἐκκλησία registered in the heavens (12:23).30 
As the proponents of covenant object, evidence demonstrating φέρω as a technical legal 
term for registration is conjectural. 
 In stark contrast to the covenant view, however, φέρω nonetheless appears in 
testamentary discourse as a legal term.
31
 The legal sense of φέρω may be observed in 
Isaeus when the speaker accuses Hierocles of having, “the audacity to come here with a 
forged will (ἐστὶ τολμηρὸς ὥστε οὐ γενομένας διαθήκας ἥκει φέρων). . . .”32 The use of 
φέρω in Isaeus demonstrates the presenting of a document in a law court; it is not 
exclusive to wills. A more interesting example is the dramatic episode recounted in 
Appian’s Civil War, when Brutus and Cassius attempt to stop the opening of Caesar’s 
will. After a stirring speech, Lucius Piso convinces the Senate to open Caesar’s will with 
the result that “Caesar’s will was now produced and the people read it at once (Διαθῆκαι 
δὲ τοῦ Καίσαρος ὤφθησαν φερόμεναι, καὶ εὐθὺς αὐτὰς τὸ πλῆθος ἐκέλευον 
                                                 
29. Cf. P. Oxy. 1.76 (MM 347). In P. Oxy. 244 (cited by Attridge, Hebrews, 256n. 33) Grenfell 
and Hunt translate φέρω as “to register,” (Grenfell and Hunt, 2:194). Unfortunately the line is lacuna and 
cannot be counted as evidence. For the required registration of the dead see Winter, Life and Letters, 132. 
 
30. Luke also uses the term when describing the census of Emperor Augustus (Luke 2:1). Also, 
the author of Hebrews never uses ἐπιδίδωμι. Acts 15:30 reflects the sense found in P. Mich. inv. 2841. 
 
31. See the subheading in Hughes, “Hebrews IX 15ff.,” 65. Of note, Wiid suggests φέρω 
accompanies διαθήκη in a global sense, but never provides references. See J. S. Wiid, “The Testamental 
Significance of διαθήκη in Hebrews 9:15-22,” Neot 26 (1992): 149-56; on this point, pg. 151. 
 
32. De Astyphilo 22 (Forster, LCL); cf. 25. 
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ἀναγινώσκειν; 2.20.143).”33 Diogenes Laertius also uses φέρω when discussing wills, but 
due to a lack of parallel evidence it is difficult to ascertain exactly what he means. Before 
reciting the will of Strato the physicist, Diogenes writes, Τοῦ δ’ οὖν φυσικοῦ φέρονται 
καὶ διαθῆκαι τοῦτον ἔχουσαι τὸν τρόπον (“But to return to Strato the physicist. His will is 
also extant and it runs as follows”).34 After reciting the will, Diogenes closes, Καὶ αἵδε 
μέν εἰσιν αἱ φερόμεναι αὐτοῦ διαθῆκαι . . . (5.64). The will of Strato is the only one 
bookmarked by the use of φέρω in Lives of Eminent Philosophers, making it difficult to 
understand its exact function. Nonetheless, it counts as another instance of φέρω in 
testamentary discourse.  
 Recognizing φέρω as the appropriate term for the presenting of a will would 
definitively prove that Heb 9:16-17 references Hellenistic testamentary practice. The 
grammar of Heb 9:16, however, simply inhibits this claim. The subject of φέρεσθαι 
(9:16) must be θάνατος. The infinitive form of φέρω takes its subject in the accusative, 
even in the passive voice.
35
 What, then, is the sense and meaning of θάνατον φέρεσθαι? 
Lane and Hughes suggest that φέρω represents bringing sacrifices, but that is unlikely 
because the testator/ratifier does not sacrifice his or her life to inaugurate a διαθήκη and 
the author of Hebrews uses προσφέρω for offering sacrifice.36 Scholars in favor of 
                                                 
33. White, LCL. Cited first by Frederick Field, Notes on the Translation of the New Testament: 
Being Otium Norvicense III (Cambridge, 1899), 230n. 3; cf. Appian Bel. civ. 2.18.135; 2.19.136; Plutarch 
Ti. C. Gracch. 14.1.2; Stud. pal. 20.14; SB 18.13168. 
 
34. Diogenes Laertius Lives of Eminent Philosophers  5.61.7 (Hicks, LCL). 
35. Interestingly, a TLG search reveals the combination of ἀνάγκη and φέρεσθαι communicates 
movement often in geometry and cosmology. It is unlikely this is what the author of Hebrews intends, but 
these references demonstrate φέρεσθαι takes its subject in the accusative case: Aristotle Gen. an. 787a.17; 
Cael.276b.14; 311b.35; [Mech.] 848.11; Phys. 215a.21; [Probl.] 913b.3; Epictetus Ench. 39.1.4; Galen De 
dignoscendis pulsibus libri iv 8.801.2; Nemesius De natura hominis 43.127.9: TLG Advanced Lemma 
“ἀνάγκη” and “φέρεσθαι” 1 words near first (Selected Forms). 
 
36. Lane, Hebrews 9-13, 231n. p. For προσφέρω see Heb 5:1, 3, 7; 8:3, 4; 9:7, 9, 14, 25, 28; 10:1, 
2, 8, 11, 12; 11:4, 17; 12:7. 
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διαθήκη as testament often settle for understanding φέρω in the sense of announcing a 
message.
37
 There are numerous examples where a message is brought forth (φέρω), but 
the subject of φέρεσθαι is θάνατος in Heb 9:16.38 The author could mean that the death 
must be announced, but Heb 9:11-22 lacks any idea of announcement. A final 
interpretive option remains, which is rather mundane, but makes the passage 
understandable. 
 A TLG search reveals that the verb φέρω is often associated with θάνατος.39 In 
one of the earliest instances of this combination, Xenophon recounts the iconic death of 
Socrates, lauding how he “won glory by the . . . equanimity and manliness with which he 
bore the sentence of death (τὴν κατάγνωσιν τοῦ θανάτου πραότατα καὶ ἀνδρωδέστατα 
ἐνέγκας).”40 Xenophon continues, “In fact it is admitted that there is no record of death 
more nobly borne (κάλλιον θάνατον ἐνεγκεῖν).”41 Xenophon uses the aorist active 
participle and then the aorist active infinitive of φέρω to describe the death of Socrates. 
The verb emphasizes Socrates’s virtue in enduring his death penalty, demonstrating the 
figurative sense of φέρω.42 The verb φέρω may take any mood but uses the active voice. 
The author of Heb 9:16 could mean “the testator must endure their own death (i.e., die),” 
but it is unlikely. Xenophon uses the active infinitive when making the general 
observation that no one else has borne such a death as Socrates (Mem. 4.8.2). Hebrews 
                                                 
37. Harold W. Attridge, The Epistle to the Hebrews: A Commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews, 
Hermeneia (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1989), 256; Koester, Hebrews, 418. 
 
38. See the references in Field, Notes, 229-30; LSJ 1923.IV; MM 666. 
 
39. TLG Advanced Lemma “θανατος” and “φερω” 6 words near first (All Forms). 
 
40. Xenophon, Mem., 4.8.1 (Marchant, LCL). 
 
41. Ibid., 4.8.2 (Marchant, LCL); Cf. Plato Gorg. 522d-e. 
 
42. BDAG 1051.1.b. 
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9:16 is also a general observation, so the active infinitive would be expected. The TLG 
search, however, revealed another sense of φέρω θάνατον. 
 Occurring eight times in medical treatises, φέρω communicates that a certain 
malady results in death. Hippocrates demonstrates this three times in his work On Joints. 
The physician writes, “In cases where the vertebrae are curved inwards from a fall or the 
impact of some heavy weight, no single vertebra is much displaced from the others as a 
rule; and if there is a great displacement of one or more, it brings death (θάνατον 
φέρουσι).”43 In this case, a major dislocation of vertebrae causes death. Five more times, 
Hippocrates uses φέρω to say a certain malady brings death (Artic. 40; 66; Morb. 1.5.12; 
Acut. 11.26, 70), using φέρω in the active voice (both singular and plural) with θάνατος 
in the accusative case. Likewise, Galen demonstrates knowledge of Hippocrates’s use of 
θάνατον φέρει when he quotes Acut. 11.26 with some textual variance in Galen 15.589.4. 
Galen uses the phrase himself in De crisibius libr iii, when he summarizes what the 
physician should remember when pre-diagnosing paroxysms and cautions, “the 
beginnings of the paroxysms more so bring the death (αἱ ἀρχαὶ τῶν παροξυσμῶν μάλιστα 
φέρουσι τὸν θάνατον).”44 According to these physicians, death is something that can be 
brought.
45
  
 A TLG search reveals φέρω and θάνατος not to be an unusual combination. 
Moreover, the idiom reflects two senses of the word φέρω: a figurative sense in which 
death is nobly endured and a literal sense in which death is brought. Determining which 
                                                 
43. Hippocrates Artic. 48 (Withington, LCL). 
 
44. Galen 9.749.12; my trans. 
 
45. See also Josephus Ant. 18.298 and Cyril of Alexandria Contra Julianum 1.16.13. There are 
two more references that use φέρω to say a death penalty has been brought, “τὴν ψῆφον θάνατον φέρειν 
τὴν πλήθει νικῶσαν” (Plato Leg. 856c); cf. Chariton Chaer. 3.4.15. 
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sense fits Heb 9:16 still has its challenges, however, because an exact grammatical 
parallel of 9:16 has yet to be located. When φέρω takes the passive voice, a nearby dative 
designates to whom death is brought (Cyril Contra Julianum 1.16.13; Chariton Chaer. 
3.4.15). There is even a dative of indirect object in Hippocrates when φέρω is active 
(Acut. 11.26). If the author of Hebrews meant “death must be brought to the testator,” 
then διαθεμένου would likely be dative. 
 There is one genitive construction, however, that allows for the above 
interpretation. Concerning the predicate use of a genitive that describes a noun, Smyth 
says, “The genitive with εἰμί may denote the person whose nature, duty, custom, etc., it is 
to do that set forth in an infinitive subject of the verb . . . .”46 As his first example Smyth 
quotes Menander Sent. 463, πενίᾱν φέρειν οὐ παντός, ἀλλ’ ἀνδρὸς σοφοποῦ, which he 
translates, “ ’tis the sage, not every one, who can bear poverty.” Here εἰμί is omitted, but 
reveals the object (designated by the genitive substantive) who fulfills the nature outlined 
by the infinitive subject. 
 Paralleling Menander’s grammar, Heb 9:16 exemplifies the predicate use of the 
genitive defined by the infinitive subject. The author of Hebrews refers to a well-known 
custom while explaining the death of Jesus. First the author introduces the concept of a 
testament (διαθήκη) while omitting εἰμί (9:16a). Then the author describes the custom 
using an infinitive that is fulfilled by a substantive participle in the genitive case. Given 
Smyth’s example, it is possible that the author of Hebrews omitted a second εἰμί in the 
latter half of the verse (Heb 9:16b). Hebrews 9:16 should be translated, “For where there 
                                                 
46. Herbert Weir Smyth, Greek Grammar (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1920; rev. by 
Gordon M. Messing: Harvard University Press, 1984), §1304; cf. §1290. 
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is a will, ’tis the testator who must be brought death.”47 Hebrews 9:16, therefore, is an 
alternative means of expressing a death has to happen (cf. θανάτου γενομένου; 9:15) that 
has its precedent in medical treatises. 
 I hope to have demonstrated that φέρω θάνατος is not unusual and that, although 
awkward to at least English ears, Heb 9:16 has a grammatical precedence. My 
interpretation rests on the inadequacy of prior solutions and the realization that φέρω 
θάνατον occurs enough in literature as an appropriate means to say “death happens.” 
Hebrews 9:16 does not employ φέρω as a technical legal term. Rather, Hebrews 9:16 is a 
simple (non-specialized) reference to a common legal custom.  
 Heb 9:17 
 Most unusual is the author’s use of ἐπὶ νεκροῖς to communicate that a will takes 
effect after the testator’s death. It is over this peculiarity that opponents of the testament 
view object, saying wills are not valid “on the basis of dead people,” and inheritance may 
be given before death, which prompts their suggestion that νεκροῖς refers to animal 
sacrifice.
48
 James Moffatt, a proponent of the testament view, aptly stated, “The 
illustration has its defects, but only when it is pressed beyond what the writer means to 
                                                 
47. A more literal way of translating Heb 9:16b, “the necessity to be brought death is of the one 
testating.” Compare with a more literal translation of Menander Sent. 463, “To bear poverty is not of 
everyone, but of the wise man.” My grammatical proposal has a leg to stand on because the infinitive 
(φέρεσθαι) separates the accusative (θάνατον) and the substantive genitive (τοῦ διαθεμένου) like Sent. 463. 
If διαθεμένου was placed immediately after θάνατον, the above genitive construction would not work. 
 
48. Hughes, “Hebrews IX 15ff.,” 44. Cf. Lane, Hebrews 9-13, 232n. t; Hahn, “Covenant, Cult, and 
the Curse-Of-Death,” 73. 
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imply.”49 Furthermore, the author’s use of νεκρός is similar to that of a near 
contemporary who also discusses a testament. 
While teaching the proper and improper uses of the oath, Philo makes a brief 
reference to testamentary practice. In one of his negative examples, Philo crafts an 
outlandish character who swears while in a fit of rage: 
They say they will not welcome so and so at the same table nor under the same 
roof. Again they will not permit any help to such one nor will they receive any 
help from this one until death. But it is when even after death they carefully guard 
the irreconcilable nature, not even directing in their wills to allow the things 
customary for the dead bodies (οὐδὲ νεκροῖς τοῖς σώμασιν ἐπιτρέποντες ἐν 
διαθήκαις τὰ νομιζόμενα παρασχεῖν).50 
 
The idea is that the character refuses help from a sworn enemy, even making the 
preemptive effort to forbid the opponent from assisting the character’s corpse. Where 
scholars have said ἐπί νεκροῖς (Heb 9:17) cannot be a part of testamentary practice, Philo 
shows otherwise.
51
 This text also uses the plural of νεκρός to describe a single theoretical 
event.  Finally, Philo’s brief reference shows the directions (ἐπιτρέπω) of the will taking 
effect after the testator becomes a corpse. Philo’s Spec. Leg. 2.16, therefore, shows that 
the ἐπὶ νεκροῖς of Heb 9:17 fits within testamentary discourse. 
 Further supporting the testament view, the term βέβαιος (9:17) also finds use in 
testamentary discourse. Isaeus uses a cognate of βέβαιος to express the validity of a will 
contested in a court of law. Casting doubt on his opponents, in Cleon. 19 the speaker 
                                                 
49. James Moffatt,  A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews, The 
International Critical Commentary (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1924), 18; Paul Ellingworth, The Epistle to 
the Hebrews: A Commentary on the Greek Text, NIGTC (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1993), 127. 
 
50. Philo Spec. Leg. 2.16; referenced as an example that Philo knew the secular sense of διαθήκη 
in Johannes Behm, “διαθήκη,” 2:128. Cf. the translation in Philo, On the Special Laws, trans. F. H. Colson 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1937; repr., 1950), 315-6; cf. 316n. a. 
 
51. It is also common to refer to a single will with the plural διαθηκαῖ. See Josephus J. W. 1.688-
69. 
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claims they insist that Cleonymus, the deceased testator, would have wanted “to confirm 
(βεβαιοῦν) the will which he made in anger.”52 Josephus uses βεβαιωτής to describe the 
authority given to Caesar in order to insure Herod’s will was fulfilled after his death, 
κύριον γὰρ ἁπάντων ὧν διατάξειεν καὶ βεβαιωτὴν τῶν διαθηκῶν εἶναι Καίσαρα. . . .53 In 
Heb 9:17, the author’s claim that a διαθήκη is βεβαία (confirmed) after death parallels 
testamentary discourse.
54
 Of course, βέβαιος is not an exclusive testamentary term, but 
often signifies the confirmation of legal documents and agreements.  
 Concerning Heb 9:17b, P. Oxy. 22.2348.2.40 is the only source I could locate that 
uses ἰσχύω in the context of a διαθήκη.55 The testator writes, “If hearafter I make 
provisions in any manner whatsoever, I wish it to be valid (Εἴ τι ἐὰν μετὰ ταῦτα 
οἱῳδήποτε τρόπῳ ἀσφαλίσωμαι τοῦτο ἰσχύειν θέλω).”56 Here, the use of ἰσχύω warns the 
reader that penalties will be enforced if the will’s provisions are transgressed. Differing 
slightly, Hebrews 9:17b uses ἰσχύω to say an entire will takes effect after the testator’s 
death. Given that P. Oxy. 22.2348 was written in 224 CE and it is the only occurrence of 
ἰσχύω in a will, it is unlikely the author learned his use of ἰσχύω from Greek translations 
                                                 
52. When Cleon was not in his right mind, a common strategy for casting doubt on a will. Isaeus 
Cleon. 19 (Forster, LCL). This is the only time Isaeus uses a cognate of βέβαιος to describe a διαθήκη, but 
he also uses cognates of βέβαιος to describe the gifts given by a will (Cleon. 18; βεβαιῶσαι σφίσιν αὐτοῖς 
τὴν δωρεάν) as well as the property given by a will (Cleon. 22; ἢ τὴν οὐσίαν ἕξειν βεβαιοτέραν).  
 
53. Josephus J. W. 1.669. Cf. 2.35; Ant. 17.202. 
 
54. Cognates of βέβαιος are often found in Greek translations of Latin wills: P. Oxy. 6.907 (276 
CE); 8.1114 (237 CE); 9.1201 (258 CE); 22.2348 (224 CE); BGU 326 (Greek Translation of Latin Will). 
Cf. the use of βεβαία in P. Yadin. 1. 19.23, 25. For background see Yosef Rivlin, “Gift and Inheritance 
Law in the Judaean Desert Documents,” Pages 165-83 in Law in the Documents of the Judaean Desert, ed. 
Ranon Katzoff and David M. Schaps, Supplements to the Journal for the Study of Judaism (Leiden: Brill, 
2005). 
 
55. TLG Advanced Lemma “ισχυω” and “διαθηκη” 1 lines near first (All Forms); Advanced 
Lemma “ισχυω” and “διατιθημι” 1 lines near first (All Forms). 
 
56. Lobel and Roberts. The Oxyrhynchus Papyri: Edited with Translations and Notes, vol. 22, The 
Egypt Exploration Fund (Oxford, 1952), 141. 
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of a Latin will. Rather, both Heb 9:17b and P. Oxy. 22.2348 reflect the common legal 
sense of ἰσχύω, which often communicates the enforcement or strengthening of a law or 
document.
 57
 
Summary 
 Having resolved some of the exegetical issues inherent in Heb 9:16-17, it should 
be clear that the author of Hebrews refers to a testament when explaining the death of 
Jesus (9:15-17). Furthermore, the parallel sources reveal the caliber of language the 
author employs. In Heb 9:16b, φέρω is not a technical legal term, but an idiomatic way of 
saying death happened. The reference to dead bodies (νεκρός) occurs not in actual wills, 
but in a general reference to common testamentary practice (Philo Spec. Leg. 2.16). The 
author inserts technical legal language in Heb 9:17 (βεβαία, ἰσχύω), but this language is 
not exclusive to testamentary discourse. Interestingly, the above references to Philo, 
Isaeus, and Josephus discuss wills in reference to their effect after death. Although 
certain specific wills benefit the heir before the testator’s death, it was the general 
understanding that wills took effect after death. The author’s analogy (Heb 9:16-17) does 
not follow the technicalities of specific legal regulations and formulas of a will, but 
instead follows common expectation and general knowledge. Hebrews 9:16-17 reflects 
common testamentary discourse. As I will argue in the following section, the author also 
uses testamentary discourse outside Heb 9:16-17, thereby dismantling the pro-covenant’s 
lexical argument.  
 
 
                                                 
57. BDAG 484.4; MM 308; Thompson, Hebrews, 190; recall my comments on ἰσχύρος, a similar 
term, in my chapter 4.  
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Other Testamentary Terms outside Heb 9:16-17 
For Hughes, διαθήκη in Heb 9:16-17 cannot mean testament because the epistle 
clearly demonstrate the sense of covenant elsewhere. Although the term ἀθέτησις is 
found in testaments (e.g., P. Oxy. 493.9), the context of Heb 7:18 makes it unlikely the 
author refers to testamentary discourse there. Nonetheless, the epistle exhibits two 
passages that use terminology found in testamentary discourse, disproving Hughes’s 
lexical argument. 
Heb 10:9 
 Attridge has already observed the origin of ἵστημι and ἀναιρέω in Heb 10:9, 
which reflects the collision of two worlds.
58
 Beginning in Heb 10:1, the author claims 
that the sacrifices mandated by the Law were inadequate (10:4), but pointed to the 
coming good things. The author then interprets Psalm 40:7-9 christologically to claim 
that the first διαθήκη/Law has been replaced by the new διαθήκη/Law. The verb ἵστημι 
often associates with God’s covenant in the LXX (e.g., Gen 9:11, 19). In Hellenistic 
literature and papyri, the verb ἀναιρέω signifies the annulment of a will (διαθήκη; Isaeus 
Cleon. 14, 18, 21).
59
 In the LXX, the verb ἀναιρέω never describes διαθήκη, while the 
verb ἵστημι never describes διαθήκη in Hellenistic literature.60 Therefore, the author 
learned his use of ἵστημι (10:9) from the Septuagint, yet learned his use of ἀναιρέω from 
common Hellenistic legal language. Hebrews 10:9 demonstrates awareness of both the 
covenantal and Hellenistic sense of διαθήκη. 
                                                 
58. Attridge, Hebrews, 275n. 98 and 276n. 99; cf. Thompson, “The New Is Better,” 559n. 39, n. 
40; Koester, Hebrews, 434; Moffatt, Hebrews, 138; LSJ 106. 
 
59. See also P. Oxy. 3.493.8; 495.3; P. Strass 4.284.4. 
 
60. TLG Advanced Lemma “ιστημι” and “διαθηκη” 1 lines near first (All Forms); Advanced 
Lemma “αναιρεω” and “διαθηκη” 1 lines near first (All Forms). 
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Heb 8:13 
 After quoting Jer 31(38):31-34 at length, the Epistle to the Hebrews features 
another juridical term that comes from testamentary discourse, previously unnoticed by 
others. Understanding the term requires the introduction of another first century CE 
author with an entirely different worldview. This author believed in a world ordered by 
uncontrollable cosmic powers. If a person were to enjoy this life, the author believed, he 
or she would need to avoid poor timing – that is, the individual would need to observe 
carefully that the stars aligned in his or her favor. The world was unpredictable and any 
facet of everyday life could go awry. It was the job of Dorotheus of Sidon, the astrologer, 
to reduce the anxiety created by the powers that be. Following the pattern of the stars, 
Dorotheus provided instruction for ensuring good fortune in travel, illness, prison, and 
even marriage ceremonies. 
The last will and testament functioned to reduce the anxieties of death, but as 
Dorotheus demonstrates, not even the διαθήκη is exempt from misfortune. In his fifth 
book, Dorotheus offers instruction for avoiding mishap when finalizing a will.
61
 Several 
of these include predictions of when the testator will die, but some of the instructions 
reveal complications that can affect a will. In one scenario, the testator does not die, but 
will have to write a second will if the moon and the ascendant (ὡροσκόπος) are in the 
tropical zodiac (427.1). In another scenario, maleficent people will dispute the will if 
                                                 
61. Text taken from Dorotheus of Sidon, Dorothei Sidonii Carmen Astrologicum: 
Interpretationem Arabicam in Linguam Anglicam Versam Una Cum Dorothei Fragmentis et Graecis et 
Latinis, ed. David Pingree, Bibliotheca Scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana (Leipzig: de 
Gruyter, 1976), 426-7. 
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Mercury is not propitious (κακωθείς; 427.4). Finally, Dorotheus provides a remedy for 
the worst thing that could happen to a testator: 
 It is absolutely of necessity (ἀναγκαίως) that Mars be carefully observed in order 
 that it may not ascend, nor be with the moon, nor become quartile, nor be in 
 opposition, for thus not only will the testator die, but also the testament will
 disappear either by a different falsehood being accepted against the testament or 
 because it was stolen (οὕτω γὰρ οὐ μόνον ὁ διαθέμενος τελευτήσει, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ 
 διαθήκη ἀφανισθήσεται ἤτοι κλαπεῖσα ἢ ἑτέρας ψευδοῦς ἀντ’ αὐτῆς 
 ὑποληφθείσης).62 
 
There is no greater anxiety than for the testator to die and the will to become nullified by 
another party. 
 In a normal setting the term ἀφανίζω means to make something disappear, such as 
the whiteness of wool (Athanaeus Deip. 15.34.33 [Kaibel]). In juridical settings, the term 
means the destruction or abolition of a law.
63
 It is this judicial sense observed in 
Dorotheus. Here, Dorotheus provides two contexts for the ἀφανίζω of a will: an 
opponent’s lies are accepted in court, or, with more emphasis on this outcome, someone 
steals the will. Dorotheus offers steps to prevent the literal vanishing of a will or the 
nullification of a will in court. 
 Before citing the use of ἀφανίζω in other examples of testamentary discourse, the 
textual history of Dorotheus must be reviewed. The text cited above is not even a 
fragment, but a copy of Dorotheus found in the appendix of Apotelesmaticorum, the work 
of the 4
th
-century astrologer Hephaestio.
64
 The Greek manuscript evidence for Dorotheus 
                                                 
62. The text cited here is Dorotheus Carmen Astrologicum 5.42 taken from Pingree, Dorothei 
Sidonii, 427.3. 
 
63. Demosthenes Timocr. 38; Aristotle Άθηναίων πολιτεία 22.1; Isaeus Cir. 1; Josephus Ant. 
12.256; 18.222; 19.156; Cf. LSJ 286; MM 95. 
 
64. See Hephaestio of Thebanus, Hephaestionis Thebani Apotelesmaticorum Libri Tres, ed. David 
Pingree, vol. 1, Bibliotheca Scriptorum Graecorum Et Romanorum Teubneriana (Leipzig: de Gruyter, 
1973), 332; cf. XI. 
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is fragmentary; the most extant evidence is a ninth century Arabic manuscript.
65
 
Pingree’s English translation suggests the Arabic manuscript differs in structure, but 
maintains the general idea. Pingree translates the Arabic version of 5.42, “and the will 
will not be executed after his death, but someone after him will refute him in his will and 
write in the will or steal the will.”66 I must confess that I do not know Arabic. Both 
Pingree’s translation of the Arabic and my translation of the Greek center on the sealing 
of a will when Mars is with the Moon. I assume Pingree’s “the will will not be executed” 
is the English translation of the Arabic equivalent for ἀφανίζω. If, however, I am 
incorrect and ἀφανίζω in the Greek text is a late corruption, two other primary sources 
demonstrate that ἀφανίζω is a technical legal term used in testamentary discourse.  
 Demosthenes, the 4
th
-century orator who trained under Isaeus in order to rectify 
his own disputed inheritance, uses ἀφανίζω.67 Throughout the speech, Demosthenes uses 
ἀφανίζω to describe property directed to Demosthenes that his guardians made disappear 
by means such as selling the slaves promised to Demosthenes (1 Aphob. 26.8; 61.6; 2 
Aphob. 12.9).
68
 In addition to hiding property promised by individual clauses of the will, 
Demosthenes accuses his guardians of abolishing the will in entirety, οἵ καὶ τὴν διαθήκην 
ἠφανίκασιν ὡς λήσοντες (1 Aphob. 64.6; cf. 48.5; 2 Aphob. 10.3). As a final reference, 
Cassius Dio further proves ἀφανίζω as part of testamentary discourse, when he writes, 
“And thus Nero, having first destroyed the will of Claudius (τάς τε διαθήκας τοῦ 
                                                 
65. Pingree, Dorothei Sidonii, XIV. 
 
66. Ibid., 321.  
 
67. See Demosthenes, Orations XXVII-XL, trans. A. T. Murray, LCL, vol. 4 (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1936; repr., 1994), 3-4 
 
68. The verb ἀφανίζω also describes what happened to sofa-makers (1 Aphob. 24.2), ivory (33.10), 
and all the property (οὐσία; 44.2; 48.3; 3 Aphob. 43.8). 
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Κλαυδίου ἠφάνισε; RH. 61.1.2 [Cary, LCL]). . . .” Both authors demonstrate ἀφανίζω as 
a technical term signifying the destruction of a will.  
 When the author of Hebrews writes, ἐν τῷ λέγειν καινὴν πεπαλαίωκεν τὴν 
πρώτην· τὸ δὲ παλαιούμενον καὶ γηράσκον ἐγγὺς ἀφανισμοῦ, (Heb 8:13) he means, 
“when he says new, he has made the first old; what is becoming old and aging is near 
nullification.”69  When the author interprets Jer 31(38) to mean the old is near destruction 
(Heb 8:13b), he speaks from the time of Jeremiah’s utterance. In Heb 9:15, when Jesus 
has died, the old has reached ἀφανισμός. The author has learned this language from 
testamentary discourse, which he enlists to interpret the promise of a new covenant. It is 
no surprise that the author connects testamentary discourse with Jeremiah’s promise, for 
both have a lot in common. Jeremiah’s διαθήκη includes dispositions for the heirs, Israel 
and Judah, just like the Will of Eudaemon instructs his sons. The comparison to a will 
was inevitable. It was even common practice to rewrite a second will, as observed in 
Dorotheus.
70
 Given its use by an astrologer, ἀφανισμός was probably a known threat 
associated with a will. In summary, Heb 8:13b shows the author used technical 
testamentary discourse elsewhere in his epistle.  
Concerning the Origin of Μεσίτης and Ἔγγυος 
In regard to μεσίτης (Heb 8:6; 9:15; 12:24), Hughes claims that a mediator of a 
testament (μεσίτης διαθήκης) has never been discovered in extra-biblical sources and 
therefore μεσίτης is a covenant term.71 Wiid recognizes that Hughes never cites examples 
                                                 
69. Cf. Johnson, Hebrews, 209-10. 
 
70. Pingree, Dorothei Sidonii, 427.1; cf. Josephus J. W. 1.669 (πρότερος); P. Wash. Univ. 13, cited 
in Llewelyn, New Docs 6:41-47. 
 
71. Hughes, “Hebrews IX 15ff.,” 64. 
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of μεσίτης as a covenant term, and then argues μεσίτης occurs “in addition to, but in 
conjunction with διαθήκη [testament]. . . .”72 Wiid never cites examples of how μεσίτης is 
related to testaments, but the papyri clarify Wiid’s intent.73 As Albert Oepke observes, 
the papyri demonstrate that the μεσίτης is a neutral party who can guarantee agreements, 
witness legal transactions, or serve as “sequestrator.”74 In BGU 2.419.8 and 18, 
inheritance is temporarily given to a mediator to ensure the transfer of goods.
75
 The 
author of Hebrews never defines μεσίτης and exhibits no specialized knowledge of the 
term (8:6; 12:24). Rather, the author makes a simple reference to a common legal term. 
The term is appropriate for describing the office of High priest, who mediates between 
God and his people (Heb 8:6; 9:14c). The term is also appropriate for the agent of the 
new covenant, who ensures the inheritance will be delivered (Heb 9:15b), similar to BGU 
2.419. Thus, μεσίτης is not a testamentary term but a legal term designed to ensure the 
delivery of property and agreements by a third party, which the author learned from 
common knowledge and perhaps a Christian tradition (Gal 3:15; 1 Tim 2:5). 
 The term ἔγγυος (7:22) has been reserved until discussion of μεσίτης because it is 
a close synonym. Like μεσίτης, ἔγγυος is a common legal term often associated with the 
                                                 
72. Wiid, “The Testamental Significance of διαθήκη,” 151. The idea being that μεσίτης is 
“globally” associated with διαθήκη. Perhaps Hughes has Gal 3:19, 1 Tim 2:5, and a Greek fragment of 
Assumptio Mosis in mind, but he never clarifies. See A.-M. Denis, ed., Fragmenta pseudepigraphorum 
quae supersunt Graeca, Pseudepigrapha Veteris Testamenti Graece 3 (Leiden: Brill, 1970), 63-67; 
fragment a, line 9. 
 
73. Wiid does not cite primary references for his understanding of μεσίτης, even in his 
dissertation. See J. S. Wiid, “The Meaning of Diatheke in Hebrews Chapter 9 with Special Reference to the 
Oxyrhynchus and Other Egyptian Papyri” (Ph.D. diss., Rand Afrikaans University, 1991), 100-105; 200-
203. 
74. Albert Oepke, “μεσίτης, μεσιτεύω,” TDNT 4:598-624; cf. Spicq, “μεσίτης,” TLNT 2:465-468; 
MM 399; LSJ 1106. 
 
75. Cited in TDNT 4:600. For similar functions of μεσίτης, see P. Strass 4.284 (also cited in 
TDNT); Chr. Mitt. 88.27; 93.11; P. Fam. Tebt. 11 coli.5; P. Cair. Goodsp. 29.4, 3.5.1. 
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delivery of goods and agreements.
76
 The ἔγγυος is a third party who claims responsibility 
for the first party. In P. Oxy. 2.259 (23 CE), Theon offers surety for Sarapion, who was 
apprehended for failing to deliver a promised gold bracelet, allowing Sarapion to leave 
prison and fulfill his promise.
77
 The term suits Heb 7:22 because Jesus died for the 
forgiveness of sins committed under the first covenant and ensures the delivery of the 
inheritance (9:15; cf. Sir 29:15). Similar to μεσίτης, the author never defines ἔγγυος nor 
demonstrates a specialized knowledge. The use of ἔγγυος in Heb 7:22 is a simple 
reference that the author learned from common legal terminology that ensures the 
delivery of property and agreements under penalty.  
Summary 
Neither ἔγγυος (7:22) nor μεσίτης (8:6; 9:15; 12:24) is a testamentary term, but 
both are associated with common legal matters regarding property and agreements. They 
show that the author relies on common legal terms to communicate his theology. The 
term ἀφανισμός (8:13), however, is a legal term used in testamentary discourse. 
Likewise, the author uses a legal term found in testamentary discourse to claim the old 
διαθήκη has been abolished (ἀναιρέω) in Heb 10:9. This survey demonstrates that the 
author of Hebrews intentionally used testamentary discourse outside Heb 9:16-17, which 
problematizes the lexical argument used by proponents of the covenant view. 
Conclusion: A Death Providing Forgiveness and Access to Inheritance 
Having established that Heb 9:16-17 refers to common testamentary practice, I 
will briefly examine what it means. Hebrews 9:15-22 occurs near the end of the author’s 
                                                 
76. See BGU 1.197 (17 CE); 2.538 (100 CE); 3.916 (69-79 CE); P. Yadin. 1.21 (130 CE); P. Cair. 
zen. 1.59001 (273 BCE); Spicq, “ἔγγυος,” TLNT 1:390-95; Herbert Preisker, “ἔγγυος,” TDNT 2:329; MM 
179. 
77. Cf. Pollux Onom. 8.33. 
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main argument (the probatio; Heb 4:14-10:31), which explains the significance of Jesus’s 
high priesthood and why the congregation should continue in faith.
78
 Chapter 9 argues 
that the Day of Atonement is the prototype of what Jesus accomplished in the heavenly 
tabernacle when he ascended to the right hand of God (8:1). Hebrews 9:15-22 sits in the 
middle of this argument and further explains what Jesus’s death accomplished and how.  
Hebrews 9:15 proclaims that, because Jesus has entered the heavenly tabernacle 
and offered his own blood (9:11-14), he has become “the mediator of a new covenant.” 
This results (ὅπως) in that “those who have been called may receive the promise of the 
age of inheritance, because a death has happened for the redemption of the transgressions 
in the first covenant.” In Heb 9:16-22, the author explains how Jesus’s death effected the 
accomplishments listed in 9:15. Hahn recognizes that Jesus’s death provides the promised 
inheritance (9:15), but his exegesis of 9:16-17 narrowly focuses on the aspect of 
redemption provided by Jesus’s death.79  The author, however, has not yet explained how 
Jesus’s death allows for the reception of inheritance, nor the inauguration of the new 
covenant. Hebrews 9:16-22 explains how Jesus’s death resulted in all of the aspects 
mentioned in 9:15: inheritance, the inauguration of the new covenant, and redemption.  
In Heb 9:16-17 the author does not explain the benefit of redemption 
(ἀπολύτρωσις) but explains how Jesus inaugurated the new covenant and its inheritance. 
This is why κληρονομία is the last word of 9:15. The author accomplishes this through an 
                                                 
78. Following the outline of Thompson, Hebrews, 19. Thompson follows Wilhelm Nauck, “Zum 
Aufbau des Hebräerbriefes,” in Judentum, Urchristentum, Kirche: Festschrift für Joachim Jeremias, ed. 
Walther Eltester (Berlin: Alfred Töpelmann, 1960), 199-206; cf. Thompson, Hebrews, 17. 
 
79. The author of Hebrews, however, has been explaining that Jesus’s death created forgiveness in 
Heb 9:9-14. See Hahn, “A Broken Covenant and the Curse of Death,” 420-1, 431. Hughes unnecessarily 
prohibits any possibility that the author could mean to explain how Jesus’s death brought inheritance in 
Heb 9:16-17, calling it “nonsense.” See Hughes, “Hebrews IX 15ff.,” 63; cf. 33-34, 38. The author of 
Hebrews, however, has been explaining that Jesus’s death created forgiveness in Heb 9:9-14. 
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analogy to testamentary practice introduced by Ὅπου γὰρ (“for where”) The author does 
not claim the covenants (διαθήκη) of Jer 31(38):33 and Exod 24:8 were secretly wills 
(διαθήκη), but he makes a comparison to a well-known custom that allows him to 
communicate his theology – that Jesus’s death inaugurated the new and provided access 
to the promise of inheritance. 
In Heb 9:18, the author uses ὅθεν to introduce a new thought that draws its 
premise from the prior principle (9:16-17). It is the equivalent of saying “just as death 
causes a will (διαθήκη) to take effect, the first covenant (διαθήκη) was inaugurated on a 
similar premise (i.e., it too involved death).” The author does not call Exod 24:8 a will, 
but applies his analogy of 9:16 to the Sinai covenant, which was inaugurated by blood 
(9:18). Here, the author focuses on how Jesus’s death effected the aspect of redemption in 
9:15c. Hebrews 9:18-22, which highlights that forgiveness is only possible with blood 
(9:22), allows the author to return to his argument about the atoning death of Jesus the 
high priest.
80
  
Proponents of the covenant view object to the author’s interpretive move in 9:16 
on the unspoken ground that it is unsatisfactory, even shallow. Attridge’s observation that 
9:16 “is in fact quite playful,” communicates, unintentionally, a flippant dismissal of the 
author’s interpretive move, to which Hahn reacts.81 Understanding the validity of Heb 
9:16-17 requires empathy on the interpreter’s part.82 In Heb 9:15-22, the author interprets 
                                                 
80. Compton’s instinct to emphasize the forgiving effect of blood and that death inaugurates a new 
covenant in Heb 9:15-22 is correct (Compton, “Psalm 110,” 161-71). Yet, his inability to recognize 9:16-17 
as a testamentary analogy prevents him from grasping that 9:16-17 also explains how Jesus’s death brings 
with it inheritance. 
 
81. Attridge, Hebrews, 254; Hahn, “Covenant, Cult, and the Curse-of-Death,” 71n. 18. 
 
82. I think Moulton and Milligan’s words one hundred years ago are the most appropriate for this 
problem (MM 148-49). 
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a series of texts (Ps 110, Jer 31, Exod 24) through what is already a reality for the author: 
the Messiah had already died and inaugurated the new covenant. The author makes an 
inevitable comparison using the tradition he inherited made possible by the LXX’s use of 
διαθήκη. Furthermore, Heb 9:16-22 does not explain why Jesus had to die, but explains 
how Jesus’s death effected the results listed in Heb 9:15. The author accomplishes this 
through two analogies: common legal practice (9:16-17) and Scripture (9:18-22). 
In addition, the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews is not the first writer who 
values the LXX to make this interpretive move. The Apostle Paul also explains his 
covenant theology by making an analogy to testamentary practice in Gal 3:15. There is, 
however, one more author who explains his covenant theology with an analogy to 
testamentary practice. Johannes Behm observes that Philo uses human wills to amplify 
God’s covenants.83 The clearest example of this, known only from an Armenian 
manuscript, happens in QG 3.60. Philo quotes Gen 17:21 and writes, “Just as in human 
testaments some persons are inscribed as heirs . . . so also in the divine testament he is 
inscribed as heir who is . . . a disciple. . . .”84 Here Philo quotes Scripture and then 
interprets it with a comparison to secular διαθῆκαι. This pattern repeats in Mut. 51-52.85 
In Mut. 52, Philo quotes Gen 17:2 and writes, “διαθῆκαι are written to help those worthy 
of the gifts (διαθῆκαι δὲ ἐπ’ ὠφελείᾳ γράφονται τῶν δωρεᾶς ἀξίων; my trans.) . . .” God 
                                                 
83. Behm, TDNT 2:128; cf. Knut Backhaus, Der Neue Bund und das Werden der Kirche: Die 
Diatheke-Deutung des Hebräerbriefs im Rahmen der frühchristlichen Theologiegeschichte, 
Neutestamentliche Abhandlungen, n. s., 29 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1996), 288. 
 
84. Marcus, LCL; 262n. f assures that the Armenian for “human testaments” is the equivalent for 
the Greek διαθήκαις; cf. Philo, Questions and Answers on Genesis, trans. Ralph Marcus, vol. 2, LCL 
(Cambridge: Harvard, 1953), x-xiii. 
 
85. Attridge, Hebrews, 256n. 30 references Philo Mut. 51-2, but only in reference to Philo’s lost 
treatises on covenants; cf. Koester, Hebrews, 418, who also references Mut. 51-2, but does not observe the 
word play. Note Moffatt, Hebrews, 128 acknowledges that Philo was aware of the secular and religious 
meaning of covenant. 
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never writes his covenant down to Abraham. Rather, Philo makes a comparison to 
testaments, which are written (Isaeus Cleon. 24; Plato Leg. 923c) to bestow gifts (Isaeus 
Cleon. 18) and inheritance (κλῆρος; Mut. 51), in order that Philo may communicate a 
theological concept.
86
  
All three authors, who share a high competency in and regard for the Septuagint, 
explain God’s covenant through a comparison to human testaments (διαθήκη). Although 
modern translators struggle with the validity of Heb 9:16-17, the author and his 
contemporaries found it an acceptable argument. The author probably did not learn his 
interpretive move from Paul or Philo given that they use it differently. Rather, Heb 9:16-
17 is the inevitable result of the Bible’s Greek translation. The Greek language allows the 
author to show a beleaguered audience a superior inheritance promised by a διαθήκη of 
God, exempt from any misfortune, made accessible on account of the superior sacrifice 
that allows the church to draw near to God’s sanctuary until their high priest appears a 
second time (9:28).
                                                 
86. Cf. Mut. 58-59. Note, Behm also mentions Philo Somn 2.224 and Sacr. 57, but it is not as 
immediately clear Philo references a will. 
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CHAPTER VI 
THE RHETORIC OF LAW AND GOD’S PROMISES
Answering the Question and Understanding the Author 
 Just as Origen confessed in the third century about the Epistle to the Hebrews, 
only God knows the identity of the author.
1
 My thesis intended to discover more about 
the anonymous author and his theology by focusing on his use of technical legal terms. 
At the outset of research and writing, I had hoped to locate the author within a specific 
group. Overall, the complex of legal terms does not link the author neatly within one 
group such as an imagined Alexandrian Christian school of rhetoric. Nor do the terms 
reveal an individual experienced in the court system, who knows the intricacies of 
testamentary law akin to a first-century Isaeus. Nonetheless, the complex of legal terms 
contributes to understanding the author’s profile. In order to identify the author within a 
specific group, I asked where the author learned his knowledge of legal terms. Close 
examination of the collective legal terminology has revealed that the author learned from 
various sources. 
 Most of the legal terms in the epistle result from their normal association with a 
particular concept. For example, the author discusses the reliability of God’s word (Law) 
in Heb 2:2-4 with terms from the appropriate legal discourse. The majority of the terms in 
6:13-18 result from rhetorical terminology associated with oaths and a type of speech 
found in Rhetorica ad Alexandrum. In Heb 7:11-19, the legal terms come from discourse 
                                                 
1. Eusebius, Eccl. Hist. 6.25.11-14, cited in Craig R. Koester, Hebrews: A New Translation with 
Introduction and Commentary, The Anchor Bible Commentaries 36 (New York: Doubleday, 2001), 21. 
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concerning a change of law, as well as its assessment, reflecting the instinct of a 
rhetorician. Finally in Heb 8:13, 9:15-17, and 10:9, several of the key terms come from 
common testamentary discourse.  
 Not every term in a given locus, however, reflects the central concept of a 
passage. In Heb 2:4, συνεπιμαρτυρέω is not normally associated with the reliability of 
law, but has been learned from advanced argumentation and has been attached to a 
Christian tradition discussing the revelatory actions of God. Others result from common 
juridical terminology found in papyri. For example, ἀμετάθετος (6:17-18) does not 
usually describe an oath or the points of a speech, but is often found in legal agreements 
or contracts.
2
 Likewise, the term ἀθέτησις never accompanies discourse concerning a 
change of law. Instead, ἀθέτησις signifies the canceling of agreements. The terms ἔγγυος 
and μεσίτης, although paired with διαθήκη in the epistle, are not normally associated with 
wills, but come from the realm of property and common law. Additionally, terms also 
result from the LXX such as the use of παράβασις (2:2) or the use of ἵστημι (10:9) to 
designate the establishment of a covenant.  
 Although originating from several sources, answering where the author learned 
his terminology contributes to the profile of the author. Several key terms demonstrate a 
background in rhetoric. Indeed, the frequent use of legal terminology matches the profile 
of a rhetorician. Quintilian instructs, “It is more important for our purpose to note that 
arguments may be drawn from . . . points of law.”3 This is best observed in Heb 9:15-17 
when the author makes a similitudo to common legal practice, one understood by the 
                                                 
2. For the discussion, see my pg. 48n. 41. 
 
3. Quintilian Inst. 5.11.32 [Butler, LCL]. 
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general public.
4
 Hebrews 7:7 further demonstrates the strategy of a rhetorician, when the 
author uses χωρὶς πάσης ἀντιλογίας. The author uses a phrase from common legal 
practice, unrelated to the context of Heb 7:1-10, in order to amplify his argument.
5
  This 
rhetorical strategy fits the aim of the author who is trying to comfort and embolden his 
audience with the certainty of Christ.  
In reality, few of the technical terms require a specialized legal knowledge, and 
they do not reflect the proper formulas found in juridical papyri. The author uses 
concepts that the audience would easily understand. Hebrews 7:11-19 mildly reflects a 
rhetorician’s training to assess laws, but the terminology involved is common sense and 
would be understood by the audience. It is unclear, however, if the audience would 
understand εἰς βεβαίωσιν as a technical term designating a part of speech that confirms 
the narrative, but the audience would still understand the certainty offered by an oath 
from God (6:16). Regardless if the audience recognized the technical nature of 
βεβαίωσις, Hebrews 6:13-18 offers the clearest example that the author possessed a 
rhetorical education. The use of the legal terminology in the Epistle to the Hebrews 
demonstrates the strategy, craftsmanship, and polish of a trained rhetorician, who 
understood that parts of a speech according to the theories of Anaximenes. 
 Nonetheless, rhetoric is not the only influence of the author. Hebrews 2:2-4 
exemplifies that the author shared a tradition with people who value the Law of Moses. 
The author speaks of the reliability of the Law just as Josephus and Philo did. 
                                                 
4. See Lausberg §843; James W. Thompson, “The New Is Better: A Neglected Aspect of the 
Hermeneutics of Hebrews,” CBQ 73.3 (2011):547-561 (here 560); Knut Backhaus, Der Neue Bund und das 
Werden der Kirche: Die Diatheke-Deutung des Hebräerbriefs im Rahmen der frühchristlichen 
Theologiegeschichte, Neutestamentliche Abhandlungen, n. s., 29 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1996), 195. 
 
5. See my pg. 55n. 59.  
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Furthermore, the author is influenced by and imitates the language and concepts of the 
Bible itself, demonstrated by the use of παράβασις and παρακοή (cf. 1 Kgdms 15:24; 4 
Kgdms 18:12). The author’s theology, which seems to depart from the prescripts of 
Scripture, actually depends on a close reading of the Septuagint. Last, as can be observed 
in how the author reads Scripture, the author has been influenced by the Christ event and 
early Christian traditions. The author’s comment that God testifies by signs and wonders 
(2:4) reflects a common NT and LXX concept. Overall, the use of legal terms 
demonstrates a complex profile of the anonymous author of the Epistle to the Hebrews 
who is rooted in the Septuagint, early Christianity, and classical rhetoric.  
A Theology of Legal Terms 
This complex author uses a series of legal terms in an epistle written to exhort a 
struggling community. Although originating from various sources, observing the 
terminology as a whole reveals a consistent purpose. The complex of legal terms 
functions to communicate the author’s eschatology and the reliability of God’s promises.6 
Before discussing the theology of the terms, it is necessary to recognize first their 
sociological value. In their ordinary use, the terms are legal mechanisms that function to 
reduce the social anxiety of everyday life. This may be observed in concepts such as 
testaments, which ensure family members are protected even after the death of a testator, 
as well as oaths which rely on the gods to enforce promises. The term ἀμετάθετος also 
functions to legitimate an agreement or stipulation. Additionally positions such as the 
μεσίτης and ἔγγυος recruit a third party to help in legal matters and transmit property. At 
some level, even laws function to reduce anxiety and are changed if they do not help a 
                                                 
6. A classic source for understanding the eschatology and promises of the epistle is Ernst 
Käsemann, The Wandering People of God: An Investigation of the Letter to the Hebrews, trans. Roy A. 
Harrisville and Irving L. Sandberg (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1984), 26-37. 
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society. It is with this sociological function in mind that the author uses the legal terms 
throughout his epistle. 
Sharing common ground with Philo and Josephus, the author uses terminology 
associated with the reliability of a law to communicate the reliability of God’s Law (ὁ 
λόγος) and the word spoken to the early church in Heb 2:2-4. The author communicates 
the reliability of God’s words because a tremendous salvation is at stake (σωτηρία; 2:3). 
The author exhorts his audience to hold on to what they have heard for God’s word is 
more reliable than the oldest laws from any other country. God’s word will bring the 
salvation about to be inherited (1:14) or just recompense to the unfaithful in the end (2:2). 
 The discussion of God’s oath in chapter 6 comes after a sharp exhortation to the 
audience. The author (we) wants the audience to remain hopeful until the end (6:11) and 
asks them to be “imitators of the ones inheriting the promises through faith and 
endurance” (6:12). The author recounts the great endurance of Abraham (6:15), but the 
emphasis of Heb 6:13-20, however, is God’s faithfulness to his oaths. The oath is the 
surest confirmation of any speech, in which God desired to show the heirs of the promise, 
the audience who is the seed of Abraham (2:16), the unchangeable nature of God’s plan 
(6:17). The author encourages the audience that they may take refuge in the previously 
laid out hope, which includes a promise to inherit a city (6:18; Gen 22:17). 
 The same characteristics of God’s oath to Abraham are applied to God’s oath in 
Ps 110:4, “The Lord swears and will not change His mind; you are a priest into the age 
according to the order of Melchizedek.” In Heb 7:11-19, the author reveals the 
implications of the new priesthood: God’s Law changed on account of His oath. Using 
legal parlance for a change of law, the author claims the laws pertaining to priesthood 
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were not good enough. This newer law (Ps 110:4) is irrepealable (7:16) and installs a new 
high priest forever (7:17), who is “able to save everyone drawing near to God through 
him” (7:25). As the author has been revealing, the promised salvation and inheritance has 
not yet fully arrived, but Christ’s priesthood is the vehicle through which the audience 
may persevere to the end. The author has this same function in mind when he uses 
μεσίτης and ἔγγυος. The Son is a third party that guarantees the new covenant and that 
the heirs of the new covenant stay in relationship with God. 
 In Heb 9:16-17, the author compares the new covenant to a will in order to say the 
promises spoken through Jeremiah have taken effect on account of Jesus’s death. The old 
covenant has reached nullification (8:13; 10:9), which means the new is established 
(9:15; 10:9). This new covenant allows “those who have been called [to] receive the 
promise of the age of inheritance” (9:15). Unlike Demosthenes or Dorotheus, the heirs of 
the new covenant will not fear its nullification (ἀφανισμός) because a superior high priest 
mediates and ensures the new covenant, which has been confirmed to be in effect by a 
death.  
 The legal terms are not the only means through which the author communicates 
his eschatology, but they are a recurring rhetorical device that communicates the end is 
guaranteed. Furthermore, these terms, used in everyday life to reduce social anxiety, 
function to boost the faith and confidence of the audience. The audience is a second-
generation church that questions their commitment to Jesus.
7
 The word of God, spoken 
through a Son (1:2), promises that the world – filled with the anxiety of death, conflict, 
xenophobia, imprisonment, public shame, insecurity, and hopelessness – will be 
subjected under the feet of the Messiah who sits at the right hand of God (Ps 110:1; 8:7). 
                                                 
7. James W. Thompson, Hebrews, Paideia (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2008), 6-10; 20. 
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But the church does not see the world subjected to Christ (2:8). In response, the author 
writes a lengthy epistle so that the audience may realize the great inheritance to which 
they have access. The Son promises an unshakable kingdom, a city called home, and 
heavenly rest. The author acknowledges the promises are incomplete and the journey is 
long, but the church has the most treasured possession of all, the audacity to draw near 
the throne room to the one through whom the everything exists in order to be cleansed by 
the blood of the everlasting priest who intercedes for those he is not ashamed to call 
family.  
One of the means through which the author communicates this invisible reality is 
the technical legal terms. They allow the author to pull from matters of everyday life to 
demonstrate the reliability of the God who has spoken through Jesus. The legal terms 
reveal an eschatology having legal certitude, with which he encourages a struggling 
community yearning to envision the spoken word of God. 
Summary Remarks 
In conclusion, I offer creative agreement with Harold W. Attridge, who claims the 
collective legal terms are metaphors found in “the standard rhetorical repertoire [and] 
ornament the discourse.”8 I further confirm that the use of legal terms matches the profile 
of an early Christian with a rhetorical education, influenced by the language of the LXX. 
I also identify that the author has learned the parts of a speech from a tradition following 
Rhetorica ad Alexandrum. I contribute words to the list of technical legal terms in the 
epistle, such as ἀκατάλυτος (7:16), ἀσθενής and ἀνωφελής (7:18), and ἀφανισμός (8:13). 
                                                 
8. Harold W. Attridge, The Epistle to the Hebrews: A Commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews, 
Hermeneia (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1989), 21. See my pg. 5. 
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Lastly, I use the origin of the terms to clarify elements of exegesis in Heb 6:13-18, 7:11-
19, 8:13, and 9:15-22. 
 My thesis further contributes to understanding the Epistle to the Hebrews and 
early Christianity. The results of this study may allow for a closer examination of the 
author’s theology of Law, how the author interacts with Ps 110, and points of similarity 
and departure from the Apostle Paul, as well as determining if the author kept Torah 
before Christ. My thesis provides another window into the Epistle to the Hebrews and the 
author’s attempt to encourage a struggling community.
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